Waltz

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

491 - TPThornton Coll

Volume XIII, Number 4 July 1961

Price $6.00 per year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

FREDERICK S. DUNN, *Chairman*

MORROE BERGER
CYRIL E. BLACK
ROBERT A. DAHL
HARRY ECKSTEIN
WILLIAM T. R. FOX
EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR.
WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER
KLAUS KNORR
GARDNER PATTERSON
EDWARD SHILS
MARSHALL D. SHULMAN

Editors: HARRY ECKSTEIN, KLAUS KNORR
Assistant Editor: JEAN MACLACHLAN

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems of international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J. Rates: $6.00 per year; $10.00 for two years; foreign postage, 25 cents additional per year. Single copies, $2.00.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by the *International Index to Periodicals*, and abstracts of its articles appear in *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone, and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers.

Copyright, 1961, by Princeton University Press

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. July 1961. Vol. XIII, No. 4. Entered as Second Class matter in the Post Office at Princeton, New Jersey, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Can assgn.

WORLD POLITICS

VOL. XIII • JULY 1961 • No. 4

CONTENTS

Peking, Moscow, and the Underdeveloped Areas — *Thomas Perry Thornton* — 491

On Stability in Deterrent Races — *Malcolm W. Hoag* — 505

Invulnerable Retaliatory Capability and Arms Control — *Seyom Brown* — 528

Crossing the Culture Bars: An Approach to the Training of American Technicians for Overseas Assignments — *John D. Montgomery* — 544

Development: The Visible or the Invisible Hand? — *Yusif A. Sayigh* — 561

Some Aspects of the Economic Development of India: The Problem of Accelerated Reaction — *Karl von Vorys* — 584

REVIEW ARTICLES

Professor Mills on the Calling of Sociology — *Edward Shils* — 600

The Politics of Economic Growth — *C. E. Black* — 622

Germany Looks in the Mirror of History — *Henry Pachter* — 633

Strategy and International Politics — *Morton A. Kaplan* — 642

The Contributors — ii

INDEX TO VOLUME XIII — 657

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

THOMAS PERRY THORNTON is on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department. During 1961-1962, on leave from the government, he will come to the Center of International Studies at Princeton University as Visiting Research Associate.

MALCOLM W. HOAG, a research economist in Santa Monica, Calif., was Professor of Foreign Affairs at the National War College in 1959-1960.

SEYOM BROWN, Instructor in the Government Programs in Administration and Harper Fellow in Political Science at the University of Chicago during the past year, has been awarded a grant for 1961-1962 from the Social Science Research Council to study the feasibility of a supranational nuclear deterrent force.

JOHN D. MONTGOMERY is Director of the Center for Development Research and Training, African Studies Program, at Boston University. His publications include *Forced to Be Free* (1957), *Cases in Vietnamese Administration* (1959), and a forthcoming study, *The Politics of Foreign Aid.*

YUSIF A. SAYIGH, Associate Professor of Economics at the American University in Beirut, has just completed a year as Visiting Associate Professor at Princeton University. He is the author of *The Economic Impact of the Arab Refugee Problem on Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan* (1954) and *Entrepreneurs of Lebanon: The Business Leader in a Developing Economy,* now in press.

KARL VON VORYS, Assistant Professor of Political Science at San Fernando Valley State College, Northridge, Calif., will be a Fulbright Lecturer at the University of Dacca in Pakistan in 1961-1962. He is preparing a book entitled *The Political Framework of Economic Development.*

EDWARD SHILS is Professor of Sociology and Social Thought in the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago and Fellow of King's College, Cambridge.

C. E. BLACK, Professor of History and Faculty Associate of the Center of International Studies at Princeton University, has been on leave this year as a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He is the editor and co-author of *The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change Since 1861* (1960) and of other books and articles on Russia and Eastern Europe.

HENRY PACHTER teaches history at the New School for Social Research in New York City and is Acting Dean of its School of Politics. He is working on a study of East-West relations with the tentative title, *Terms of Co-existence.*

MORTON A. KAPLAN is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago, as well as Research Associate of the Center of International Studies at Princeton. His most recent book, *The Political Foundations of International Law,* of which he and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach are co-authors, was published in June 1961.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PEKING, MOSCOW, AND THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

By THOMAS PERRY THORNTON

THE year 1960 saw the first major open break in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Beginning with the *Hongqi* (*Red Flag*) articles of April 1 and 15, and receiving a quietus only after the November conference of 81 Communist parties in Moscow, the divergent views of the two Communist partners were laid bare to public view. Western observers have been virtually overwhelmed by this windfall of fascinating material, and speculation as to its meaning has been rampant.

It had taken no great degree of perspicacity to see that at some stage or other Communist China and the Soviet Union would find themselves in a situation which would sorely strain their alliance, but when this did occur, many were astonished at the timing and violence of the dispute and initially misinterpreted its substance.[1] Much of the popular attention given these mutual recriminations missed the point which China was pressing. Westerners, conditioned by preoccupation with nuclear war, interpreted the Sino-Soviet dispute in that context, and the Chinese are in fact probably more willing than their Russian allies to run the risks of general war. But Peking's position has never been the advocacy of general war. From its point of view, both geographic and ideological, limited war is a much more compelling prospect.

The first of the *Hongqi* articles introduced this theme, albeit obliquely: "(U.S. imperialists) have adopted the strategy of 'limited wars' short of world war. The U.S. policy of 'local wars' is a kind of conclusion drawn from historical experience in its policy of aggressive wars."[2] The substance of the Chinese position is contained in the following extracts: "Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the real, immediate contradictions in the postwar world are the contradictions between the imperialist states and the colonies and semi-colonies, and the contradictions among the imperialist nations. The real, immediate contradictions of this period are not the contradictions between the Soviet Union and the United States."[3] *However*, "The modern revisionists [i.e., the Russians] are

[1] Donald Zagoria's article, "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," in the May-June 1960 issue of *Problems of Communism* gives a good summary of the background of the dispute.

[2] Yu Chao-li, "Imperialism—Source of War in Modern Times—and the Path of the People's Struggle for Peace," *Hongqi* (Peking), April 1, 1960: also in *Peking Review*, No. 15 (April 12, 1960), pp. 18ff.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

panic-stricken by a policy of nuclear war blackmail. They develop from fear of war to fear of revolution,"[4] *and* "according to the modern revisionists, . . . whoever persists in fighting against imperialism and in revolution would be hindering peace and peaceful co-existence and a 'rigid dogmatist.' "[5] *On the contrary*, "It will only be by means of revolutionary overthrow of the ruling bourgeoisie that peace can be attained."[6] "The Marxist-Leninists [i.e., the Chinese] regard this as an unprecedentedly favorable new epoch for proletarian revolution in the countries of the world and for the national revolution in the colonies and semi-colonies."[7] It is in this context that the Chinese side of the controversy is to be read.

Although some have interpreted this position as a reversal of Chinese Communist theory, it is in fact the culmination of a logical historical and ideological development. Well before the dispute broke into the open, it was evident that the Chinese view of world revolution, especially in the underdeveloped areas, was far different from that held by the post-Stalin leadership in the USSR. It is worthwhile to review briefly the conditions which led to the open schism—the revolutionary experiences and international positions of the two Communist powers. A summation of the various types of revolutions by which Communists have sought to achieve power is a good place to begin, and for our purposes we may conveniently divide these into four categories.

The first type exists only in theory. It is the classical Marxian program which postulates the uprising of an infuriated proletariat to expropriate the expropriators. Indeed, isolated "proletarian" uprisings have at times met with momentary success, but it does not lie in the nature of an infuriated mob to take the rational steps necessary for the successful consolidation of power. The transformation of this amorphous concept into a functioning mechanism was the great accomplishment of Lenin; his instrument was of course a tightly organized Communist Party.

This provided the framework for the second type of revolution, in which there is not necessarily any real rising of the masses. The Party acts as their self-appointed representative. A certain amount of physical violence may be entailed, but this is not essential and even in the

[4] Lu Ting-yi, "Unite Under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner," speech of April 22, 1960, reprinted in *Long Live Leninism*, Peking, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, p. 105.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 101-2.

[6] Hu Hsi-huei, "Lenin's Theory on Peace and War," *Renmin Ribao* (Peking), April 25, 1960; also in *Joint Publications Research Service* (New York), No. 3369 (June 6, 1960), p. 4.

[7] Lu Ting-yi, *op.cit.*, p. 98.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bolshevik Revolution was not the main element. The primary prerequisite is for the Party to gain at least limited governmental toleration and to achieve respectability in the eyes of the people. This done, the road to power may be a palace revolution, an election, or a creeping increase in control of important branches of the government until the subversion is complete and power is achieved.

Type 3 is really no revolution at all. It entails the establishment of a Communist regime by means of external armed force, as in most of the power seizures in Eastern Europe, and in Mongolia and North Korea. Implicit or explicit support by external Communist armed forces is probably essential to the success and maintenance of any Communist revolution, but the role played and the degree of assistance given by these forces are crucial questions. The dividing line between types 2 and 3 is very thin; the classification of the Czech coup is a case in point. (The West, as well as the Soviets, saw it as a revolution of the second type, tending to ignore the determining role played by Soviet armed power. As a result, Soviet policies and Western countermeasures continue even today to be unduly influenced by what was at most a unique case among Communist revolutions, but more likely just a variant of the third type of power seizure.)

There remains the fourth type of revolution, which established Communist power in China, North Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. Although all of these revolutions received outside help, in each case the impetus for revolution came from within. There was a sizable, aggressive Communist minority, and although the bulk of the population was non-Communist, it was either passive or accepted Communist slogans to the extent that it was unwilling to oppose the Communist rise. Typified in the Chinese experience, this revolution asserts its broadly nationalistic character, establishes itself on a base of peasant, worker, and bourgeois support (the "four-class alliance") and wrests power from established authority in a more or less prolonged guerrilla war. An important requirement for success has proved to be the existence of a contiguous, sympathetic nation from which logistic support may be drawn, and where temporary refuge may be sought.

Since the third type is no true revolution, it may be said that the Communists have managed only four successful ones in the USSR, China, Yugoslavia, and Vietnam. All other Communist regimes have been established by the bayonets of the Red Army, and a few other temporary successes fell on barren ground and withered. Even the four successful revolutions show striking differences. Certainly the Communist victories in Vietnam and Yugoslavia were possible only because of the existence of outside Communist support, and to a lesser

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extent this is true of China. In none of these, however, was the government called in from a safe haven abroad; local leaders, their prestige enhanced by victory, were on the scene and in control of a functioning organization. (Lenin and Trotsky were of course temporary exiles, but the point at issue is less their absence from their homeland than their not being in a foreign country which would subsequently control them.)

The outlook of any government is necessarily influenced by the manner in which it achieved power. The revolutions of the United States, France, and Great Britain have had lasting influences, recognizable even today, on the policies and institutions of these governments, and the same is true of Communist states. The independent role played by Yugoslavia has been possible only because of the strength and prestige which the Tito organization gained in its fight against the German occupation. This strength is not merely organizational, but is drawn from the passive support and respect which the regime enjoys among Yugoslav citizens. Similar independence of action for, say, East Germany, where the government was clearly imposed from abroad and has never won national support, is unthinkable.

Our main attention is to be devoted to the two great powers, the Soviet Union and China, which typify the most important revolutionary categories. Soviet mythology asserts that the October Revolution was a true Marxist uprising of the proletariat, led by the Communist Party, which then found support all through the country. The proletariat did, of course, man a few barricades and was otherwise frequently in evidence during the revolution, but the real cause of Bolshevik success was the demoralization of the Czarist government and the subsequent administrative paralysis of the Kerensky regime. The revolution was in reality a *coup d'état* which enjoyed a certain amount of support from a confused populace. The triumph of the Chinese Communists was of an entirely different order. There had indeed been common fronts with the Kuomintang; the Party did accede to power in the confused aftermath of World War II with a considerable material assist from the USSR; and the victory was achieved over a demoralized and ineffective opponent. These were tactical advantages for the Communists, while their strategic superiority lay in their self-created organization and extensive rapport with the Chinese peasantry. Massive Soviet assistance came too late to have a determining influence on the course of China's revolutionary development. The Russians, and particularly Stalin, were bound by their dogmatism and prescribed a standard revolution for China, based on the proletariat of Canton and Shanghai.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Had the Russian plan been followed, and the leadership of the Chinese Party remained in the hands of the Moscow-oriented faction rather than in Mao's, communism in China would today probably be farther from power than it is in India or Indonesia. The Chinese Communists' tradition of independence, born of pride in their achievements, still persists today and their success entitles them to a strong voice in Bloc councils—stronger even than their size would warrant.[8]

In addition to the image which the Soviets and Chinese have of themselves, it is essential to consider the image which other nations have of them. Except for the most sophisticated elements in the non-Communist world, ideological considerations are immaterial. It is the present situation of the two countries which is of supreme concern, for much of the world is now looking for new social and economic forms in which to mold its destiny, while both Peking and Moscow eagerly offer themselves as examples. Forty years have passed since the Russian Revolution, and although both Russia and China give the impression of great world powers pursuing their goals of national development, the Soviet Union is much farther along that road and, particularly in the last five years, has assumed the aspect of a wealthy "have" nation—one of the two super-powers. The USSR has failed utterly to project an image of itself as an Asiatic nation, and most of the underdeveloped world views it as belonging within the traditional European framework. China, on the other hand, is a non-Caucasian, "have-not" nation, vigorously pursuing its own course of national development. While many underdeveloped countries may look up to and fear the Soviet Union, they can feel only a slight sense of identification with it. The underdeveloped lands—many of which are non-white—do feel a certain automatic identification with China, and see that China is engaged in much the same tasks as they are: emergence from a semi-colonial past, and the forging of a viable national economic and political system. The USSR, like the other advanced nations, is in a position to give aid; the Chinese are in a position to give a timely example.

The two leaders of the Communist Bloc undoubtedly recognize that in underdeveloped non-white areas the Chinese have significant initial advantages. Conversely, Europeans—economically further advanced and with a feeling of superiority toward the Asians—are more inclined to look to the USSR as a mentor. Besides those factors which indicate a division of effort between Moscow and Peking, there are additional

[8] Explicit recognition of this fact is to be found in the Moscow Declaration (see below). The CPSU undoubtedly remains the "most equal" in this arrangement, but the Chinese Party implicitly enjoys an "equality" second only to that of the CPSU and much greater than any non-Russian party has had since the earliest days of the Comintern.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elements militating toward a division of authority in the guidance of local Communist parties in their quests for power. An orthodox revolution or a Soviet-type *coup d'état* is best adapted to advanced countries. A nation with a highly developed communications network makes a poor target for the Chinese type of revolution. Such a nation has a relatively sophisticated population, more susceptible to propaganda stressing class struggle and theoretical communism than to the nationalistic, vaguely socialistic, propaganda of the Chinese type. It also will frequently have civil rights provisions which protect the operations of a Communist minority. Conversely, the underdeveloped lands—substantially without an urban proletariat and often having an electoral and constitutional system which is "adjustable" by the dominant political group—are better targets for agitation of the Chinese type.

As early as 1949, Liu Shao-ch'i asserted that the Chinese mode of revolution was "the path to be taken by the peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people's democracy."[9] This doctrine has frequently been restated, and Chinese propaganda defines these areas as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, leaving only Europe and North America to follow the Soviet model. The general principle of a division has perhaps been accepted by both parties, but there are signs of misgivings on specific points and on the extent of the area ceded to the Chinese sphere.[10] A division of labor between Moscow and Peking on the basis of geography, timing, or both, would certainly be reasonable and, if well coordinated, of great benefit to the Bloc as a whole.

A historical summary of Communist approaches to the question of revolution is not necessary here, and for our purpose we need only review briefly the period following the close of World War II, during which the Chinese role became significant. After the years of the anti-Fascist front and a short postwar period when Moscow was organizing its forces, a resumption of hard-line tactics was symbolized by the formation of the Cominform. Eastern Europe was rapidly absorbed, and pressure was brought to bear on Greece, Turkey, and Iran. In Asia, the situation was initially similar. The "left" strategy of violence based upon proletarian uprisings was initiated in some areas, notably India, with disastrous results for the local parties. Shortly thereafter the Soviets concurred in a change to the Chinese approach of a four-class alliance,

[9] Speech at the Conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Oceania, reprinted in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*, December 30, 1949, p. 2.

[10] For instance, at the Chinese Tenth Anniversary celebrations in October 1959, Moscow-oriented speakers invariably deleted the words "Latin America" from the Chinese formula, "Asia, Africa, and Latin America."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with revolutionary activity based on the peasantry. It is generally conceded that the 1948 Calcutta Asian Youth Conference marked the official transfer of policy to the Chinese line.[11] Although Peking did not automatically assume control of the local parties, it did acquire considerable prestige, enhanced still further by the obvious capability of the Chinese to manage their own revolution. The acceptance of the Peking line was general and for a time had a considerable degree of success, culminating in the victory of the Viet Minh rebels. Ultimately, local governments were able to contain the rebels, albeit at a considerable cost, and by 1955 the situation in most areas had reached an impasse.

The end of the "Peking period" of insurrection was brought about by events transpiring outside of Asia. The death of Stalin and subsequent rise of Khrushchev called forth a new Soviet tactic (or, more properly, the resurrection of an old one), a "right" approach with a heavy infusion of Khrushchevian personal diplomacy. The Soviets recognized that their "hard" line had become unproductive in Europe, and although the Chinese-type revolutions were still of significance in Asia, these too were sacrificed to a new era in which there was little room for terrorists sponsored by the second-ranking Communist power. The Chinese were perhaps less enthusiastic about the new turn of events, but Chou En-lai was dispatched to Bandoeng to show a smiling visage to his fellow Asians, and the Chinese scored considerable successes in the never-never land of co-existence. Still, Asian resistance groups were never fully disbanded, and Mao was gradually being developed as the true oracle of revolution in succession to Stalin.

The Chinese had accepted the Soviet lead in 1955, but by mid-1958 they had second thoughts. China had made considerable economic progress and the country was swept by a wave of confidence manifested in the "leap forward" and the commune movement. Simultaneously, it had grounds for dissatisfaction with Soviet leadership, for the Soviets had only one qualified success in luring or coercing a government into communism, and around 1958 a number of countries on which attention had been lavished—Egypt, Syria, India, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia—were adopting more or less strong anti-Communist postures.

[11] Ruth McVey's valuable study, *The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asia Uprisings* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958), points out, however, a number of factors which cast serious doubt on a direct connection between the conference and the uprisings. It seems probable that secret discussions among various Communist delegates had some effect on the course of events during succeeding months in Southeast Asia, but not as directly as has previously been believed. For a general coverage, see Shen-yu Dai, *Peking, Moscow, and the Communist Parties of Colonial Asia,* Cambridge, Mass., 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The sole success had been in Kerala, where a Communist state government was elected, only to be ultimately deposed by the "neutralist" Indian government of Pandit Nehru. For the Russians, this was probably an acceptable setback; for the Chinese it seems to have been the crowning proof that a bourgeois government will not let itself be taken over by means short of violence.[12] The Chinese also saw Soviet advances in missilery as a sign that the Western "paper tiger" was being overtaken rapidly. In such a situation, Peking apparently felt justified in pressing for an intensification of the revolutionary process.

A radical shift in Chinese foreign policy became visible during the summer of 1958, signaled by Chou En-lai's relinquishment of the foreign ministry.[13] In quick succession, the Chinese took actions which alienated the good will of Japan, India, Nepal, Laos, and Indonesia, and by their shelling of Quemoy and the subjugation of Tibet abandoned the substance and much of the form of peaceful co-existence and *panch shila.* The Soviets had continued to pursue essentially the same "right" strategy which they launched after the death of Stalin, so that even before the open break of 1960 it was obvious that the two partners were following separate courses and that each was unhappy with his ally's policy. In such instances as the Sino-Indian border dispute, it was abundantly clear that co-ordination was non-existent. Barring the unlikely possibility that the divergent policies are but two aspects of a "carrot-and-stick" campaign, we are entitled to the assumption that Peking and Moscow find themselves in disagreement and that this disagreement will be reflected in various phases of their external relationships.

The differences mentioned thus far have involved matters which can best be described as foreign policy, and it is only natural that China and the Soviet Union will have different national requirements in this field. Russia can hardly be as concerned over events along the southern Chinese border as are the Chinese themselves, just as the United States found it expedient to take a different view of the Suez crisis in 1956 than that of its major allies. However well co-ordinated an alliance

[12] Cf. "Long Live Leninism," *Hongqi*, April 16, 1960, reprinted in the booklet of the same name, *op.cit.*, esp. p. 46. The strictures on "bourgeois parliamentary systems" delivered there are directly applicable to a situation of the Kerala type.

[13] This does not imply that Chou is in disagreement with the new policy. It seems likely, however, that the Peking government thought it wise to disassociate him from the harder line, much as the Russians shifted foreign ministers to symbolize foreign policy changes before the Second World War. Should Chou at some future time reassume the post of foreign minister, it would quite possibly be an indication that a softer line was being introduced, for although Chou has participated publicly in foreign policy matters in the last two years, he has generally been associated with a relatively conciliatory posture.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

may be, such divergencies will inevitably arise, and only those who have a completely unrealistic view of the structure of the Communist Bloc would expect to find a complete identity of interests. As noted above, however, the Chinese failure to accept the Soviet position on relations with the underdeveloped areas is based on ideological as well as nationalistic grounds. Given the Chinese view of the unreliability of "neutralist" governments and their ability to follow a line independent of Moscow's guidance, this divergence is bound to find expression in the approaches of the two Communist powers to the sub-diplomatic instrumentality by which both operate in third countries—local Communist parties.[14] It is to be expected that the Chinese would emphasize their own revolutionary strategy, while the Russians would encourage local parties to work within the constitutional framework of their country in accordance with the currently prevalent "right" strategy. Thus, while in the past a uniformity of strategies has been agreed upon by the various Bloc members (or, more probably, was enforced by Soviet fiat), we would now find that two divergent lines are competing for ascendancy in third countries. There is significant evidence which supports this deduction.

A. Y. Kaznacheyev, a defector from the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon, refers to an implicit division of revolutionary labor whereby the Soviets are dominant in India, Afghanistan, and Ceylon, while the Chinese predominate in Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia. He further states that in Burma the Soviets and the Chinese were divided in their approach, with the Soviets ". . . working slowly towards a Communist government by parliamentary methods," while the Chinese "generally don't believe in neutrality and therefore have maintained support of the Communist insurgents."[15] The import of this statement is obvious. The Soviets and the Chinese have been able to co-exist with each other in Burma, but the Soviets' unhappiness at their ally's position in an area of Chinese ascendancy is paralleled in other areas where the reverse is the case—Iraq and India.

Information from Iraq is not so authoritative, but one extremely interesting report from Beirut states that ". . . some Communist leaders [in Iraq] are getting directives from Moscow and others from Peking. And the two Communist capitals often contradict each other. . . . The Russians appear to favor a go-slow policy in Iraq. . . . The Red Chinese

[14] This instrumentality is especially important to China, whose diplomatic contacts are much more limited than those of the Russians.

[15] Reported in the *Christian Science Monitor*, December 17 and 18, 1959. Some of Kaznacheyev's interpretations may be faulty in detail, but the over-all picture which he gives appears trustworthy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

favor a tough line. They want an all-out campaign to take over Iraq and make it a Communist state. . . . If the Russians prevail, the Communists will probably continue to back Gen. Kassem for an indefinite period, possibly for years."[16] Here again we see a picture of Chinese and Soviet mentors competing in their guidance of a local Communist movement.

The situation in India is especially interesting, but, like most matters concerning the Communist Party of India, it is appallingly confused. The postwar shifts and turns of the international Communist line have fallen particularly heavily on the CPI, beginning with the abortive "left" activities under B. T. Ranadive, continuing with the Peking-line Telengana uprisings of 1948, and the "right" period symbolized by the Secretary-Generalship of Ajoy Ghosh. Each of these turns has left some of the Party faithful manning long-abandoned positions, so that now the CPI is one of the most faction-ridden of all parties. Although Ghosh, and latterly Namboodiripad, have been able to keep the Party generally in line with Soviet behests, the existence of "Moscow" and "Peking" factions is common knowledge. The composition of Ghosh's opposition is particularly interesting. In addition to the Bengal group and the leader of the Telengana uprising (C. R. Rao), one finds even Ranadive, a long-time critic of Maoism, who was ousted in order to make way for the Peking line. This odd collection of bedfellows derives from the fact that in 1948, and for some years afterward, Chinese communism represented the right wing of the world movement; thus left-wingers such as Ranadive turned to Moscow for spiritual guidance. The relative positions of the two power centers changed in response to the events of 1955-1957. China, deeply disturbed by the experiences of the "hundred flowers" interlude and the Hungarian uprising, hardened its outlook, while Khrushchev, encouraged by the rapid economic and military development of Russia and his success at Geneva, moved the Moscow policy sharply to the right. An agile opportunist such as Ghosh made the transition well, but many others did not, so that old leftists now find themselves associated with the Chinese position simply because they have stood still while the spectrum shifted around them.[17] The

[16] Wilton Wynn in the *Washington Evening Star*, August 6, 1959.

[17] A corresponding fate has befallen such erstwhile supporters of China as the India-China Friendship Association and the Bombay tabloid *Blitz*, which now find the USSR more congenial to their "right-wing" outlook. It might not be exaggerated to suggest that such figures as Ulbricht, Hoxha, Gus Hall, and even Molotov find themselves in a position similar to Ranadive's. This does not imply that the Chinese and the Stalinists hold identical positions, nor even that their "left-ness" consists of the same factors. But seen from the "right" viewpoint of Khrushchev, they must appear very close together, just as from the "left" viewpoint of China, Khrushchev comes very close to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CPI has been hard hit by Chinese expansionist activities on the Indian northern border, and has found it equally difficult to cope with the problems raised by the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy. Since the national interests of China and Russia vis-à-vis India are so divergent, it will be most interesting to observe the actions of the two nations as they maneuver for influence among the factions of the CPI. (The strength of the Chinese position among Bengali Communists—traditionally India's most violent revolutionaries—is a particularly noteworthy phenomenon. Should China ultimately succeed in pushing its frontier down from the M'Mahon line into the Himalaya foothills, it would be in a position to give direct support to any Communist uprising in Bengal, thus eliminating one of the major factors which led to the Telengana failure.)

Signs of conflict can also be detected in other areas. For example, the Chinese give maximum support and full recognition to the Algerian rebel government, while the Soviets have been most reluctant to follow suit. The failure of the Communist Neo Lao Hak Xat to penetrate the Laotian government *à la russe* was followed in late 1959 by the military action of the Pathet Lao, based on the revolutionary approach of the North Vietnamese and their Chinese mentors. These hostilities occurred just before Khrushchev's visit to the United States, and caused him considerable embarrassment. It is unlikely that the Pathet Lao launched their action without the approval of Peking or Moscow, and even more unlikely that Moscow would have encouraged it at such a time. The more recent developments in that unfortunate country show a less clear pattern. The principal burden of open support for the Pathet Lao has fallen on the Soviet Union, while the Chinese have remained an ominous presence in the background. The initial coup of Captain Kong Le took both Moscow and Peking by surprise, and the entire course of events since then gives the impression of having been improvised. It is at least possible that the USSR has undertaken the support of the Laotian Communist group as a gesture of good faith—thus implementing some compromise reached at the Moscow Conference pertaining to the support of national revolutionary movements—while the Chinese prefer to let the Russians get themselves involved in an area where China will inevitably have the ultimate profit. On the other hand, the Soviets also may be anxious to keep the Laotian situation in hand so that the Chinese

Titoism. Certainly Enver Hoxha seems to have found Chinese militancy congenial in his attempt to force a stronger anti-Yugoslav line on Khrushchev. Even after the Moscow meeting, the special relationship between Tirana and Peking seems to have continued undiminished, as evidenced by exchanges of visits and unprecedentedly large economic aid given to Albania in the face of China's own foreign exchange shortage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have no excuse to enter into it, with the resultant danger of more widespread fighting. As is the case with so many developments following the Moscow Conference, however, the relationships between the two partners in Laos are still quite blurred.

The conference itself marked the end of a period of adjustment in the alliance following the dislocations of 1960. The first attempt at conciliation—the meeting held at Bucharest in June—was apparently a complete failure despite the show of unanimity in signing the final communiqué.[18] The continuing polemics throughout the summer necessitated the calling of the full-scale Moscow Conference, and it too did not progress in any notable atmosphere of camaraderie.[19] All parties concerned, however, did apparently recognize the need for some sort of accommodation, and the resultant declaration is replete with unresolved conflicts and ambiguous formulations. This is not the place to discuss the significance of this strange document, but three points are important for the present purpose: (1) the declaration makes clear the right of other parties to challenge the CPSU on matters of policy and to expect the CPSU to come to a compromise; (2) although the Soviet viewpoint prevailed in most instances, all of the basic Chinese contentions received a fair degree of prominence; and (3) the declaration made clear that there is a class of "national liberation" movements which are deserving of unqualified Bloc support—including, by implication, military support. As a result, each partner has been left substantially free to interpret the communiqué as he sees fit with regard to timing, nature, and location of activities, with only a minimum of restraint from what is left of the central authority in Moscow. It is too early to see how these opportunities for divergent interpretations will affect operations, but the propaganda lines taken by the Russians and Chinese give ample evidence that both interpret the document in their own interest, and both feel that they have sufficient latitude for manipulation.[20]

[18] Contrast, for example, these two commentaries on the Bucharest meeting: "Those who do not take into account the aspirations of the peoples for peace may slip down the path of sectarianism and isolate themselves from the broad masses" (*Pravda* editorial, June 28, 1960). "In no case is it permissible to discard the fundamental theoretical positions of Marxism-Leninism on the pretext of combating dogmatism or to substitute revisionism for Marxism-Leninism" (*Renmin Ribao* editorial, June 29, 1960).

[19] At least not according to Edward Crankshaw's articles in the *Observer* (London), which were variously reprinted—e.g., in the *Washington Post*, February 12, 1961, and *New York Herald Tribune*, February 19, 1961. The text of the Moscow communiqué was printed in the *New York Times*, December 7, 1960.

[20] Khrushchev's speech on the conference (*Kommunist*, No. 1, January 1961) gives the heaviest possible emphasis to the prospects of avoiding the horrors of nuclear war. The Chinese commentaries brush off these features, while continuing to emphasize

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sino-Soviet differences with regard to revolutionary methods in the underdeveloped areas are thus natural developments of the historical and national peculiarities which motivate the two countries' outlooks. To the extent that Peking and Moscow are able to minimize dissension, these pecularities can be extremely useful tools in the penetration of these areas. The Chinese have readier access to the national feelings of many underdeveloped areas and a program which is particularly adaptable to conditions there. The Soviets have economic, military, and political advantages which in turn enable them to deal with special effectiveness with the developed nations and frequently with the governments of underdeveloped states. It would be perfectly feasible for the two partners to divide their responsibilities either on a basis of geography or of timing, or even to pursue their separate lines simultaneously in the same area. As China develops in strength and independence, however, the maintenance of this co-ordination becomes increasingly difficult. What is to be the Chinese role in Africa—or Latin America? Will it be possible to divide up responsibilities for tactical, as opposed to strategic, guidance? Above all, what will be the revolutionary concept basic to all actions taken; the Soviet assumption that the underdeveloped nations, awed by Russian economic and social progress, will voluntarily embrace communism, or the Chinese belief that power can only be the fruit of struggle?

Given good will on both sides, most of these problems could be resolved, for there can be no doubt that the ultimate aim of both Mao and Khrushchev is world-wide communism in one form or another. The tactical differences are of very great scope, however, and good will is manifestly lacking. Having tasted partial triumph as the result of its insubordination, China's appetite will be hard to satisfy. No genuine rapprochement between the two positions has been achieved, and none is likely at least as long as the present leaderships remain unchanged. In the face of the severe Chinese crop failures of the past two years, Moscow may soon be in a position to enforce conformity through economic pressure. Such a tactic would be shortsighted, however, and at best it would be but a question of time until

the struggle against imperialism and favorable prospects for local uprisings. E.g., Communiqué of the 9th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in *Peking Review*, No. 4 (January 27, 1961); Yu Chao-li, "New Situation in the People's Struggle Throughout the World," *Hongqi*, No. 1, January 1961 (*JPRS*, No. 8003, April 3, 1961); and especially the editorial in *Renmin Ribao*, January 22, 1961, which smugly states: "We are particularly glad that the fundamental principles and revolutionary spirit of Marxism-Leninism, in which the Chinese Communists and Communists in other countries have for many years persisted, are clearly reflected in the Moscow statement" (*Peking Review, loc.cit.*).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a still more severe and bitter rupture occurred. The crop failures, and the attendant collapse of the "leap forward" and commune programs, are probably more responsible than any desire to appease the USSR for the amelioration of China's truculent foreign policy during late 1960 and early 1961. Even at the height of the dispute, the groundwork was laid for accommodations with Indonesia, Nepal, and Burma, and a degree of restraint was shown with regard to Japan and Taiwan. (Only India received no sop, which was probably indicative of the belief of the Chinese that Nehru is their most dangerous obstacle in Asia.) It is most improbable, however, that this relatively restrained approach is more than a passing tactic. As China's domestic position is consolidated and/or the exigencies of international and intra-Bloc politics give encouragement, Chinese aggressiveness, coupled with intensified revolutionary activity by Communists in the underdeveloped areas, will become a major factor in world politics.

Such a prospect is pleasing neither to the West nor to the USSR. The divergencies between the two Communist powers pose a grave danger to the peace of the world. At the same time, they pose an equally severe danger to the Sino-Soviet alliance. There will be a deadly fascination in seeing whether one or the other or both of these potentialities are realized. China's declaration of independence from Soviet control must be regarded as one of the most significant developments in the history of communism. It may be of no less importance to the entire world system which balances so precariously.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON STABILITY IN DETERRENT RACES

By MALCOLM W. HOAG*

I

IN modern strategy no distinction has been labored more than that between deterrence and defense. Everyone now knows that to avert war is not the same as to protect the nation or win if war occurs. But what everyone knows vaguely, few may know well, and what the distinction implies for the mixture of military forces the nation should buy, still fewer may perceive. For deterrence and defense as military objectives overlap as well as diverge, complement each other as well as compete, so that a simple distinction can become complicated. Of special contemporary relevance, moreover, what is alleged to strengthen deterrence in the short run may jeopardize it in the long. About our military preparations, few queries are more important than "How will they influence the nature and intensity of the arms race, and therefore the prospects for arms control?"

The simplest way to illustrate these points is to move indirectly from the pure concepts to their policy implications via hypothetical situations or models. By doing so the clutter of secondarily relevant detail is avoided. This overriding merit of abstraction is shared by neither of the customary alternatives—careful examination of historical instances, or a direct comparison of the probable performance of alternative modern military postures—for all their other virtues.

Given the freedom to generate the most convenient hypothetical situations, we choose an initial one *circa* 1900. That, among other things, gets rid of airpower but not deterrence. To eliminate seapower, consider the situation of a landlocked country—say, Ruritania. For doctrines of airpower, landpower, or seapower tend to confuse the central issues more than they clarify them, not to mention the passions they arouse. Finally, to make our situation as simple as possible, let us suppose that there is only one potential enemy on the land frontier, and that this enemy has roughly comparable resources. In short, we contrive initially to make military planning as easy as possible.

Let us assume that Ruritania's Defense Minister gets the following

* I am indebted to many colleagues at the National War College in 1959-1960. That persons so senior, informed, and intelligent about these matters could nonetheless profit from a re-examination of fundamentals motivated this article. My own understanding owes so much to current associates that acknowledgment in detail is unfortunately impossible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instructions as political guidelines: "We want to deter our threatening neighbor from attacking us, and to protect our country from invasion if he does attack." A realistic response from a defense planner, grateful for such comparative succinctness, moderation, and clarity, would stop at "Yes, sir." Any bureaucrat would dismiss as a hopelessly niggling philosopher a Defense Minister who, in so ideal a situation, would query: "But what comparative values do you assign to the objectives of deterrence and defense?" It would, in principle, be a legitimate question, but it would be unnecessarily disruptive. It would be very difficult to answer and, whatever the answer, it would have little effect on policy.

It would not be the similarity of the two goals, but the near-identity of military preparations directed toward either of them, that would render the distinction academic. An army is required. If one good enough and big enough is provided, Ruritania will be confident that any attack by her neighbor can be stopped. The same prospect should be evident to the neighbor, whose low confidence in the success of any attack should roughly mirror Ruritania's high confidence in successful defense. Therefore, the neighbor should be deterred. How strongly he is deterred by any given balance of opposed armies depends also, of course, upon his bellicosity and recklessness. Deterrence in the final analysis always rests upon a state of mind, which raises the age-old issue of whether defense planning should be based upon enemy capabilities or intent.

We assume in this case that a Ruritanian planner, following the classically conservative precept, places primary emphasis upon estimated enemy capabilities. About enemy intent he assumes not the worst, for that would be to assume an enemy so bent upon aggression that he is unmoved by any rational calculations of excessive risk. But he assumes almost the worst: specifically, an enemy who will attack if his military prospects, soberly calculated, are promising. By assuming a malevolent if rational foe, he will generate military requirements that will perhaps provide excessive protection against a neighbor more peaceably inclined. Any excess protection, however, will insure against any precarious misreading of future enemy intent as peaceable.

It will be possible to provide defense here, moreover, in a way that should not make a hitherto peaceable enemy suspiciously hostile. Ruritanian defense measures to strengthen deterrence need not incite an arms race and so, in part, negate themselves. This conclusion follows if we add a special assumption, in this case the empirically founded one that attacking armies require, other things being equal, a consider-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able numerical superiority to prevail over defending armies.[1] Then Ruritania can meet its stated military goals with lesser forces than its neighbor, and, provided both sides share this assumption of defense advantage, pose no aggressive threat. Passing over all the complex details of the area to be defended, terrain, equipment, and so forth, suppose that Ruritanian army planners conclude that the old rule of thumb is applicable and that a minimum of 10 divisions can hold against the 30 divisions that the enemy is expected to have. Suppose further that they prudently multiply this minimum estimate by two, and that a resultant force goal of 20 divisions is accepted by the government over the protests of a reluctant Finance Ministry. To its neighbor, this force will still fall far short of the numbers required if Ruritania is to be a successful aggressor. Why should it be troubled unless, indeed, it had contemplated attack? How could such explicitly defensive measures provoke enemy attack unless their announcement prior to implementation crystallized previously existing aggressive intentions, i.e., moved the enemy to seize an opportunity before it vanished? Barring either of these possibilities, Ruritania's defense measures are consistent with international tranquillity; and, barring only the second, they increase the probability of peace. In short, they lead not merely to deterrence, but to stable deterrence in the dual sense that neither an attack nor an explosive arms race is triggered.

That no such arms race need result follows from the assumption that Ruritania can meet her defense goals with forces numerically inferior to her neighbor's. Any further increase in enemy forces can then be countered by a lesser Ruritanian increase within the range of one-third to two-thirds as much, leaving the enemy to bear higher costs for greater force increases without any gain in prospective performance as an aggressor. This penalty of higher costs for the enemy just to stay even can be expected to damp his ardor for the race, and to do so automatically. This damping effect makes for stability, rather than instability, in an arms competition. That is, if we look not merely at the first reaction of one side to a change, however caused, in the strength of the other, but at the entire sequence of actions, reactions, counter-reactions, etc., we get a series of increases of progressively diminishing size. Suppose that an initial increase of a division by the enemy is motivated by prestige, fear of a different neighbor, or whatever, but

[1] See B. H. Liddell Hart, *Deterrent or Defense*, New York, 1960, esp. ch. 10. That both sides would have recognized the superiority of prepared defenses in 1900, when most nations were ignoring rather than profiting from the lessons of the U.S. Civil War, is unlikely, but we presume them unusually enlightened.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that it will respond only defensively by simply matching any subsequent increase in Ruritanian strength. Then if Ruritania responds initially, say, by increasing its army by one-half of a division and the enemy matches this increase, with Ruritania in turn then offsetting by half of that or an additional one-fourth, and so on, we get an especially simple progression which leads to a total of only one added division for Ruritania. No arms race ever progresses so mechanically or simply, but the illustrated point of whether a non-self-aggravating, or damped, competition occurs, remains crucial.

Because this aspect of arms races is of crucial importance, we shall refer often to military "exchange rates," which measure the effort that would be required by one side to restore any stipulated balance of forces after a given effort by the opposition. Where effort can be illustrated in kind, e.g., two equivalent divisions for one, the rate of exchange will be so expressed, although invariably in practice more complex measures of national cost or effort are required. The policy application is direct. It is not enough to find a military preparation efficacious against a fixed estimate of the enemy. It should be appraised also in terms of his likely reactions: Does it impose adverse rates of exchange upon him as he responds, or even, ideally, impossible ones? Some things may be worth doing even when they do not impose such rates, but they must be so valuable for special reasons that they can bear the onus of participating in and possibly provoking a losing arms race.

To recapitulate, Ruritania poses two goals—deterrence and defense—which can be met by the same military measures. Therefore any conflicts in goals can be overlooked. Military planning, simple both in itself and in terms of broader foreign policy, can legitimately proceed on the basis of "military considerations only." The first-order questions that are always posed by deterrence are easily answered: (1) From what is the enemy to be deterred? (2) By fear of what consequences? (3) How are these consequences to be inflicted? (4) How is the threat of these consequences to be made credible?

In this case, it is invasion by the enemy that is deterred through his fear of failure, with a Ruritanian army the means to promise failure. That the army would be used if deterrence failed is inherently credible, for its use to frustrate the enemy would be synonomous with protection of the homeland. In this case, deterrence, which typically rests upon threatening dire consequences to an opponent unless he is deterred, does not conflict with defense, which seeks to alleviate the consequences to one's self if the enemy is not deterred. By virtue of the happy coincidence of frustration for the enemy and protection for Ruritania if

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deterrence fails, an army fulfills all requirements. It could be provided, moreover, at favorable rates of exchange, even when planned conservatively on the basis of enemy capabilities rather than intent. To complete the idyllic picture, military planning could proceed with little risk of any troubling foreign policy by-products. Except for the special case of an enemy already so close to aggressive decision that announcements of strengthened future defenses would trigger attack, Ruritanian defense measures would not be provocative. Nor would an explosive arms race be generated.

II

A situation like this enables broad military issues to be put at their simplest, and so more easily viewed as a whole. To do so is relevant because fundamentally the military questions have not changed, just their answers; nor have the issues, just their complexity. But the complexities have grown so formidable that the fundamentals can easily be obscured. More particularly, old lessons are remembered more easily than their rationale. Precepts can be drilled into all—e.g., assess enemy capability, not intent; or, more broadly, to defend is to deter and not to provoke—and at their grandest can be elevated into principles of war. What we need, however, is not a group of precepts, but their rationale; not which precept, but which combination, and why.

In short, we must discriminate, for circumstances do alter cases. The hypothetical circumstances in our example were rigged to generate convenient and comforting simplifications. The nuclear revolution, naturally, is mainly responsible for changing typical military circumstances markedly from those in our contrived case, but it is by no means solely responsible. Without moving our example forward into the nuclear age, the picture can be changed by altering our assumptions about the military means, objectives, or both.

This can be vividly illustrated if we convert our example momentarily from land to old naval warfare. Suppose Ruritania to be an island, concentrating upon seapower. The principal effect upon our example would be to invalidate the assumption that a defender enjoys great numerical advantages by virtue of his role. The open seas provide no opportunity for a defender to benefit from dug-in positions on terrain mainly of his own choosing. The fleets of aggressor and defender start virtually even, with superior position in battle dependent upon tactics rather than nature. Moreover, because the firepower of numerically superior fleets may all be brought to bear simultaneously, while the inferior opposition is forced to divide its fire among too many

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

targets, any advantage in numbers should be multiplied in battle effectiveness. The expected relative losses mount not merely in proportion to the relative numbers engaged, but, qualifications aside, to their square.[2] For example, if Ruritania faced five enemy ships with five of equal quality, the outcome would be a fifty-fifty proposition, dependent upon luck and superior seamanship. But if the enemy fleet were increased to seven ships, Ruritania's expected losses in an engagement relative to the enemy would mount in proportion to $(7)^2:(5)^2$, or nearly twice those of the enemy. Against firepower so disadvantageous, a tremendous load would be placed on good fortune and possible superior performance per ship. Consequently, a great penalty is attached to falling behind in such an arms race, and a correspondingly great premium to being ahead.

The arms race in dreadnoughts before World War I is a case in point.[3] This kind of competition, unlike that in our army illustration, is not inherently self-damping. At best, precarious equilibrium results when each side is content with matching and a balance is somehow obtained. Then and only then no self-exacerbating series of retaliatory increases is generated. It takes only one side to generate such a series by seeking superiority, even if the other is content with matching. If Ruritania insists upon being one or more battleships ahead, while her opponent is firmly resolved not to fall behind, there is no natural limit. Either the race explodes into war or one side is priced out of the competition. The arithmetic of such an arms race is distressing, which places a much greater burden upon political accommodation.

Our earlier statement of Ruritanian defense objectives was restricted to deterrence and defense. If we add, "and *win* if the enemy does attack," we move beyond the acceptability of stalemate and get the more familiar trio of deterrence, defense, and victory. Then the arms race issues, or more generally the issues of provocation, are posed more sharply. These more ambitious aims, when coupled with our switch to a naval setting, obviously contain the seeds of an explosive international competition of the sort illustrated above. With a great premium upon concentration in battle to secure the "firepower-squared" advantages, massed fleets might well meet in one decisive engagement.

[2] The classic development of this finding is in F. W. Lanchester, *Aircraft in Warfare*, London, 1916.

[3] For a valuable historical account of these and other examples, and some intriguing if controversial conclusions, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," in C. J. Friedrich and S. E. Harris, eds., *Public Policy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, pp. 41-86. For a more general and abstract treatment of arms races, see Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates*, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When the outcome might thus be settled overnight early in the war, little reliance could be placed upon wartime production of such long lead-time items as battleships. The arms race would therefore focus upon fleets-in-being. In these vital respects, if not in technology, the situation would anticipate modern aerospace competition.

If we revert to Ruritania as a land power, the addition of victory as an objective would also heighten international tension, but less so. Those who fear her always retain the option of adequate defensive counters that fall short of matching her force increases. Self-damping still characterizes the mechanics of the arms race. The race, moreover, would not depend as sensitively upon forces-in-being, because apprehensions about the possibility of overnight defeat would be lessened. Blitzes are still possible, but much less likely. Greater reliance can be placed by both sides upon mobilization potentials, especially of reserve forces. If, at best, one side knows that the other is not mobilizing, it is reassured; at worst, massive mobilization gives it warning. A defender must take care, of course, that it can neither be greatly overwhelmed in ultimate amount nor outpaced in speed by enemy mobilization. As with armies in being, however, these requirements need not call for matching man for man, and accordingly are less disruptive.

Our digression into naval aspects, to sum up, illustrates how unstable, trigger-happy, arms competition can arise, and the lessons are especially pertinent in a nuclear age. The naval example serves especially to emphasize the adverse impact upon international stability of adding victory as a military goal. But whether the naval or land warfare example be used, with their somewhat different impact upon stability, the direct impact upon military planning is only quantitative. In the hypothetical situation the same kind of forces meet the goals either of deterrence, defense, or victory. This crucial simplification, having served its purpose, must now be removed.

III

The conflict among kinds of military preparations can be put at its starkest if we leap to a missile age. Suppose that Ruritania can buy thermonuclear-tipped ballistic missiles as well as army divisions, that the missiles can be guided fairly accurately to any point in her neighbor's territory, and that they are, by any previous standard, phenomenally cheap per unit of promised destruction, although very expensive per complete installation. If we further assume a Ruritanian monopoly on this option, we get a different kind of classic simplicity in military planning. A missile force by itself can fulfill all military requirements

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

if Ruritania is willing to gamble in one respect; and it can fulfill most requirements even if Ruritania is not willing.

The gamble in question is whether to rely solely upon the influence of an awesome missile threat upon enemy intent. Ruritania can choose to rely completely on nuclear intimidation before and also during any war. To deter, she can threaten to destroy one or many enemy cities if she is attacked; to defend, she can threaten to destroy other cities in order to compel the enemy to withdraw or even disarm; to win, she can perhaps use similiar threats even to compel surrender. Given such a policy, which would dispense with an army, the enemy retains a capability to invade. Therefore, Ruritania must not plan to spend all her missiles at one blow if she is to defend after war starts as well as deter. What she needs is some combination of residual striking power linked to valuable remaining enemy targets in their vital role as hostages. The policy, in short, is dependent upon intra-war as well as prewar threats, and amounts to pure nuclear intimidation.

Alternative policies would mix missile and army capabilities in various proportions. One possibility would be a defensive army shield much as before, but with a sizably diminished mobilization potential because missile strikes were counted upon to reduce enemy potential. This policy, with its virtually complete insurance against enemy capability, deserves special mention as a natural outgrowth of old plans and doctrine. Incidentally, it would also be consistent with an all-out, single-strike philosophy for missile employment, however imprudent though conveniently simple such a philosophy might be.

The nuclear monopoly case is nostalgically interesting, but too easy. The interactions among military goals become lively only when both sides have nuclear striking (missile) opportunities. To examine the implications, it is convenient to suppose that both sides have the same technological options, and these we restrict, unrealistically, to a very few in order to avoid complicated calculations. Suppose the missiles are to be based in clusters of, say, 10 missiles apiece, in order to share common facilities and so greatly reduce costs per missile. However, the missiles can be separated enough within a cluster so that, if placed in hardened shelters underground, each becomes a separate target. To complete the list of drastic simplifications, suppose that future progress in technology is expected to lead to superior hardening so in step with increases in missile performance (yield, accuracy, and reliability) that the vulnerability of a missile remains constant. Specifically, we assume that the single-shot kill probability of a missile is one-half against either

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a single hardened missile or an unhardened cluster of 10 missiles, and that in the latter case it applies to air-burst tactics.

Now we can generate simple arms races again, of which the most horrendous arises if both sides seek soft missiles systems—say, 10 clusters or 100 missiles apiece as a beginning. In this situation the balance of terror is obviously precarious. If there is a missile war, whoever strikes first is decisively ahead. If the attacker reserves 50 missiles for intra-war threats and fires 50 (five at each enemy cluster), the probability of any particular cluster surviving is reduced to 3 per cent. The probability that at least one cluster out of the 10 will survive is, of course, higher, but it is only about one chance in four. The attacker, moreover, can hedge against the unfavorable outcome that the one chance in four occurs by threats of city attacks that may induce the defender not to retaliate. The attacker has a much greater residual missile force than the defender but, especially given air-burst tactics which minimize fallout, still retains most of the defender's population and industry as hostages. In terms of hostages, the bargaining power of the two sides is virtually even; but in terms of remaining striking power, greatly and perhaps decisively uneven. Nothing can assure the attacker that he will get off scot-free and victorious, but his chances are very good.

Lack of certainty of a favorable outcome may be enough to deter an attack, but that it will be enough requires more stringent conditions than believers in near-automatic nuclear deterrence sometimes realize. Our model incorporates not merely meager retaliatory power, but the disruptive feature of "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack."[4] A high probability of peace requires more than that each side prefers peace even to victory, when victory implies the risk of one chance in four of small but appreciable retaliatory power that might be used. The choices open to each are only two—attack or do not attack; but the possible results are three—attack, peace, or be attacked. If the third occurs, it is much worse than the first. Yet this worst result can be eliminated only by attacking, which rules out also the second result.

So it is not enough that each side prefers peace to war. Each must so much prefer peace to war even on advantageous terms, and be somehow so sure that its opponent will continue to do likewise, that it is willing to live with the risk of catastrophe.[5] To do so may be easy when

[4] See T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, esp. ch. 9.

[5] To illustrate the principle, once again we can calculate oversimply and precisely where policy-makers never can calculate precisely, even when they can face the calculation psychologically. Suppose a country estimates that its feared enemy is unlikely to attack, but may, with the probability in any single year only one in twenty. If it expects

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

international tensions are minor, but difficult otherwise. Mutual deterrence here does not rest upon a solid foundation in objective conditions that promise to make victorious war nearly as disastrous to the attacker as losing war. It rests mainly instead upon subjective confidence in mutual benign intent, which international conflicts serve precisely to undermine. Wherever such conflicts generate a brinkman's cycle of bluff and counterbluff, originating perhaps in very minor and implicit threats but spiraling to an uncertain outcome, the incentive is strong to forestall the worst outcome by attacking. Each side is so driven, not least because it realizes that its enemy is equally tempted by fear of pre-emptive attack. This interacting sequence of reciprocating fears breeds war. Mutual deterrence that rests upon this shaky base can easily be converted to mutual incitement of the very event that one hopes to avoid.

Nobody finds such a situation tolerable, and hence the quest for stable deterrence firmly rooted in greatly reduced vulnerability of retaliatory power. A much more stable situation results if Ruritania and its neighbor harden their missiles. Then if one side fires 50 missiles at the other's, it can expect, given our assumptions, to kill only 25 of them. In purely military terms, the attacker loses in the exchange. He is here trading missiles at the adverse rate of two for one, in contrast to the "soft" basing situation in which he could exchange missiles at rates up to nearly five to one in his favor. Such a trade is catastrophically foolish for the attacker unless he enjoys such overwhelming initial superiority that he can override an adverse rate of exchange by brute force of numbers. Such a superiority can be prevented by an opponent who stays in the arms race, but at less cost than matching missile for

this probability to remain the same per year, and decides that it will never attack, the cumulative probability of peace over a decade is, barring accidents, about three chances in five. Assuming arbitrary value weights, we can get this situation:

State	*Probability of Occurrence*	*Utility Score if It Occurs*	*Expected Value*
Attack	0	5	0
Peace	.6	6	3.6
Defend	.4	1	0.4
Total			4.0

Here our country prefers peace to overwhelmingly victorious war 6 to 5, but victorious war over disastrous war 5 to 1, so that it can improve its expected "score" from 4 to 5 by rejecting deterrence in favor of "preventive" war.

Yet this illustration merely sets the stage for a compounding of reciprocal fears of attack. If the enemy estimates that you will estimate as above, clearly his incentive to pre-empt soars. This means that your original estimate of the probability of his attack was wildly optimistic, as his must have been of your intent, and so on in an explosively interacting sequence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

missile. A defender who buys one additional protected missile for every two bought by the enemy will not fall behind in terms of absolute retaliatory power, but will gain as the race proceeds.[6] Our new hypothetical arms race thus permits a damped competition like the army case discussed earlier, not the unstable naval case. Those who seek stable mutual nuclear deterrence find the key in retaliatory forces so well protected that they impose insufficiently rewarding or even adverse exchange rates upon any attacker.

Our example can also illustrate other aspects of comparative stability as a function of kind as well as amount of protection. Suppose the same degree of protection against unambiguous all-out attack could have been provided by warning measures rather than hardening. This alternative would not have implied the same security. Reliance upon warning for protection of soft missiles sites requires speedy launch, and the resultant trigger-happy system becomes more accident prone. It is also an all-or-nothing system in operation. Any missile war becomes total war because missiles cannot be withheld to back intra-war threats or, more generally, to permit a chaotic situation to be clarified, without inordinate risk that they will be destroyed on the ground. In contrast, missiles so hardened or otherwise protected that they can ride out attacks permit these options. They not only protect against surprise attack, but survive it, and are therefore consistent with wartime policies either of massive or limited strategic retaliation.

Given a securely hardened missile force equal to her enemy, need Ruritania add other arms? Should it instead try to deter the enemy from invasion as well as missile attack by threats of missile retaliation, forgoing defense in favor of pure deterrence? To do so involves no direct defense against enemy armies, but an indirect defense that, far from making punishment of the enemy in war synonymous with protection of the homeland, implies the worst sort of reciprocal damage. The worst for him does not equal the best for you, but the worst.

Pure nuclear deterrence will accordingly be sharply questioned, but may nonetheless be sensible. In its favor will be powerful budgetary considerations, plus the paradox that has been elevated into a prime principle of deterrent strategy—"the rationality of irrationality." Viewed in isolation from other events, missile exchanges against an enemy whose retaliatory power is secure are "irrational." Shooting at enemy

[6] The same percentage survival rate applied to a larger force will yield a greater absolute survival. In addition, as the attacker moves from initial parity to pre-attack superiority, he may go beyond the tactic of only one missile aimed at one missile, with resultant lower kills per missile. Higher absolute-force levels, moreover, will make defensive calculations less sensitive to errors in intelligence about enemy capabilities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

missiles, given our assumptions, costs you more than the enemy, and is militarily self-defeating. The alternative tactic is to attack civil rather than military targets. Yet, in trading cities with the enemy, surely the loss of one's own far outweighs any gain from enemy losses of comparable size. So it, too, is "irrational." Yet a policy of which city-trading is but one late element in a related sequence may nonetheless make sense, for commitment to the sequence as a whole may be the best means of reducing the probability of the "irrational" act to very low, and hopefully near-zero, proportions. Or, to put this central point the other way around, failure to commit yourself to the entire sequence may increase the probability of the feared act or other disastrous consequences. An alternative policy which leads to different sequential decisions, each of which is rational when judged separately, may generate a probability distribution of sequences that is worse.

The obvious case is massive retaliation in kind for attacks upon one's self. To retaliate after being hit may, in a cold-blooded calculation, be worse than to seek to minimize further damage by bargaining from residual strength that is not dissipated in retaliation. To announce beforehand, however, that one will assuredly not retaliate is madness, for it invites attack. The middle course of assuring the enemy that one will retaliate massively whatever the cost, while reserving with all possible secrecy the likely option of non-retaliation, is tempting but is feasible to only a limited extent. Any such policy invites corrosion of the morale as well as the capability of retaliatory forces, and yet evidence of the corrosion must not become apparent. Consequently, the generals emphasize advance commitment to retaliate, with resolve and fortitude as necessary to deterrence as appropriate weapons. They are right, although their good points can be driven too far. When the means to deter differ sharply from the means to mitigate damage if deterrence fails, difficult choices between them cannot validly be avoided simply by neglecting one goal in favor of the other. If a change in military preparations detracts only slightly from deterrence but promises to alleviate damage greatly in war, surely it should be made. The evident sense of such a change illustrates that a nation rarely, if ever, seeks singlemindedly to maximize deterrence, but seeks rather to maximize some complicated goal that, as a minimum, combines deterrence and defense.

But how are deterrence and defense to be weighted in this combination? We can rephrase the now-relevant question posed by military planners to political leaders: "How should we value increments to deterrence relative to increments to defense?" Answers now become

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unnecessary only if military resources are made so plentiful that competing claimants for different kinds of preparations are all satisfied, e.g., Ruritania gets all the hardened missiles and divisions she could want, which is hardly a realistic or interesting case. Suppose instead, to look at hard and therefore interesting choices, that Ruritania imposes budget constraints that permit only these alternatives: (1) hardened missiles cut from 100 to 25, plus army divisions cut from two-thirds of enemy divisions to one-half; (2) no army but the full force of 100 missiles. Now controversy will be rife, not least because intra-service lines will be sharply drawn.

Suppose the first, mixed-force alternative be adopted, in part because policy-makers find persuasive the argument that only 20 missiles delivered on city targets would be "adequate" and that 25 protected ones should therefore be more than enough. Critics of the policy will counter with at least two arguments. First, even granting that 20 delivered missiles would be enough, a pre-attack force of but 25 gives very little likelihood that enough could survive to meet this test of adequacy. Given the assumptions of our model, an enemy with 100 missiles could reserve 25, fire three at each one of Ruritania's, and reduce expected force survival to only three missiles. The numbers, of course, are arbitrary, but our model is realistic in speaking of degrees of vulnerability rather than of approachable but unattainable invulnerability, and so it serves to warn against the excesses of naïve proponents of "minimum" deterrence. Second, would not the missile deterrent to invasion be so weakened as to offset the deterrent value of armies? Would not the very fact of providing an army as an alternative diminish the credibility in enemy eyes of missile response? Would not the credibility be further degraded by superior enemy missile bargaining-power, either pre-attack (100:25) or post-attack (25:3)? In short, with missiles so few, would not too great a load have been placed upon resolve to substitute for, rather than necessarily complement, inadequate strategic forces?

Answers are by no means self-evident. But these are proper questions, as are those that will be asked in return. Even if an army as an alternative diminishes the credibility of missile retaliation and diverts resources from retaliatory power, does it not compensate by providing local deterrents to invasion? As for reinforcing the credibility of missile retaliation, is not city-trading an inherently incredible response even to enemy occupation? In the final analysis, arms policies have always rested upon the willingness of some fighting men to put honor and the integrity of their country above considerations of personal safety.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now the issue is cruelly changed, for massive strategic retaliation may imply sacrificing one's country. We seek here to explain arms dilemmas, not solve them, and the most personal dilemma is surely that the path of military duty and honor is no longer clear.

IV

Having manipulated models to illustrate some arms fundamentals, we must ask what they have to do with the real world. Far-reaching simplifications have been made. Neglected, for example, are missile impacts upon tactical (army) operations via industrial and other damage in the classic view of the land battle as the pay-off. Yet to trace these impacts would be misleading, as well as tedious. Massive thermonuclear exchanges, if backed by implementable threats of more, will almost certainly dominate and shortly terminate any war in which they occur.[7] Therefore we should emphasize nuclear intimidation during as well as before war, and can neglect "broken-back" tactical war. Any current fixation upon one great thermonuclear strike can only be deplored. This holds true whether it be derived as an outmoded legacy from "smash war-industry" philosophies, or from wishful thinking that all enemy capabilities would be completely crushed at a blow.

Other simplifications in the models may mislead. The retaliatory systems as a whole were either soft or hard, whereas in the real world they will always be a mixture. The system with no vulnerable places anywhere in the entire complex of retaliation, with respect to all its components, is but an ideal. Some less hard places will always be present, and there may even be an Achilles' heel in the system. Accordingly, there will always be some scope for militarily rewarding counterforce as well as countercity operations. How much scope cannot be answered without looking at particular situations, but that there will be some is itself a useful reminder to those who unrealistically view counterforce strategies as a flat go, no-go proposition (total disarming of the enemy at a blow, or not) and so convert a question of degree into one of kind. We have emphasized threat power during as well as before war, and that power, crudely put, is measured by destroyed enemy weapons as well as by preserved enemy hostages and unspent weapons of our own. Counterforce strategies must continually be reappraised, but they are certainly not outmoded.

[7] See Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Princeton, N.J., 1959, especially pp. 160-72. Dissenters have not yet, to my knowledge, provided the calculations, *inter alia*, of protection against radioactive fall-out in combat areas that would be consistent with political and military prosecution of organized war.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of our model is its restriction to but two possible enemy provocations, with each of them necessarily a clear and massive challenge to an interest traditionally accepted as vital. We have considered only invasion of, or missile attack against, one's own country. Accordingly, we have stacked the cards in favor of those who stress massive retaliation, and have ruled out most limited-war questions by assumption. To consider the case for limited-war preparations fairly, one has to go into far murkier and subtler political issues, precisely those that our model neglects. Central issues there turn upon challenges to allies or neutrals where the nature of our interest —let alone how vital it is—is sometimes unclear; where much besides boundary disputes may be an open issue, with who provoked whom a pertinent question; and where challenges need not begin at all in overt or massive form. Accordingly, the appropriate role of force is very different.

How biased our models are against any advocacy of limited war preparations can be shown more concretely by concentrating upon one possible road to general war. Will control of the limits in any local war be maintained? The probability of general war by loss of such control is a product of two linked probabilities, that of getting into the limited war in the first place, and of escalation all the way upward in the second. Would-be massive retaliators stress reducing the first probability by awesome threats which, however, increase the second. Would-be limited warriors stress reducing the second probability by observing whatever limits may be mutually apparent and beneficial, the notable example being non-use of nuclear weapons. But they run the risk of emboldening local aggressors and so increasing the first probability. What compounded probabilities of general war will then arise from the alternative policies? No general answer is possible, but our restricted hypothetical situation suggests that a near-zero probability might be reached by Ruritanian concentration upon massive retaliation, i.e., upon reduction of the first of the linked probabilities. But other combinations of circumstances might suggest the opposite, although even in our models the merit of exclusive concentration upon missiles is not evident.

Rigged though it is to favor a policy of pure deterrence, the model nonetheless illustrates that there are conflicting choices between deterrence and defense. The first requisite for realism in military discussion is to perceive these conflicts; the second, to recognize that they cannot in practice be resolved by budgets so high that both of these military goals are met in full. Neither 100 per cent deterrence nor 100 per cent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

protection against the contingency when deterrence fails is now procurable, if they ever were. And even if they could be achieved, for that matter, conflict between them would be sharpened. For who would pay expensive insurance premiums to cover a contingency that could not happen? Or, if 100 per cent defense were the goal instead, who would pay to lessen the likelihood of events against which he was fully protected?

The military professional yearns for a position comparable to that of a physician, whose prescriptions supposedly are governed by considerations of health rather than the patient's income, and he frequently employs the analogy. But the doctor is constrained by knowledge that good medicine and nutrients must not be taken in excess, and is comforted because nature will not react malevolently against him in ways that exacerbate the original complaint. Typically, moreover, his prescriptions cost the patient only small parts of his income. When they do not, budgetary constraints may be nonetheless pervasive for being tacitly rather than openly taken into account. Not all of us who could profit from a three months' cruise find one prescribed. And, for that matter, the nation's deplorable lack of good $5 per hour psychoanalysts is reflected in tight rationing of existing services by the purse. The soldier's desire to rise above sordid politics and economics finds little support in the favorite medical analogy or in any other.

We harp on the point for an old but vital reason: Realistic expectations of budget constraints and choices among imperfect military alternatives should influence what one tries to buy, not merely how much. Starting out for "full requirements" in one military area and then cutting back under budgetary pressure may leave us not with one-half of the right sort of capability but with one-half of the wrong. We can illustrate such a development by another modification of our model.

Suppose Ruritania and her enemy can buy anti-missile missiles to defend their cities, but that the unit cost of these missiles matches that of an offensive hardened missile. Then substituting a defensive for an offensive missile changes, among other things, the type of defense. Direct defense replaces indirect, for a protected offensive weapon defends cities indirectly in two ways: it reduces the likelihood of enemy attack, and it draws enemy fire to itself and away from other targets if there is an attack. This second indirect defense may itself dominate the argument if we assume (1) that anti-missile defenses fall considerably short of the ideal of a kill probability of unity against an incoming missile—say, to a kill probability of 0.3; and (2) that Ruritania is seriously threatened by an enemy who has outpaced her quantitatively

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in missiles either through higher total budgets or greater concentration of military resources. Suppose, specifically, that the enemy can fire two missiles at each of Ruritania's, can still withhold one missile as a threat against each Ruritanian city, and can expect an .8 kill probability against an undefended city. Then if Ruritania replaces one of its protected offensive missiles with an anti-missile defense of one city, its loss in indirect defense is measured by the two enemy missiles that are freed for city threats. This loss overwhelms the gain in direct defense, for two extra missiles reduce the survival probability of a city more than the anti-missile defense increases it.[8] Such a shift of Ruritanian defense from indirect to direct would therefore be a mistake from all points of view, for it would lessen defense as well as deterrence measured by survivable retaliatory power. Protected offensive missiles, on the other hand, would not so dominate over defensive missiles if Ruritanian total military resources rose markedly, relative to those of her enemy. Then the enemy would not have two missiles to be freed by every removal of a counterforce target, and anti-missile defenses would not confront so dismaying a prospect. The issue of anti-missile defenses would then be open. But an ambitious anti-missile or other program that is based on the premise that tolerable balance in other arms would be maintained as a prerequisite can be a disaster if that premise is falsified. To repeat, what one sensibly buys, as well as how much, depends upon the total resources to be made available relative to the enemy.[9]

V

The extreme case of no direct defense, which outrages military doctrine of happier days when defense conflicted much less with deterrence, is the most provocative aspect of a general military policy to which most of our remarks especially apply. That policy, sometimes

[8] With the kill probability of defense set at .3, 70 per cent of arriving missiles should survive. The kill probability of an undefended city was set at .8 to allow for unreliability and inaccuracy. Against a defended city only 70 per cent survival of the 80 per cent that arrive would be expected, yielding a .56 single-shot kill probability. The city survival probability would then be 1 — .56, or .44, but if two extra missiles were shot at it, this probability would be cubed, falling to .085, or appreciably less than the assumed .20 single-shot survival probability of an undefended city.

In the interests of simplicity, we here and elsewhere overlook all sophisticated consideration of the added elements of uncertainty in Ruritanian and enemy calculations that would be induced. Our use of expected values makes discussion too simple, but introduces no significant errors for our restricted purposes.

[9] The military reader will recognize the old sound point that some guide to priorities is better than no guide to allocations at all. I have elsewhere tried to move in turn beyond the inadequacies of blunt military priorities to what, in economists' jargon, are income elasticities. See "Some Complexities in Military Planning," *World Politics*, XI, No. 4 (July 1959), pp. 553-77.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

labeled "finite" or "passive deterrence," is directed, above all, toward stable deterrence of thermonuclear war. It seeks stability, first, in terms of the balance of opposed forces at any moment of time, and, second, by tempering and damping the thermonuclear arms race over time. Hence it implies a kind of arms control policy. It tries, in essence, to institutionalize a less precarious balance of terror rather than to supplant it. The goal is stable mutual deterrence, which in practice amounts to playing for a stalemate rather than a win in the grimmest of games should deterrence fail, and so affronts an even deeper military preconception about proper objectives.

The radical version of this policy would be implemented and announced to our enemy something like this:

"We shall maintain a retaliatory capability so big, mixed in composition, and securely protected in all ways that we are confident that we could, at the least, smash most of the cities of any nation or coalition of nations that tried to cripple our retaliatory power by any conceivable attack. We expect, in short, to hold most of your industry and people in perpetual hostage, and to this end shall effectively counter by increased offensive power your defensive measures to remove our hostages. We expect that you will do the same. As a joint result, any rational grounds for surprise or pre-emptive mass thermonuclear strikes by either of us should disappear.

"The open question is the strategic budgetary scale, and consequent public image of arms intensity and political tension, on which we shall attain this condition. We propose that it be low in our mutual interest. Confident of our ability to protect our retaliatory power against even superior numbers and surprise, we are willing to tolerate rough parity in offensive power; pessimistic about the cost of further reductions in civilian vulnerability (after some first-order measures, perhaps rudimentary fall-out shelters[10]) relative to the costs of offensive improvements that negate them, we are prepared, if you are, to settle for cities whose direct defenses are inadequate. If you agree, we must both, of course, be assured that the implied measures of disarmament are taken reciprocally. If they are, we shall by joint action have pledged the safety of

[10] The first-order civil defense measures cannot be detailed here. They might be constrained, however, by these criteria: (1) favorable exchange rates against enemy offensive counters; (2) catching up with, rather than outpacing, enemy civil defenses; (3) consistency with strike-second protection of people when the enemy tries to preserve them as hostages, e.g., shelters in cities that protect against the fall-out from an enemy first-strike against military targets. Each of these constraints limits our program markedly, and surely no resultant civil defenses could be provocative in any major sense.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

our obviously vulnerable peoples to the elimination of general thermonuclear war."

A stable deterrent policy like this is seductive in its very simplicity, not least because it is consistent with past sins of omission. Its advocacy comforts those critics whose analyses have unpardonably overlooked the vulnerability of delivery forces and the consequent genuine grounds for concern about reciprocal fears of surprise attack, and who therefore, at best prematurely, have presumed a stability in the balance of terror that is far from automatic. Such a policy also rationalizes past neglect in preparations, notably in paltry appropriations for civil defense that were so much at variance with a declaratory policy of massive retaliation against threats to our overseas interests. But these are suspect, if politically potent, reasons for adoption of any such policy. They should not obscure the real promise of reduced probabilities of surprise attack and a visible slowing down in the arms race that so rightly concerns an anxious world.

Any road to effective arms control looks long and uncertain to all but the soft in heart and head. Yet some roads are surely far less dismaying in prospect than others. While we may have little choice about being in an arms race, we may and do exercise great influence over the kind of race it will be. A policy aimed at stable mutual deterrence, for example, can focus initially upon inspection where it is easiest rather than hardest. Rigorous control of nuclear weapons is probably impossible because they are so easily hidden, and control of delivery vehicles is not much more promising when any nominally civilian means of delivery (civilian airliners) may do. But anti-missile defenses of cities should be highly specialized, prominent, and necessarily located near much-traveled places. So they are much easier to detect. Elaborate civil defenses, e.g., shelters in cities designed to protect against high blast overpressures, should be still more observable. Protecting 50 or 100 million people can hardly be as discreet an activity as hiding a few hundred weapons. Satisfactory inspection of hostages, in short, can be an easy if incomplete substitute for inspection of arms.

Another inducement for taking this road to arms control is that the fundamental agreements can be tacit. One implements the policy by doing and proclaiming rather than by agreeing explicitly, and therefore very slowly and cautiously, to terms that will be binding. What one does unilaterally is clear: First, remove or greatly reduce vulnerabilities in the system of thermonuclear retaliation so that the system can not only survive the worst of enemy attacks, but will impose adverse rather than rewarding military rates of exchange upon the enemy in his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attack. Convert any extensive enemy counterforce operations, in short, from a winning to a losing game. Second, be prepared to resume, if necessary, the dangerous arms race that seeks to remove one's people but not the enemy's from hostage status. Because nobody can be sure that the enemy will reciprocate in control, such preparedness is a hedge. It is also a means of bargaining pressure to induce reciprocity, which raises the old dilemma that arms measures may either coerce desired arms control or explode into the race one seeks to avoid. Should one "arm to parley," or the reverse? Some compromise answers may hedge this question acceptably. For example, thorough research and development programs for anti-missile and civil defenses—programs that are required in order to reduce lead-times later if the worst arms race is forced upon us—need not provoke this race unless they move into production and implementation phases. So the dilemma may be resolved.

Appealing as such a policy is, it must face several searching questions, of which perhaps the greatest arises when we move from overly simple two-power to many-power considerations. What happens to deterrence of provocations in third areas if the residual fear of general war—otherwise so powerful a control upon whether local aggressions occur and what limits are observed—is deliberately reduced by a policy of stable mutual deterrence? One popular answer is that third-area deterrence will be bolstered by improved limited-war capabilities. This answer is good and very important as far as it goes, but no tactical limited-war capabilities, in themselves, answer threatened or actual nuclear attacks upon an ally's cities, to take the extreme case. Something more is required. It may be the deliberate proliferation of strategic deterrent forces in third areas, as many advocates of "finite deterrence" have suggested, but such a course hardly serves the global cause of arms control.[11]

A third possibility is a policy of limited strategic retaliation—the destruction of a city in the main enemy's homeland as a strategic reprisal for extreme provocations that cannot be met by limited war capabilities.[12] Such a policy suffers from the political defect, but analytic virtue, of explicit bizarreness. Unless one is confident that the pre-

[11] An alliance-wide collective retaliatory force, notably for NATO, may be a good compromise, depending upon its design and control.

[12] The first systematic account of this policy, to my knowledge, was that of Morton A. Kaplan, *The Strategy of Limited Retaliation*, Policy Memorandum No. 19, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1959. See especially Schelling, *op.cit.*, and Leo Szilard, "How to Live with the Bomb and Survive," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XVI, No. 2 (February 1960), pp. 59-73.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ltd. Strat War
518

requisites have been met for stable mutual deterrence, a strike limited to one city is madness. If the prerequisite of secure forces has not been met on the striking side, serious risk of rational massive retaliation is incurred. If that prerequisite has not been met by the enemy, it is foolish to forgo the great military advantage of a sizable counterforce strike instead, for such a strike can also be made consistent with limited civilian damage if that be desired for bargaining purposes. If the prerequisites are met on both sides, however, a one-city strike, despite expectations of retaliation in kind, may be the best among the poor alternatives that range from appeasement to self-defeating massive retaliation. In any case, a situation of stable mutual deterrence does not rule out all strategic strikes, but only those so sweeping that they destroy the bargaining power of the striker by dissipation of relative military power or valuable hostages. Some residual strategic backing for limited-war capabilities in third areas is still possible.

If we move toward stable mutual deterrence, the choice will be open between controlled counterforce and limited city attacks as the last resort of international bargaining. The choice must be determined, of course, by empirical matters beyond the limited scope of our discussion. It is a merit of our primitive models that they show how relative numbers can still matter. But what the numbers are and will be are the decisive issues. How many and how soft, for example, will be the inevitable vulnerabilities in the opposing retaliatory systems? Other equally crucial issues will depend on more political considerations. If, say, a particular controlled counterforce operation promises to kill no more of the enemy than a one-city strike, but to improve the military balance significantly, although not decisively, will it strengthen the chances of a favorable outcome? Or will it weaken it because a mass strike runs much greater risk of triggering the kind of massive retaliation that is in nobody's interest, because it floods the alarmed enemy with confused intelligence in a fast-moving and catastrophic situation? Questions like these are pertinent, and their answers should determine the blend between controlled counterforce and limited city attacks.

Many will contend that we should not settle in any case for so modest a goal as mutual stability, or, more subtly, they fear that to try to do so will induce lethargy that yields defeat rather than stalemate. They do not predict or espouse strategic symmetry, but project a favorable asymmetry if we are but resolute enough to exploit it, risks and all. Their classic aim, in contrast, is to win, or, its modern euphemism, to prevail. Again our hypothetical illustrations cannot resolve so fundamental a divergence; they can only illustrate aspects of it. Here we merely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remind the reader that when our illustrations in Section II added victory as a third major goal to deterrence and defense, the impact was only quantitative. The prescription then became more of the same, with destabilizing repercussions or not upon the arms race dependent upon the type of arms in question. Those who now seek strategic dominance may argue that it will be destabilizing, and therefore risky but promising; or that it will not be destabilizing, and so not risky but militarily less rewarding. This issue will turn, once more, on the scale and rates of exchange that may be expected in strategic counterforce operations. Or they may argue for both reasonable stability and dominance, fundamentally because we outspend or outwit the enemy. Whichever variant is put forward, adding "to prevail" as an objective in thermonuclear war implies much more than quantitative changes. It implies adding different kinds of capabilities, more dramatically and obviously on the defensive side, that limit damage to us so appreciably that striking first and massively, under dire provocation, becomes a credible policy for us when no longer so for our enemy.[13]

The popular compromise between this ambitious goal and stable mutual deterrence is easy to define as an aspiration; namely, strategic capabilities that promise to lessen damage to us in general thermonuclear war, but not so much so that they need alarm the enemy about our willingness to strike and thus weaken deterrence. The compromisers want to insure against the catastrophe if it occurs, even though their main hopes are pinned upon its avoidance. And what could be more natural? Yet significant insurance can only be purchased at some cost in strengthening reciprocal fears of surprise attack, for it does make resort to thermonuclear war less costly and therefore less incredible. As always, an offsetting effect can be sought by budgetary increases rather than decreases—more protected striking power to strengthen deterrence, while the damage-alleviating measures weaken it. This expedient moves any possibly destabilizing impacts upon strategic equilibrium to the different plane of the arms race, and to a more complex assessment. If the enemy matches us, mutual fears of pre-emptive attack may be calmed, but, with his greater striking power, what happens now to our prospects for alleviating damage? At what rate of exchange and

[13] I should not like the country to adopt as full-fledged and belligerent-appearing a central war preparedness as that advocated by Herman Kahn in *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, N.J., 1960), mainly because to go that far toward a "credible first strike" posture jeopardizes the longer-term prospects for arms control. My policy dissent, however, is coupled with great admiration for the book, which is enthusiastically recommended for, among other things, a much fuller treatment of many of the issues discussed in this article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to what extent has his increased power negated the increment to our protection?

We do well to leave these questions open, for again their answers require quantitative specification. To recognize that deterrence, defense, and victory as goals imply very different military prescriptions is not to supply them, although it is an indispensable first step toward good prescriptions. If we buy retaliatory power plus a wide range of capabilities that limit damage in thermonuclear war, the interactions among defense and deterrence will be many and important. Sensible policy will require that they be given fundamental and explicit consideration. On the other hand, if we opt for stable mutual deterrence, and explicitly rationalize the exchange of hostages as the main means of arms control, direct defense against thermonuclear war will be subordinated.

Having begun our discussion by reference to an old situation when the conflict between deterrence and defense did not matter, since achieving one automatically provided the other, we end by noting the possibility of a conflict among these objectives that matters so much that it must be radically settled. For general thermonuclear war, will deterrence definitely prevail over defense, with counterthreats posed to nullify enemy intent rather than capability, and victory forsworn? By turning classic military precepts upside down, do we come full circle to new simplicity, contrived rather than natural, in arms objectives? Finally, if we have not reached this radical situation yet, will we come to it later, more expensively?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INVULNERABLE RETALIATORY CAPABILITY AND ARMS CONTROL

By SEYOM BROWN

A CONSENSUS seems to have emerged among government decision-makers, military strategists, and scholars that an invulnerable nuclear retaliatory capability is a national goal of high priority, if not top priority. The Kennedy Administration, to a much greater degree than its predecessor, has given indication that the rationale and ingredients of a "second-strike" nuclear strategy are understood and being concretely programmed into defense planning. The agreed-upon goal is for the United States to be able to launch a devastating retaliatory nuclear attack against the enemy regardless of the size of the enemy's first strike against the United States.[1] "As a power which will never strike first," explained President Kennedy in his March 28 defense budget message, "our hopes for anything close to an absolute deterrent must rest on weapons which come from hidden, moving, or invulnerable bases which will not be wiped out by surprise attack. A retaliatory capability based on adequate numbers of these weapons would deter any aggressor from launching or even threatening an attack—an attack he knew could not find or destroy enough of our force to prevent his own destruction."

The elaboration of this policy in our alliance system, the apportionment among the armed services of the responsibility for the second-strike capability, and the necessary adaptation of the policy to a constantly changing technology will continue to demand controversial decisions of a high order. But the attention given to the strategic and budgetary issues involved should not be allowed to obscure the crucial impact that our commitment to an invulnerable retaliatory force has on the question of arms control.

This article emphasizes the military side of arms control problems, and almost totally excludes other considerations—such as public opinion or diplomatic bargaining—which may legitimately influence the formulation of over-all foreign policy. The focus, admittedly narrow, is deliberate, in order to isolate more starkly existing or potential contra-

[1] Even analysts of the Herman Kahn (*On Thermonuclear War*, Princeton, N.J., 1960) persuasion, who point to the need of maintaining a credible nuclear first-strike capability, consider an invulnerable retaliatory force a necessity. They tend, however, to stress its *insufficiency* (even with a conventional force build-up) for dealing with the total spectrum of likely military threats.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dictions between various arms control measures and military security. If there *are* contradictions between some arms control policies and some military security considerations, we may nonetheless opt for the policy of greater military risk in order to serve grand national strategy goals. But we should do so only with our eyes wide open and a clear knowledge of the risks involved.

I. Arms Reductions and Freezes

Western statesmen may have shelved any real expectations of "disarmament" (the removal of each nation's war-making capacity) in the foreseeable future; but the hope of avoiding unwanted war, or limiting the horrors of war by putting a brake on the arms race, remains very much alive. On the surface, attempts to agree with the Soviet Union on maximum acceptable levels of armaments might not seem to contradict our retaliatory strategy; but the assumptions on which such "partial disarmament" schemes rest bear closer examination.

If the major criterion for the size of our nuclear forces-in-being is deterrence, then—in theory at least—ratios should exist for weapons to be possessed by each side that would constitute mutual deterrence. Such ratios undoubtedly do exist, and are probably approximated by current armament levels, but formalizing them by agreement is another matter. Not only must any formula vary with changes in the absolute number of forces possessed by each side, but there must be continual revision of ratios in accordance with changes in the destructiveness, accuracy, and security from attack of those forces—technological variables incapable of prediction. Assuming, however, that such ratios could be agreed upon, it might nonetheless be dangerous to do so, since subsequent departure from a stated ratio, or failure to revise a ratio in the light of a technological breakthrough, could mean that mutual deterrence was no longer operative, giving the stronger party an incentive to consider a surprise first strike or the weaker party an incentive to consider a pre-emptive blow out of fear that the worst was coming anyway.

But there are even more compelling reasons why an administration committed to achieving an invulnerable deterrent could not agree to reduce or stop increasing the size of its nuclear striking force, at least not during the next few years. As long as a large part of this force remains exposed to enemy attack there will be some "security in numbers." United States defense planning can be expected to be responsive to the counsel of strategic analysts like Thomas C. Schelling, who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

argues: "For anything like equal numbers on both sides, the likelihood of successfully wiping out the other side's missiles becomes less and less as the missiles on both sides increase."[2] With missile arsenals significantly larger than either side possesses today, the likelihood (and mutual suspicion) of surprise attack will probably be *less*. And with a large enough retaliatory force on each side, an agreement to put a freeze on further missile production will also become less of a risk than it is now, since clandestine production by a cheating party would have to be conducted on a very large scale to alter the balance of forces sufficiently to make surprise attack "worth while." Moreover, when each side possesses a large enough arsenal so that there would have to be a gross augmentation of forces on one side or a major technological breakthrough to upset the deterrent balance fundamentally, *then* ratios might be meaningful. They might serve as boundaries within which unilateral augmentation or reduction of nuclear forces would *not* be regarded as highly provocative. Yet the upshot of this line of reasoning is that we should look *up* for our ratios, not down. And if the implications of the argument are accepted in government circles, it will mean that for the time being the United States will consider an "arms race" in missiles something to be favored rather than deplored.

On the other hand, Thomas Schelling foresees a reduction of specified *kinds* of nuclear weapons as a fit subject for negotiation if a second-strike capability is considered sufficient to deter attack, *and* if countercity, as distinguished from counterforce, weapons are considered adequate to implement this capability. Weapons which were clearly designed for a first strike and not for retaliation could then be safely abandoned by each side. There would be no incentive to violate such an agreement; furthermore, it would formalize the abandonment by each side of any intention to launch a surprise attack.[3] However, to reach the point where both sides would find it advantageous to proclaim jointly their abandonment of first-strike or counterforce arsenals demands, as a precondition, accelerated weapons development by both sides, especially of the mobile and concealed types.

Cutoffs on further *production* of nuclear materials to be used for

[2] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, p. 237. Henry Kissinger accepted and elaborated upon this hypothesis in his "Arms Control, Inspection, and Surprise Attack," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII, No. 4 (July 1960), pp. 561-62, and in *The Necessity for Choice*, New York, 1961, pp. 216-18.

[3] Schelling, *ibid.*, p. 241. For Schelling's ideas on unilateral programs for weapons systems which might *tacitly* convey our abandonment of a first-strike capability, see his "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," *Daedalus*, LXXXIX, No. 4 (Fall 1960), pp. 905-8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cl.440.

weapons,[4] however, would not have to await the achievement of striking-force invulnerability. An "overkill" stock of nuclear explosives may be reached prior to reaching a minimum security level in delivery systems. Furthermore, once all the destructive power conceivably required is already possessed by both sides, violation of a stockpile freeze agreement by either side need not make the other side jittery. Yet the very fact that violation of the agreement would not gravely endanger our security (except insofar as it created an atmosphere of suspicion and tension) indicates that it would not be the kind of agreement which has much intrinsic importance for averting or limiting wars. However, a cutoff of nuclear production has been seen as a means to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons capabilities to other nations. The plausibility of this assumption will be discussed below in the section on "Nuclear Diffusion."

Proposals for "conventional" arms reduction are also affected by the emphasis on a second-strike nuclear strategy, a relationship which pronouncements and proposals by the Kennedy Administration have done much to highlight in recent months. To the extent that both the USSR and the United States rely on invulnerable retaliatory capabilities to deter the other from launching a massive nuclear first strike, the need for an augmented limited war capability for the United States and its allies seems greater, and the likelihood of our agreeing to reduce our limited-war fighting strength becomes less. The de-emphasis of a first-strike strategy carries with it a lessening of the function of our strategic forces in deterring attacks against areas other than the United States itself. Thus, the deterrent function falls more heavily on the limited-war forces, which must be made strong enough to convince potential aggressors in Europe or Asia that they have more to lose than gain by any attacks, even if massive nuclear weapons are never used. The West may someday be willing to reopen serious negotiations with the Soviets for a mutual "balanced" reduction of forces, but this would be *after* NATO had built up its conventional capability to a level of parity with the Warsaw Pact countries. Manpower reduction per se could be agreed to or made unilaterally before parity was achieved insofar as fighting effectiveness were not dependent upon the number of men in uniform; but this would not be even "partial disarmament" in the sense of scaling down actual fighting power.

[4] Such as contained in the Eisenhower proposals to the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1960, urging "a system for terminating, under verification procedures, all production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes." *New York Times*, September 23, 1960, p. 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The hope of reducing requirements for manpower while augmenting our power to fight limited wars lay behind some of the support in the Eisenhower Administration for giving NATO an effective capability for tactical nuclear warfare.[5] And there can be little doubt that recent conventional force reductions by the Soviet Union have been concurrent with—though not necessarily induced by—her development of tactical nuclear fighting units.

"Disengagement"—the demilitarization or denuclearization of areas of tension—has thus far had little prominent support in the United States, except from George Kennan and his disciples. But it has been seriously advocated by leaders of both parties in England. Anthony Eden at Geneva in 1955 suggested the creation of a zone of limited armaments in Europe with a completely demilitarized center strip; and Prime Minister Macmillan in his 1959 joint communiqué with Khrushchev agreed to give further consideration to the "possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces, both conventional and nuclear, in the agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection." The idea would seem to have special relevance for the period of mutual massive deterrence, where the fear is not so much of war ignited by a strategic nuclear blow, as of a limited war spiraling out of control into a total war of mass destruction. Disengagement in those areas where limited war between members of the two great alliances is most likely to break out is envisaged as a "strategic interspace" or "international safety belt."[6] The difficulty with such an interspace is that an expansionist power, like Nature and the vacuum, is apt to abhor it and be tempted to fill it. It is precisely a situation of mutual stand-off nuclear deterrence that would encourage an aggressor to move swiftly into a relatively defenseless area and present the world with a *fait accompli*. On the other hand, there might be value in denuclearizing zones of tension if they were kept strongly armed with conventional weapons. Denuclearization might prevent

[5] A less widely acknowledged but nonetheless important reason for giving NATO a "tactical" nuclear capability has been to renew the credibility of the massive retaliation doctrine against conventional aggression in Europe. This approach looks with favor upon the blurred line between "tactical" and "strategic" nuclear weapons, stresses the likelihood of any limited war in Europe "escalating" into a total war, and wants to remind the Russians continually of this likelihood.

[6] Terms used by the British strategist B. H. Liddell Hart in his most recent book, *Deterrent or Defense*, New York, 1960, pp. 229-35. Liddell Hart comes out strongly for disengagement in this book, preferably for an atom-free zone in Central Europe with a reduced level of conventional armaments, comprising countries not in alliance with the nuclear powers on either side. This he feels might eventually be extended to make "a Trans-Eurasian safety belt that would stretch from Spitzbergen to the Himalayas."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

immediate escalation into nuclear war. And the threat of graduated nuclear reprisals against any injection of nuclear weapons into the conflict might serve to keep the conflict limited. The decision to resort to nuclear weapons (even tacticals) could not be made at the battle-front but would necessitate a considered decision by top-echelon authorities. This variety of disengagement, though, does not imply a *reduction* of armaments, nor should it be regarded as a "gateway" to grander arms-control schemes. It would constitute only a *redeployment* of forces within each of the military blocs in the service of an interest they presumably both share—that is, retaining effective control over the dimensions of any war which may involve them.

Although it is commonly argued that, if we cannot have complete disarmament, we had better hurry to negotiate for partial disarmament before the arms race gets out of hand, an investigation of the existing military situation suggests an alternative proposition: any meaningful arms reductions or freezes must be *preceded* by significant armament build-ups in certain categories—particularly conventional forces and concealed, mobile, and hardened missile systems.

II. Nuclear Test Bans

Although prospects for a treaty seem remote at this writing, the United States and the USSR have come closer to agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests than on any other arms control item. Partly in order not to disturb the fragile negotiating environment, and partly from fear of offending widespread public sentiment for an agreement, the government has refrained from officially airing a highly pertinent question: namely, *would a test ban be inimical to a U.S. strategy committed to achieving an invulnerable retaliatory capability?*

A nuclear weapons-test agreement which retarded the development of offensive or defensive weapons necessary to the maintenance of such a capability would, of course, be a contradiction (in military terms) of the national strategy. This is one of the key arguments of Edward Teller. "Nuclear experiments," he contends, "can provide us with smaller, more handy, more flexible tools which can move easily and survive even the hardest attack."[7]

It is common knowledge among physicists that some significant weapons developments would probably result from a resumption of testing. One of these, according to Ralph E. Lapp, is an increase in "specific yield," i.e., explosive equivalent divided by weight of active

[7] Edward Teller, "The Issue of Peace," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XVI, No. 6 (June 1960), p. 204.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

material. This would be particularly important for increasing the effectiveness of the Minuteman and Polaris (the least vulnerable of our weapons systems and therefore the most heavily relied upon for a second-strike strategy), whose major weakness is their inability to carry large warheads. Lapp estimates that the 0.5-megaton yield of the 1961 design of their warheads could be increased to 1 megaton fairly soon and, with exhaustive testing, perhaps even to 2 megatons.[8]

A related and somewhat more startling connection between further nuclear experimentation and our retaliatory strategy was pointed out by Bernard Brodie in his *Strategy in the Missile Age*. The strategy threatens retaliation directed not so much at the enemy's strategic nuclear forces (since most of these would presumably have been unleashed against us already) as at the lifeblood of the enemy nation—its industrial complex, its cities. Thus, said Brodie: "When . . . we consider the special requirements of deterrence, with its emphasis upon the punitive aspect of retaliation, we may find a need for even super-dirty bombs. Since the emphasis must be on making certain that the enemy will fear even the smallest number of bombs that might be sent in retaliation, one wants these bombs to be, and thus to appear before the event, as horrendous as possible. This grim objective is advanced by making the bomb very large and also very contaminating. It may also prove feasible by an appropriate selection of chemicals to augment close-in fallout without increasing the output of those radioactive isotopes which are characteristically carried a considerable distance."[9]

Such arguments, let it be noted, are of a different order from support for the continuation of tests in order to perfect *tactical* nuclear weapons for use in limited-war situations.[10] Teller, Lapp, and Brodie were here particularly concerned with the nation's strategic retaliatory force and its effectiveness in deterring a surprise first strike. To the extent that nuclear tests are in fact necessary for the weapons developments they speak of, a nuclear test ban is at odds with the goal of developing an invulnerable retaliatory capability.

Even if progress toward an invulnerable retaliatory capability may be retarded by failure to resume testing, it has been increasingly urged in recent years that the restriction in the development of nuclear arsenals

[8] Ralph E. Lapp, "Nuclear Weapon Systems," *ibid.*, XVII, No. 3 (March 1961), pp. 99-102.

[9] Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Princeton, N.J., 1959, p. 295.

[10] The latter was the argument most stressed by the Atomic Energy Commission and many Defense Department officials in the Eisenhower Administration, according to Hanson W. Baldwin, *New York Times*, March 30, 1960. Former Atomic Energy Commissioner Thomas E. Murray also took this position in his *Nuclear Policy for War and Peace*, Cleveland, 1960.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by other nations resulting from a test ban treaty would be worth such a cost. This assumption too demands closer examination.

III. Preventing Nuclear Weapons Diffusion

The so-called "nth-country problem" is becoming the central problem of arms control. It is generally agreed that the greater the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons, the greater the likelihood of their use. But how to stop the diffusion of nuclear weapons, or at least slow down the process, remains the great puzzle. Some students of the problem, already convinced that a growth of the nuclear club is inevitable, feel that arms control schemes not built on the assumption of "n" equaling at least 5 are sure to be obsolete before they have a chance of being implemented. The problem is tending to become how to operate in the nth-country world rather than how to prevent it.[11]

However, the conviction continues to be widespread that a test ban agreement among the present nuclear powers will prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons capabilities to other nations. Unfortunately, more faith than analysis seems to underlie this conviction. As The RAND Corporation's arms control analyst, Fred Iklé, has pointed out, the assumed link between a test suspension and a curb on nth-country capabilities is subject to the following limitations: (1) Potential nuclear countries such as China and countries engaged in developing their own nuclear weapons might refuse to accede to the treaty. (2) Even if there were universal accession to the treaty, some kinds of nuclear weapons could be developed without testing; or if production controls were included in the treaty (though there is nothing in past test ban negotiations to suggest they would be), important potential nth countries might demand nuclear weapons from the United States or the Soviets in return for acceding to the treaty. (3) Clandestine testing in violation of a universal test ban might be easier to conduct in countries like China; and since an offended world opinion would presumably be the only sanction against cheating, "irresponsible" governments might be willing to gamble a temporary loss in international good will for a large increment in military power.[12]

Paradoxically, attempts to formalize a division of the world into nuclear have and have-not nations could stimulate nuclear weapons

[11] See especially Arthur L. Burns, *Power Politics and the Growing Nuclear Club*, Policy Memorandum No. 20, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1959, and his *The Rationale of Catalytic War*, Research Monograph No. 3, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1959.

[12] Fred Charles Iklé, "Nth Countries and Disarmament," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XVI, No. 10 (December 1960), pp. 391-94.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development programs among the have-nots.[13] A more fruitful approach might be for the United States and the USSR to stress the expensiveness and strategic hazards of unilateral development while providing *controlled* diffusion to those of their respective allies who were willing to participate in "joint command" schemes. If nuclear diffusion is to occur, it would be better if those nations achieving capabilities were helped to develop relatively secure second-strike forces which would not be an enticement to surprise attack.

However, as the case of France shows, pride coupled with legitimate national security considerations is likely to frustrate attempts by the United States to assist its allies to build up effective nuclear capabilities as long as we object to enabling each nation to make independent decisions in regard to the *use* of the weapons. Chafing at the bit of joint control is caused by a growing skepticism about the political ability of nations not themselves under attack to join in a massive nuclear response to an attack upon an ally. The result has been a variety of "safety catch and trigger" formulas.

Prominent among such formulas is the system of "dual control" proposed by Pierre M. Gallois, an advisor on military policy to the French government. Gallois would have the United States give substantial aid in weapons and materials to its major allies in order to build up their nuclear capabilities to the level where each, acting by itself, could "inflict enough damage to outweigh the benefits which the aggressor could hope to win by resorting to force." But in order to avoid undue risks, the circumstances under which the nuclear weapons could be used independently would be set forth explicitly in an agreement between the United States and the recipient nations. "If those expressly defined conditions were to materialize, the United States government would hand over to its ally the 'key' held by its own representative. Thus an arsenal hitherto held under dual control would be converted into an instrument of purely national defense."[14] The feasibility of the Gallois plan depends upon the ability of the United States and its allies to define expressly those conditions which would require the United States to relinquish its veto over the use of nuclear weapons. A different set of contingencies would probably have to be

[13] Thornton Read maintains that this adverse effect could be avoided by a treaty restricting nuclear weapons to the US and USSR, outlawing any first use, and making nuclear reprisals mandatory against any first use. (*A Proposal to Neutralize Nuclear Weapons*, Policy Memorandum No. 22, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1961).

[14] Pierre M. Gallois, "New Teeth for NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX, No. 1 (October 1960), p. 75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

developed for each ally. Even if such agreements could be negotiated, we might not want to give a potential aggressor such detailed information on when and at what level of provocation he could attack without invoking the response of the entire alliance.

Skepticism as to the feasibility and deterrent effectiveness of plans which attempt to straddle the alternatives of joint control and command vs. independent nuclear capabilities has reactivated serious pursuit of means to effect greater military integration within the NATO alliance and of ways of transforming the Atlantic Community into something approaching a real federation.[15] In an age of mutual invulnerable retaliatory capabilities, effective arms control may become more likely to the degree that the present loose bipolar system is able to transform itself into a tight bipolar system.[16] The place of non-aligned nations in either system and their possible role in contributing to or frustrating meaningful arms control is beyond the scope of this article. But merely to suggest its relevance to the nth-country problem shows the extent to which workable arms control plans must be more than a fusion of diplomacy, physics, and military strategy, and must be informed by a variety of intellectual resources from the social sciences.

However, even without taking into account the multiplicity of variables which impinge upon the problem, it can be asserted with some confidence that the stability given to the "balance of terror" by American and Soviet stress on second-strike capabilities could be drastically undermined by a proliferation of nuclear capabilities, unless there were a radical tightening of command and control within both the Western and the Sino-Soviet bloc. Arms control may involve some concerted nuclear armament of other countries rather than attempts to get them to renounce nuclear status.

IV. Inspection Systems

Proposals for mutual inspection of armaments have been championed as devices for *verifying* adherence to other arms control agreements or for gaining *foreknowledge* of military attack. The former purpose is typified by proposed inspection systems to implement a nuclear test ban or a cutoff of nuclear weapons production; and the latter is most

[15] See, for example, chap. iv ("The United States and Europe") in Kissinger's *The Necessity for Choice, op.cit.* An intensive analysis of the complex of problems involved in attempts to secure greater military integration within NATO will be found in Robert E. Osgood's forthcoming book, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance.*

[16] Morton Kaplan's discussion of the essential characteristics of these two systems is instructive here. See his *System and Process in International Politics*, New York, 1957.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prominently associated with Eisenhower's 1955 open skies proposal and subsequent variations on that theme.

Either kind of inspection system might directly contradict a deterrent strategy stressing retaliatory force invulnerability.

If the security of the retaliatory force against attack depends primarily upon its concealment, then its hidden portion would have to be exempted from an inspection system. This consideration may drastically restrict the field within which the United States or any other country can pursue serious negotiations for arms limitation requiring verification. Inspection to verify adherence to an agreement to cease production of fissionable materials or weapons, for example, would be desirable only if the inspectorate was not allowed to inspect already existing weapons systems. However, with each nation able to put up "off bounds" signs, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing access to areas that might house portions of the retaliatory force, the chances for clandestine production would be multiplied.

Kissinger has suggested a unique method for reconciling concealment requirements with "inventory" inspection—that is, inspection for the purpose of determining the size and basic composition of a nation's forces. Such knowledge could be important to opponents whose security depended upon a system of stable deterrence based upon a formally agreed upon or tacitly adhered to ratio of forces. Each nation would designate *several* large geographic areas in which it had stationed its mobile and concealed systems. Total inspection would be allowed in other areas but only inventory inspection would be allowed in *these* areas. Furthermore, not all of a nation's retaliatory force would be subject to inventory inspection simultaneously, allowing a large enough portion to remain hidden or mobile while inventory was being taken of other portions so that the nation's total strike-back ability would not be significantly compromised at any one time. Total inspection in strips separating the inventory areas and complete control of airport and harbor facilities would also be required to detect transfers of weapons between the areas in order to elude the inventory inspectors.[17] The major difficulty with the scheme is its vastness. It is hard to see how it could be reliable without being global; and as such it would

[17] *The Necessity for Choice, op.cit.*, pp. 222-27. Kissinger is fully aware of possible kinks in the proposal, and has discovered some himself (particularly the likelihood that the system would be cumbersome in adapting to technological breakthroughs); but even if it serves only as a kind of arms-control gaming exercise, it is highly suggestive of how imaginative students of the problem may shatter many of our prematurely rigid notions of the narrow possibilities for new approaches.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

require a fundamental lessening of international tension as a precondition for its negotiation and acceptance.

Mutual or UN inspection systems to guard against surprise attack might also compromise weapons concealment, but need not be so designed. The original open skies proposal could not form the basis of an acceptable system, since it called for exchange of complete military blueprints as well as aerial inspection (and was later expanded to include ground inspection). It was designed primarily as a weapons *disclosure* system under the assumption that significant alterations in the deployment of weapons would have to be made by a country before engaging in a massive attack (an assumption less tenable in the missile age).

Anti-surprise attack schemes dependent upon reconnaissance, as distinguished from on-site inspection, would be compatible with a deterrent strategy that relied heavily on concealment only to the extent that the technology of hiding outpaces the technology of finding. As detection devices are perfected, and *both* sides rely more heavily on mobility than concealment, we may find the Soviets less adamant in their opposition to overflights.

Current justification for reconnaissance flights is their utility in increasing warning time of surprise attack; and this is sufficient justification while the security of our retaliatory force depends upon early warning. (Increased warning time might be irrelevant to retaliatory force security when the force is effectively protected, since surprise would then give no significant advantage to the aggressor. But when many nations possess nuclear weapons, it will be important to know from which one an attack came, for retaliation to make any sense at all. Reconnaissance systems such as the Midas which can detect a missile at its point of launching would thus seem essential.) Even when crucial to deterrence, however, there is no compelling reason to have reconnaissance systems administered by the UN.[18] Unilateral devices could accomplish the purpose just as well and might be less susceptible to sabotage. And a possible system for registry and advance inspection by a UN agency of all overflights to ensure that the vehicles are not carrying weapons need not inhibit the legitimate activities of reconnaissance systems.

A form of foreknowledge inspection which began to appear prominently in United States proposals during 1960 and is now being increasingly urged by arms control specialists is directed at preventing

[18] Except that a *mutual* system could not be objected to by one side as being "provocative."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pre-emptive strikes arising from a misreading of enemy moves or intentions. Some machinery for verifying in a crisis situation that neither side is preparing to attack the other was advocated but not elaborated upon by President Eisenhower in his September 1960 UN address: "Today the danger of war by miscalculation could be reduced, in times of crisis, by the intervention, when requested by a nation seeking to prove its peaceful intention, of an appropriate United Nations surveillance body. The question of methods can be left to the experts."[19] However, "methods" are the stuff of any arms control system; and feasibility or the lack of it distinguishes the airy hope from the serious proposal. Even Thomas Schelling, who has done the most systematic study of this type of proposal, has not yet fashioned a model of such a surveillance body specific enough to determine the feasibility of its establishment and operation. How, in fact, parties to the system could be sure that a potential enemy was not faking a pacific intent as a diversionary prelude to a surprise attack has not been shown. Schelling suggests non-evacuation of cities as one kind of evidence that a first strike is not being prepared. However, this would be conclusive evidence only if the enemy thought its surprise attack, even if successful, would not confer a decisive advantage. Yet Schelling himself stresses that his scheme rests on the premise that "there is likely to be, during most of the foreseeable future, an enormous advantage in striking first in the event that war occurs."[20] Moreover, Schelling admits that "crash" inspection systems could be abused. "One can feign alarm and demand reassurance as a means of using an observation force to get information not intended under the scheme, either information about how the enemy responds to dramatic events or just snapshot information. . . ."[21] He is still exploring the logic of the whole idea and does not appear ready to say with any assurance that the dangers of such a system are outweighed by its advantages. It would thus seem imprudent for political leaders to jump in with policy pronouncements where the specialists are still treading very cautiously.

V. Space Satellite Weapon Controls

Although the vision of the earth being orbited constantly by weapons carriers is nightmarish to many, such a situation need not necessarily

[19] *New York Times*, September 23, 1960, p. 14.

[20] Thomas C. Schelling, "Arms Control: Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force," *World Politics*, XIII, No. 1 (October 1960), p. 6.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 16. See also his "Surprise Attack and Disarmament," in *NATO and American Security*, edited by Klaus Knorr, Princeton, N.J., 1959; reprinted in slightly modified form in Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict, op.cit.*, pp. 230-54.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

add to the dangers of a mutual deterrence system which allows nations to keep ICBM's aimed at each other. There is still no evidence or reason for fearing that a massive attack launched from bombardment satellites would be any more effective, owing to surprise or destructiveness, than an attack by land- and sea-based missiles. The stress given to banning space weapons[22] may be the product of a psychological lag, of the kind that makes some people continue to fear that flying in an airplane is more dangerous than traveling by automobile.

Whether or not space weaponry would augment existing military capabilities so as to alter international political relationships basically does not have an obvious answer. It is quite likely that ten years ago sentiment for a ban on submarine-borne nuclear missiles (apart from Holy Loch) would have been widespread, should such a proposal have been made; yet today the Polaris-carrying submarine is generally conceded to be our most effective deterrent, and the Russians' possession of such capability can also be viewed as *stabilizing* the "balance of terror," since it helps remove their suspicion that the United States would contemplate a surprise first-strike against them. If space weapons will have an analogous positive effect upon relative invulnerability—i.e., the ability of the retaliating party to render unacceptable damage to his attacker—such an increment to the military arsenals of the major powers should possibly be favored and encouraged. Considerations to be given attention in evaluating the impact of space weapons capabilities upon mutual deterrence include many that are highly speculative owing to the infant state of space technology: Would weapon-carrying satellites (wagging their orbital tails behind them) be easy targets? Would decoys lessen their vulnerability? Could anti-missile weapons stationed in space be made more effective than ground-based anti-missile systems? To what extent would ground control systems have to survive after a first strike for satellites to be able to perform a retaliatory function? Is counterforce warfare among space satellites, and limited to outer space, a mere fantasy or is it quite plausible? Are the versatility and effectiveness of ground- and sea-based weapons likely to be equal or superior to any contemplated satellite weapons system, with the result that nations will be deterred from developing satellite weapons by economic considerations?

These were among the questions explored by a conference of social scientists and space scientists convened by The RAND Corporation

[22] As, for example, President Eisenhower's proposal that "We agree, subject to appropriate verification, that no nation will put into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction" (UN speech, September 22, 1960).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in October 1959[23]—without any basic consensus being reached other than on the need for further study.

Rather than rushing to champion a ban on space weapons before a thoroughgoing evaluation of their positive and negative effects for a stable deterrence system, the United States, while operating under an invulnerable retaliatory force strategy, would seem well advised to concentrate (for purposes of arms control negotiation) on proposals for merely registering and inspecting satellite flights.

On the other hand, it may be argued that here is one field in which the weapons are not yet in existence; therefore, there is still a chance to establish a workable prohibition of their development and use if we act *now*. This is one of the areas of arms control which requires urgent study. For unless we tread the path of space weapons controls with some forethought, we could easily get stuck in the propaganda quicksand of a "ban the space forces" campaign and thus prevent necessary policy flexibility in an age of rapidly changing technology.

VI. General Considerations for Arms Control Policy Planning

We have attempted to show how a strategy based upon the assumption that the main deterrent to a nuclear attack by the Russians upon the United States is their fear of our ability to maim them in a return blow makes certain types of arms control agreements unacceptable to the United States, and also how such a strategy downgrades the war-averting or war-limiting importance of those agreements which might be acceptable.

The strategy seems to preclude the United States from agreeing to allow its military condition relative to its enemies, especially during *stages* of "disarming," to be of such nature as to encourage a nuclear first-strike against itself. This means that our capacity to retaliate against attack cannot be surrendered until the very *last* stage, although the kind of weapons required for an effective retaliatory force could vary with successive stages. Consequently, whatever the comprehensiveness of a disarmament scheme, the United States must continue to insist on well-defined stages, timing of stages, and effective verification at each step. The government has made such insistence in its objections to Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament—thus in-

[23] *International Political Implications of Activities in Outer Space*, The RAND Corporation, Report R-362-RC, 1960. See especially the paper by Klaus Knorr, pp. 133-156; the statement by Thomas Schelling, pp. 36-48; and the statement by Paul Kecskemeti, pp. 95-97.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

curring the propaganda disadvantages of being even this candid in a less than candid world where rapid disarmament continues to be a panacea to many. But some of the arms control proposals suggested as realistic alternatives by the United States and its allies often contradict the strategic reasoning invoked in the context of opposing the more ambitious Soviet schemes. To label a proposal "arms control" rather than disarmament does not make it automatically compatible with the nation's overriding military strategy goals. Some inspection and control devices could undercut a relatively stable system of mutual deterrence no less than an indiscriminate diffusion of nuclear capabilities among smaller powers. "Open skies" arrangements may not only be ineffective in preventing surprise attacks, but could actually increase the temptations to a would-be aggressor. Cooperation to effectuate retaliatory force security may be more important than disclosure schemes in an age when invulnerable weapons systems constitute the crucial deterrents.

Modest arms control schemes must be given the same hard scrutiny we seem to reserve for assessing the grander plans or we may some day find ourselves being handed a pen by the Soviets to sign a control agreement we have publicly championed but are not really ready to accept.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CROSSING THE CULTURE BARS

An Approach to the Training of American Technicians for Overseas Assignments

By JOHN D. MONTGOMERY

I. The Problem

SOME of the 25,000 American businessmen, most of the 30,000 American missionaries, and all of the 33,000 public officials working abroad have received some form of training in "overseasmanship" prior to embarking upon their careers as technical assistants. This training was not supposed to make them better managers, Christians, diplomats, or technicians, but to enhance their usefulness in a strange cultural environment. Such training may be viewed as a specialized form of education designed to influence their performance or behavior. Conveying knowledge about foreign cultures or about the processes of change is an important form of training as well as a legitimate aspect of education; the distinction is one of purpose and focus. Employers are more sympathetic to offering "training" programs than to providing "education" for their overseas agents, even if the subject matter is essentially the same. They expect a specific result—better performance—from their training programs.

This distinction between "education" and "training" is an important one. Academic studies for relevant educational purposes are normally those carried on in university departments of sociology, economics, and political science, or in area programs; and they usually involve research in the cultures undergoing change. Training programs carried on within a university, on the other hand, are generally administered as special programs, often on a nominally interdisciplinary basis, and nearly always directed toward a special clientele of government technicians, missionaries, and businessmen. Such programs are usually short, leading to no degree or academic credit. There is an atmosphere of utility in their classrooms, in which the processes of learning and thinking appear to be mere stop-overs en route to an overseas situation rather than ends in themselves. The research that underlies training programs may include materials derived from both developed and underdeveloped societies, since the meeting of two cultures engaged in inducing change requires adjustments on the part of both. Such training programs thus confront some of the most complex problems

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the entire range of the social sciences, yet they must often perform their functions on demand and follow a tight schedule in spite of inadequate time for preparation and instruction, inadequate attention to the need for research, and an inadequate store of knowledge of previous American experiences in technical assistance.

Failures in technical assistance are seldom the result of an insufficient store of technical knowledge. Nearly all fields of knowledge in which we offer technical assistance are reasonably well understood in our professional and technical schools, and foreign aid practitioners are generally competent men. Yet the level of technical skills and even the basic methodology of many specialized or professional fields must be adapted to fundamentally different requirements and material circumstances when practiced overseas, and we expect these adjustments to be made by the specialists themselves rather than in our professional schools. Where American technicians encounter failure overseas, the reasons are not so much professional incompetence as failure to adapt.

Two principal explanations are given for failure in communicating technical knowledge across frontiers: *personal factors* in "overseasmanship," involving differences in individual ability, articulateness, personality characteristics, and character traits;[1] and *cultural factors*, which may be encountered by technicians as a group sharing the same assumptions about human nature, representing the same value system, and employing similar technical approaches. The first group of obstacles is a matter for the psychologists and recruitment officers to deal with, and has already received some sophisticated attention. But the cultural factors that inhibit or reduce technical communication are still little understood. They affect those who survive personality screening and they must be dealt with in the training process. This suggests that the traditional preoccupation with cultural peculiarities of the society that is playing host to our technicians may not be enough. Perhaps an equally fruitful source of understanding would come from examining our own cultural peculiarities as factors in the process of inducing change.

II. National and Transfer Cultural Errors

American failures in technical assistance involve two types of erroneous cultural assumptions: those induced by blindness to our own national cultural idiosyncrasies, and those induced by the uncritical transfer of assumptions from one set of personal experiences in technical

[1] A useful list of these factors is found in Harlan Cleveland *et al.*, *The Overseas American*, New York, 1960, pp. 123-88.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assistance to another setting. The first might be characterized as the notion that all people are like us; the second, by the hypothesis that all other people are alike because, or at least insofar as, they are not like us. For purposes of this discussion I shall refer to them respectively as "national" and "transfer" cultural errors.

Cultural rigidities on our part—the "national" errors—are an exact parallel to the doubts, apathies, and suspicions that we so often observe as peculiarities in the receiving cultures. In fact, the limitations on our own self-perception have made others seem even more peculiar than they really are.

These self-limiting cultural factors I sometimes call the "beanbag syndrome" because of an experience that my wife and I shared in Saigon. The American Women's Association there, over 250 strong, engaged in a number of charitable activities on their own initiative. They were especially attentive to orphanages and hospitals. One of their benevolences was an elaborate project for the hand artisans among the American wives: to make some 300 cloth dolls vaguely resembling cats, filled with beans. (The culture-sensitive American women did not want to offend the Vietnamese by using rice, a much cheaper commodity but one in somewhat short supply as food.) These were presented to orphanages for use as Christmas gifts, with the understanding that any surplus could be sold in a self-help fund-raising scheme. Tours of inspection during the ensuing weeks revealed that while none of the beanbags had entered the Saigon marketplace, neither had any reached the hands of the Vietnamese orphans. Upon inquiry it developed that the dolls, each the product of several hours of painstaking work, had been slit open and the beans removed, cooked, and eaten, while the decorated cloth was either discarded or used to make rather small and odd-looking handbags. The project was not, in short, an economic success: the generous club-women had been looking at Vietnamese orphans, but seeing American children.

The three main features of this miniature self-help operation present an object lesson about American foreign aid. First, it was undertaken from the purest of motives, and with no hope of personal gain. Second, an undoubted benefit resulted (if a meal of beans can be thus defined). Third, the inefficiency of the relationship between intentions and results suggests that the effort involved might have been better applied in some other fashion.

Examples of the "beanbag syndrome" in technical assistance are provided by countless stories of misused or underused tools: the laundress in Indo-China who was given an ironing board so she would no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

longer squat on the floor to do her ironing, and who after repeated urgings by her mistress to "use it" was discovered squatting on it precariously as she performed her task; or the sawing off of the long-handled hoes given to Egyptian farmers to replace the *faz*, the traditional short-handled wooden implements used in the back-breaking posture familiar to travelers in the Near East; or the discarding of unfamiliar food from the CARE packages in Bolivia so that the cans at least could be used in cooking. Scores of such examples have been reported as evidence of a failure in transmission. They have been used in the popular literature to discredit the entire foreign aid process. They are illustrations of the "beanbag" effect in its simplest, most obvious form. They are typical of many gifts offered by the United States in the form in which they have been useful to us.

The "beanbag syndrome," long observed in the physical aspects of technical assistance, can also be identified in the tools of the mind that are involved whenever institutions are to be transplanted. Without indulging in an exhaustive examination of the American culture as a source of ideas and techniques,[2] it is obvious that the pragmatic tenor of our institutional behavior is not a cultural universal; that the idea of "economic man" means something different in the African bush than in the American college classroom; that the virtues of cleanliness are not everywhere self-evident; that the concept of advancement by individual merit is an affront to certain orders of society; that the ticking clock as a symbol of efficiency has not measured the timeless golden days of most village headmen within commuting distance of the equator. All of these culturally induced attitudes are characteristic of Western society, especially in its American variant.

It is true, of course, that study of non-Western societies where these attitudes are not prevalent may succeed in alerting technicians to some of the dangers of ethnocentricity. But these are not always revealed in studies of foreign cultures by themselves: no one would study a non-Western culture in terms of the notion that it assigns "uncleanliness" or "inefficiency" a place in its hierarchy of values. It is not enough to study the peculiarities of non-Western peoples if we are to identify the difficulties likely to arise in the transmission of technical knowledge and attitudes to them. Some attention must also be devoted to American ways of doing things that collide with those of non-Western cultures.

Not all American traits constitute factors of equal importance in their relationships with every non-Western culture. A generalized study

[2] For a provocative examination of this question, see Conrad M. Arensberg, "Assumptions of American Culture," New York, 1954 (mimeographed).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of American culture would soon violate the test of relevance in a training program.[3] The variety among the newly developing countries inevitably means that the attitudes of some are more like ours than those of others are; and what may constitute an obstacle in relationships between the United States and a second culture may be a bridge in other circumstances. This poses a serious dilemma in action and in training for action: if non-Western cultures differ significantly among themselves in their responses to technical assistance, can there be a generalized training suitable for all cultures? A common answer to this dilemma is that training can "sensitize" the technician to the characteristics of the non-Western culture, or at least help him recognize a cultural obstacle when he sees it. This has led to some assumptions about the possibility of studying "other areas" in a diluted "sensitizing" form that is less substantial than that offered by the traditional disciplines but is thought to provide a cultural inoculation. A more specific approach is the short-term immersion in another culture during the training process, scheduled in the hope of developing a transferable cultural empathy.

Still another useful approach, not yet attempted systematically, would be to start by considering ourselves as a coherent, unitary culture, at least as we approach the rest of the world through our technical assistance programs, and then isolate and identify those of our characteristics that have seemed strange and repellent to those we have tried to influence. By the study of enough examples drawn from experience in technical assistance, it may be possible to identify, minimize, and perhaps avoid repeating some of our standard national errors.

One of the principal assumptions in American technical assistance is our cultural exaltation of the written word. Centuries of Roman and Anglo-Saxon adjudication of contracts and written agreements have left their mark, until the written word is now considered altogether more binding as an obligation than other agreements. Like the Muslims, we are "people of the book." We do not like to think of agreements as capable of fluctuating with changes in the conditions that gave rise to them. Our Constitution is legalistically considered changeless except by written amendment; and when its words are given new meanings, someone always objects. Even so, the uncertainty can be eventually resolved, again in writing; and the Supreme Court simply uses more written words to define the new (or "rediscovered") mean-

[3] This is not to deny the fact that Americans need to have more specific knowledge about their country to be successful abroad than they do in the United States. See Stuart Gerry Brown, *Memo for Overseas Americans*, Syracuse, N.Y., 1960, esp. Harlan Cleveland's introduction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ings of old ones. After each decision, the "social contract" is once more fixed, until it is challenged anew.

In many societies, however, the written word is a last resort in expressing or identifying agreement, and contract obligations shift with changing needs. President Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam, one of the few Asian leaders who has been counted a "reliable" friend of the United States, has been characterized by aid officials as wholly unconcerned with our written bilateral agreements. Vietnamese guarantees of contributions from the national budget to various programs have not always been scrupulously kept; agreements to undertake governmental reorganization to administer projects supported by American funds have also been loosely interpreted; and as a result Americans have felt cheated. These derelictions appear reprehensible to American technicians and diplomats, but they are perfectly normal to Vietnamese officials. The latter explain that Vietnamese are more concerned with accomplishing the end result of a project than with undertaking all the obligations assumed as a condition to an agreement. Yet the Vietnamese society is a relatively sophisticated one. It has, if anything, a surplus of lawyers, and it enjoys a rigid—not to say, static—bureaucratic system. On the administrative level, in contrast to the diplomatic, the orders transmitted from the central government are fulfilled with terrifying literalness. To minor officials in Vietnam, written words are coats of mail. This again shocks the American bureaucrat, because at the working levels he is accustomed to finding enough flexibility to permit discretionary changes in policy in the field, to be followed, if necessary, by subsequent justifications. Thus one might say that in Vietnamese governmental circles the written word conveys rigid orders, but not rigid obligations, while traditions in the United States are nearly the reverse.

In some cultures, however, the written word serves neither purpose. The assumptions of literacy and the usefulness of contracts and written agreements break down still further in non-literate societies which have only recently adapted themselves to the Western alphabet. Speaking of the continent of Africa, Margery Perham asserted that "Until the very recent penetration by Europe the greater part of the continent was without the wheel, the plough and the transport animal; almost without stone houses or clothes except for skins; *without writing and so without history*."[4] Yet the traditions of such a society may be well

[4] Margery Perham, "The British Problem in Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIX, No. 4 (July 1951), p. 638; italics added. This controversial statement is of course confined to "history" in a narrow sense. Cf. Daniel F. McCall, "Non-Documentary Sources of African History" (forthcoming).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

established. It has its agreements, arrived at by careful group negotiation; and they will be remembered by its elder citizens in terms of the general atmosphere of negotiation and purpose as understood at the time. That is one reason why the slow processes of reaching agreement are so important in some non-Western societies. A consensus reached by careful soundings may be of much greater importance to this group than a cold written contract, enforcement of which would be all but impossible. The procedure enjoined upon the technician under such circumstances may well be a patient, step-by-step series of negotiations at which communal understanding is reached for each point under consideration. The detailed written agreement may even have to be abandoned altogether, or at least delayed until implementation has begun. In general, dependence upon signed contracts, which appears to be the pattern enjoined by ICA for technical assistance operations, sometimes makes the Americans seem rigid, impersonal, irrational, and unresponsive to the actual conditions of the society. The *Marouf,* a spontaneous, unplanned gesture of friendship in some Arabic countries, is almost never possible in foreign aid.

A closely related assumption of the American culture is reliance upon fixed standards of measurement and the expectation that reports and statistical data can become a basis for evaluating progress or success. It is obvious that such standards do not exist in most underdeveloped societies, where lengths and weights are calculated in terms of human sizes and shapes, and even distance may be measured in terms of the number of cheroots or pipefuls of tobacco smoked while walking at a normal pace between two points. There are still millions of people unaccustomed to a cash economy or to measuring farm output. Reports of national income, farm productivity, and even population cannot be more reliable than the accuracy of the intricate measurements that are reported in the farms and villages of the country concerned. Detailed accounts of food production, cash income, and expenditures at the village level may be offered by indigenous technicians and administrators upon request, especially if they are anxious to demonstrate their sophistication; but adding up these totals may be a worse disservice to remote-control planners than using such terms as "much" and "little," or "poor" and "rich." This is a problem better understood among experienced field technicians than in the bureaucratic headquarters of a religious mission, the United Nations, or ICA, which must satisfy critics who are accustomed to measuring achievements according to fixed standards.

Another assumption related to the Western preoccupation with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

written word is the unexpressed view adopted uncritically in underdeveloped countries that the only valid learning is book-learning, that the only education is formal schooling, and that education provides the road to advancement in a backward society. This has given rise to a preference for degrees and certificates in evaluating individual technicians, civil servants, and their counterparts, although these may bear little relation to the needs or habits of a developing society. The United States, which often seems peopled with degree-bearing citizens, has led the way in easing some of the needlessly strenuous academic disciplines bequeathed to the underdeveloped countries by the colonial powers; but the implication of this relaxation has not yet been accepted in practice by our own diplomats and technicians or by European-trained Africans and Asians, who are still impressed by degrees. They still tend to believe that the way to develop a leader is to send him to school. It is American universities, on the whole, that have had to try to find substitutes for academic courses and degrees that will at once satisfy the bias toward book-learning and fulfill the needs of the underdeveloped countries. In this effort they have already earned the scorn of European scholars, and at the same time failed to come to grips with another cultural obstacle: the fact that in many underdeveloped societies, knowledge, especially from book-learning, is not necessarily power. Many highly educated men from underdeveloped societies, chosen for leadership through education in a "fair" competition with other candidates, will continue to encounter disappointment and frustration as they discover that leadership may demand other qualities often unrelated to book-learning, technical skills, and even a Westernized conscience.

Still another fundamental assumption in American life that is carried into most technical assistance activities is the tradition of relying upon individual incentives to increase productivity, whether on the farm or in the government office. This approach assumes that changes in ways of doing things can be induced by offering increased earnings or improved efficiency. But although economic motives are widespread in the underdeveloped world, they are not necessarily related to individual betterment. This is particularly true in subsistence economies or societies in which strong family ties would deprive an individual of the benefits of increased earning power. In Africa it has been noted that certain tribes possess extensive kinship systems that offer the basic means of social security. Members of these societies cannot always be induced to accept more efficient ways of farming by holding out the advantages of increased income to individuals. The old ways are easier;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and most increases in an individual's income would only be absorbed by the indigent members of the kinship group. Resettlement efforts have been known to fail to achieve their economic objective because the large farms that were originally established as part of the development scheme were surreptitiously broken up into smaller uneconomic holdings and divided among the kinship group. Nor have the members of the family always been willing to band together to gain the benefits of large-scale operations, such patterns of co-operative activity being foreign to much of Africa. The result is that the large-scale practices that would have provided the economic foundation of the resettlement could not be followed by either individuals or families. What is "economic" to Westerners may not be so at all to others.

Certain attitudes toward the role of government have also permeated American technical assistance operations. Not many Americans are conscious of the fact that they look upon their government as a service institution, but this is the basis of nearly all of their complaints about government. Certain institutional procedures such as Congressional review, patronage appointments and removals, and the requirements of public morality all tend to make the civil servant conscious of his role in rendering public service. Bureaucrats must be courteous if not actually responsive to public desires. In many parts of the world, however, this is not the case: civil servants in Asia are often direct heirs of the Mandarin tradition, in which public service is largely irrelevant to public office. In other parts of the world, civil servants as a class are the lineal descendants of men performing public functions as personal servants to the king or chief. Service to the people, and the designing of government operations to accommodate the convenience of the public, are products of some of the most sophisticated traditions of democratic history. Many aid projects that have depended for their success upon the dedication of the civil servant to fulfilling his responsibilities in the public interest have failed because the individuals involved in the system possessed an entirely different—and, from their point of view, equally legitimate—conception of their role. Thus a *servicio* in Guatemala abandoned a program for training agricultural extension workers in order to engage in research for the purpose of improving the strains of plantation crops; public health trainees in Ethiopia returned from a course in the United States to take care of their own extended families and ignored other groups; and when an American technician found a warehouse filled with drugs which a Vietnamese official had failed to distribute, that worthy said, "You Americans are too sentimental. People will die anyhow." All of these examples repre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sent points of view entirely appropriate (or at least acceptable) in the societies in question, based on different cultural causes, and alike only in repudiating the concept of the government as an organ of service to its citizens.

Americans are commonly accused of pretending to omniscience in technical matters. It is true that many of them tend to think of American history as providing verifiable facts and even universal truths of economic and technical development; but such pretenses are usually greatly softened by experiences in another culture. A technician who has learned that his knowledge cannot be simply translated into a foreign tongue may also have learned how to transmit it in an immediate situation. The discovery that techniques have a cultural dimension may help eliminate one set of errors, only to introduce another; for a successful adaptation to one culture may lead a technician to a new set of assumptions about his omniscience. He may now fancy that he possesses the key to "the non-Western culture."

The assumptions that individual technicians develop out of their own successful experiences are compounded by a practical administrative need: that of simultaneously operating scores of foreign aid programs on a global basis. Sixty-five different countries now receive various forms of American aid, and the necessity of accommodating so many requirements makes it necessary to standardize operations in South Asian, Near Eastern, African, and Latin American cultures. Thus the individual technician's tendency to treat one like another (the fallacy of universalizing from one success) is compounded by the administrative necessity for treating all alike.[5]

These factors have led to a second set of cultural errors, which I have called "transfer" errors because they represent a variety of individual experiences and technical assumptions carried from one assignment to another. They lead to errors of transmission which represent rigidities on the part of American technicians that are even more confusing to outsiders than those arising from ethnocentric blindness. The assumptions are not American; they are foreign to both the donor and the host culture. They arise from insufficiently examined experiences in other cultures.

It is difficult to generalize about these transfer cultural errors, although I suspect that the phenomenon itself is recognizable enough.

[5] For a discussion of the "country approach" as a means of adapting administrative and program arrangements to the host society, see John D. Montgomery, "Field Organization, Administrative Relationships, and Foreign Aid Policies," in C. J. Friedrich and S. Harris, eds., *Public Policy*, Vol. x, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In some respects post-Geneva Vietnam was like postwar Greece, especially as seen by an American foreign aid technician. Both were torn by civil disorder, both still threatened by Communists and the failure of democratic institutions, and both industrially underdeveloped. Indeed, cultural and social resemblances could be enumerated until a plausible case could be made that Vietnam and Greece were for practical purposes culturally identical. Improbable as this seems, members of the American aid mission actually made such assumptions about Vietnamese commercial potentialities based on these superficial resemblances. The consequences were to prove puzzling and frustrating to both sides. Similarly, technicians who moved from Korea to Taiwan—to choose a somewhat more likely cultural confusion—have been distressed at the nature and extent of cultural and institutional differences. The techniques used in introducing community development to the Philippines were not crowned by equal success in Iran. The *servicio* technique developed operating skills in many technicians in Latin America that could not be transferred to a later assignment in Asia.

Transfer errors are essentially individual and perhaps non-recurrent phenomena, and are therefore somewhat more difficult to approach through a broadside group-training process than national errors, which presumably represent common problems for all participants. But even transfer errors could be grouped according to general patterns. A number of them have arisen out of regional or racial confusions based on the assumption that Asians, Africans, Middle East Arabs, or other foreign peoples are culturally alike. Others have been produced by historical assumptions, such as those derived from the rather superficial resemblances among different countries emerging from the British or French colonial experiences in India and Malaya or in Indochina and Africa. A third set of transfer errors might be traced to confusions arising out of political similarities among "oriental despotisms," "neutralist countries," or "tribal" and "patron" party systems that may hide more than they reveal. Still others might arise out of differences in administrative and political relationships between the American and host government's technicians, leading to misunderstanding of motives and procedures.

Unlike national cultural errors, these mistaken judgments are usually the result of a conscious or unconscious attempt to learn by experience. To be sure, even a misplaced application of experience is better than not learning at all from the past; and few would doubt that a technician can perform better in a strange cultural setting if he has already had some overseas experience, no matter where. But the trainer's prob-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lem is to help him discriminate between the *relevant* and the *misleading* as he transfers his operations from one setting to another.

III. Broad Training in Particulars

This discussion may have conveyed an impression of cultural bluntness on the part of American technicians that is both unfair and misleading. The fact is that Americans are not at all indifferent to the sensitivities and opinions of others. Americans are in some ways distressingly unsure of themselves. They are anxious to be liked and respected. When the British wrote best-sellers about their achievements as cultural innovators, they used Rudyard Kipling's Victorian "empire builders" as a prototype; while the Americans have typically accepted books like *The Ugly American* as providing recognizable, if equally unrealistic, depictions of their neo-Victorian efforts overseas. Neither the French, Belgians, Germans, nor Russians have worked abroad with so little public sympathy at home for their problems and achievements, or so great an uncertainty about the appropriateness of their being there at all. Few Americans would presume to live in the bush as the British have and attempt to bring the natives into submissiveness by sheer self-confidence. Our tradition has not permitted us to assume the burden of actually governing any backward peoples for very long, largely because the Declaration of Independence really did state something approaching our complex political-value system. Our political self-restraint has inhibited us from building empires of long standing, and in recent years we have dared offer advice only because of the distinction we make between "political" and "technical." Even this self-restraint has not fully protected us, however; for while our society distinguishes between "politics" and "techniques," many underdeveloped cultures do not. We have begun to learn that the advice we offer in the belief that it is politically sterile sometimes sounds to the listener like an invasion of national sovereignty.[6] Such misunderstandings have been so frequent that American technicians now welcome training that facilitates crossing these culture bars and avoids generating unnecessary antagonisms while trying to offer assistance.

Assuming that the kinds of cultural errors that I have described are real, recurrent, and typical of others, how can training minimize their

[6] I have written elsewhere about some of the political implications of foreign aid. See Montgomery, *Forced to Be Free*, Chicago, 1957, ch. 5; "Gilded Missiles," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXVIII, No. 6 (June 1959), pp. 81-89; and "Political Dimensions of Foreign Aid," in R. Braibanti, S. Spengler *et al., Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development*, Durham, N.C., 1961.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capacity for injuring American objectives? It has long been accepted that in dealing with *individual* personality and character traits, recognition alone may enable an individual to maximize some of his most useful qualities and suppress, sublimate, or even discard the others. In Freudian psychology, the very possibility of psychoanalysis rests on the proposition that self-knowledge can contribute to improved control over personal behavior and emotional responses. Following this analogy of the individual's sometimes highly personal self-learning process, training programs have been devised to deal with problems of individual idiosyncrasy on a group basis, in the hope that the members of a group will apply whatever is appropriate to their own individual conditions.

But cultural idiosyncrasies represent characteristics common to a group; it is therefore possible that group training can deal more effectively with them than with individual problems. Much attention has already been devoted to phenomena loosely identified as "culture shock," a study of which is thought to help individuals recognize the emotional responses and frustrations that generally attend the work of an American technician in an underdeveloped society. This training usually consists of a brief warning issued on the assumption that because in most technical assistance operations Americans tend to move and work in groups, they can observe "culture shock" in each other and compensate for it even if individuals do not detect the symptoms in themselves. One of the most sophisticated justifications for the "golden ghettoes" is the belief that Americans living together abroad can help each other lift their frustrations from a suppressed, unconscious condition to a socially acceptable and communicable one, and thus protect themselves from irresponsible or uncontrolled "misbehavior." The overseas cocktail parties thus become part of an "in-service" training process!

National and transfer cultural errors have not yet been directly confronted in the training programs offered to technical assistants. Yet like Plato's state, cultural factors are writ larger than individual characteristics. They are more easily seen because they are multiplied endlessly in the experience of thousands of individuals. Moreover, members of a single culture can discuss their group peculiarities with much less sensitiveness than they can their personal limitations (though this is not usually true as between members of different cultures). Recognition of one's cultural peculiarities does not suggest offensive judgments of "right" or "wrong" or of "acceptability" or "rejection." Cultural factors are also more susceptible to protracted group training than individual characteristics. They can be treated as an organic, in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

separable element in the process of technical assistance, and thus can be introduced in discussions of many phases of overseas operations rather than occupying a single lecture or two. Finally, from the operational viewpoint, specific cultural patterns can sometimes be changed once they are recognized. Thus, for example, some written contracts have been waived in the implementing of projects in West Africa; academic requirements for admission to universities have been relaxed in offering study and observation grants, replacing the traditional forms of book-learning as the legitimate avenue to leadership; and civic action and self-help community programs unlike anything in the United States are being developed with American aid in places where the national civil servants themselves may be disinterested in devising modes of rendering service to the public.

There are two basic ways in which training for technical assistance can approach these cultural obstacles. The first is the *area study approach*, which encourages a recognition of cultural factors in identified underdeveloped situations. The advantages of this approach are well known: there is usually a corpus of knowledge available and a cohabitation (if not an actual wedding) of several academic disciplines. There are centers where nearly every area in the world can be studied in the comfort of an alternatively air-conditioned and steam-heated classroom. And there are experts available for a standard (though not necessarily modest) consultant's fee, to render advice and supervise training programs. But there are disadvantages, too: area knowledge is generally a mine of unrefined ore, so far as the technical assistant is concerned. Moreover, area knowledge as such is not necessarily transferable from one non-Western culture to another. The training of a technician for Laos may doom him to Vientiane or even Luang Prabang for many months to enable the government to recover its investment in that particular specialist, without regard to the possibility that he might be more usefully assigned elsewhere after a short tour. There are compromises, of course: training for Southeast Asia, or Tropical Africa, or Latin America would offer a wide flexibility in subsequent assignments; but unless the training course is of relatively long duration, the cultural diversity within any of these vast areas may render the training itself superficial and inadequate for practical purposes.

The second approach in technical assistance training is the use of *problems and case studies*, offered without regard to geographic specializations, representing a variety of situations in which psychological, social, political, and cultural factors have actually impeded communication and acceptance. Preferably such studies concentrate on efforts that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were or could have been made toward resolving the difficulty, since one can learn more surely from a problem solved, or at least dealt with, than from one ignored or unconfronted. Unfortunately, few of these case studies are yet in existence,[7] and such as there are have not been prepared to illuminate national and transfer cultural errors. Some colonial experiences and large-scale development programs have been examined for the cross-cultural insights they yield; but most of the American experience over the past decade is lost and unclaimed, except as it has contributed to individual memories, a few rules of thumb, and a vast folklore of technical assistance.

One means of illuminating American technical experiences in the variety of circumstances necessary for identifying national cultural errors would be to present project histories in *clusters of cases*, showing how cultural factors or assumptions have yielded different responses in different circumstances. The selection of national cultural errors to be illuminated by this process would require a validation of their general existence and their significance in terms of the experiences of the technicians who have committed or observed them. Examples of such errors can doubtless be multiplied many times as the American experience itself is sifted and analyzed. The main problem would not be finding examples, but using them in a sufficiently broad context to develop a "preventive understanding" of them.

Case studies are difficult and costly to prepare, even in fields of knowledge that are already well developed and in good academic order. Eventually the logistical requirements of such research would require access to government documents (preferably both American and foreign), in addition to interviews and field investigations in several parts of the world. It is possible that much of this could be done by social scientists already performing technical assistance operations abroad, once a consensus on method and purpose had been reached. Such a program would require some co-ordination and integration in order to avoid overlapping and even competing activities overseas.

[7] The most useful are Benjamin D. Paul, ed., *Health, Culture and Community: Case Studies of Public Reactions to Health Programs*, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1955; Howard U. Teaf, Jr., and Peter C. Franck, *Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation*, The Hague, NUFFIC, distributed by Cornell University Press, 1955; Edward H. Spicer, *Human Problems in Technological Change: A Casebook*, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1952; and Arthur T. Mosher, *Technical Cooperation in Latin American Agriculture*, Chicago, 1957. On the general characteristics of cases, see Glenn Paige, "Problems and Uses of the Single Case in Political Research," University of Minnesota, 1959 (mimeographed), and the bibliography cited there. See also Montgomery, "Flesh for the Bones of Principle: A Socratic Dialogue," *Public Administration Review*, XVIII, No. 2 (Spring 1958), pp. 118-23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, the materials themselves would have to be distilled and presented in a form that would challenge technicians undergoing training to participate in critical discussions following already well-established techniques in the use of case materials in law and administration. There would have to be role-playing in some form if the abstractions of mere knowledge were to be made active and applicable.

The extent of co-operation and co-ordination that would be required to carry out such a program presents the formidable question of whether the game would be worth the not inconsiderable candle. Inter-university co-operation would perhaps be more difficult to manage than interdepartmental or interdisciplinary co-operation, which is still an unsolved problem in our university area programs. The fifty-seven universities with overseas contracts in technical assistance probably offer the greatest resources for such studies. However, it is questionable whether they would be willing to risk sacrificing their relationships in the field by undertaking surveys of their interactions with the host government, or to endanger the diplomatic relationships of the U.S. aid operations mission to which they are contracted.

The values of such an approach must be weighed against its difficulties. An immediate product would be training materials of a greater vitality and relevance than any now available. By vicariously experiencing in the classroom a variety of cultural exchanges in which conflicts of values and attitudes occurred, trainees could retrospectively understand better their own past experiences and prepare themselves for new cultural challenges. They could exchange analogous experiences on a systematic basis and they could improve their performance as trainers of other American technicians. Outside the classroom, studies of national and transfer cultural errors could have still greater impact once the policy implications of their research were relayed to government circles. The case-cluster approach to cultural problems in technical assistance could be employed in several participating universities without disrupting other basic aspects of those programs. It could be adapted to in-service training in private and public agencies engaged in foreign operations and thus provide still wider sources of data. It could be combined with the conventional area approaches and with undergraduate and graduate instruction in various social science disciplines.

The case-cluster approach would not, of course, eliminate the need for other types of case materials, the presentation of orientation and background lectures, area studies, or technical and professional courses. It would not enable us to polish off rough facets of the American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

culture that might be irritating or graceless in some parts of the world. Nor would it turn poor practitioners into superb ones. But it could open the way to a more imaginative adjustment of American techniques to non-Western cultures, and perhaps contribute to a better public understanding of the processes of rendering foreign aid. And it could make our training programs a more interesting and creative experience than they now are.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DEVELOPMENT

The Visible or the Invisible Hand?

By YUSIF A. SAYIGH

THE heightened interest of many economists in recent years in the subject of economic development has been accompanied by their recognition of the importance of the role of non-economic forces in the initiation and pursuit of development. The present article is an attempt to explore the power of some of these forces and the circumstances under which they operate. I shall give particular attention to nationalist ideology and leadership, owing to their pre-eminence among non-economic forces. Throughout, the focus will be on underdeveloped countries outside the Western Hemisphere and outside the Communist bloc.

Three questions will occupy the center of the discussion. (1) To what extent can underdevelopment be explained, and its treatment suggested, by the Western classical system of economic thought and its modern variants? (2) What kinds of men, ideas, and policies are likely to lead a society's thrust against social stagnation and economic deprivation? (3) Does the pursuit of development tend to result in the emergence of any special political pattern, and, if so, what are the features of this pattern likely to be, and the principles underlying it?

I. The Economics of Industrial Capitalism and Development

Belief in the ability of the Invisible Hand to arrange economic life efficiently, smoothly, and to everybody's satisfaction dominated economic thinking between Adam Smith and the Great Depression. Whether as a result of rigorous analysis, or as an act of faith, this belief held the loyalty of most men in Western society who concerned themselves at all with economic activity and organization. The beauty of a system guided by the Invisible Hand lay in the comprehensiveness of its operation, in its simplicity, and in the elegance of the analysis which created it.

This system, generally designated as perfect competition, had simple assumptions. Perfect knowledge of markets, factor mobility, flexibility of prices, freedom of entry into and exit from the industry, non-differentiation of product and near-equality of power of firms within the industry—these constituted the analytical foundations of the system. Add to them an assumption about motives—that "economic man," as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

producer, rationally attempts to maximize profit, and, as consumer, attempts to maximize satisfaction—and you have a complete mechanism, ready for operation. Add again a few assumptions regarding factor mobility across national frontiers, knowledge of markets, and rationality in the exchange of goods, and you have a system of international division of labor under which nations specialize to the optimum, and both buyers and sellers are better off with foreign trade than without.

Nor was this all. Through the guidance and instrumentality of the Invisible Hand the wealth of nations must grow over time and, unless eaten by the Malthusian hordes, would lead to, or at least tend toward, a state of equilibrium at a very high level of capital stock, to end ultimately in the stationary state. It was all really very simple. Growth would occur because it was in everybody's interest. The entrepreneur would see to it that economies grew. He needed a minimum of outside assistance, and even less of guidance. All he required of the state was that it assure him of law and order, build the roads he needed, issue the currency which his transactions called for, protect his trade channels, and, for the rest, leave him alone.

This model was indeed fine so long as everybody concerned observed the rules of the game, and so long as reality did not stray far from the assumptions. During much of the period of the hegemony of classical economics, the model was probably not much out of line with the world it was meant to describe and explain. The social and political philosophy underlying it, and the economy embodying it, gave it credibility. The businessman, on whom so much devolved in the system, was probably able to play the role allotted to him unaided. His claim to have brought about growth and prosperity cannot be seriously challenged.

However, the enterprising businessman of Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not emerge onto a vacant stage, any more than the Industrial Revolution burst out with the suddenness of an explosion. Geographical exploration and discovery, cultural liberation and enrichment, commercial and agricultural development, scientific and technical advances had preceded his emergence. The national state had taken over mastery of the political stage, provided unity where fragmented principalities had existed, established law and order, built communications, and generally promoted business and trade. Only with this legacy securely in hand did the businessman of those days promote development, on the scale and in the directions for which he is given credit by writers on entrepreneurial history.

The businessman in the underdeveloped countries that are today in their pre-industrial phase of development is in a radically different posi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion. It is true that there are pockets of advanced technology or small groups of well-educated men in most underdeveloped countries. But it is an established fact that the starting point for these countries, and most of the "endowments" they can readily use in the arduous task of development—national income, native scientific and technical knowledge, education, capital stock, government administration, banking, and so on—are inferior to the endowments at the disposal of Western Europe or the United States late in the eighteenth century.[1] The problems of the underdeveloped countries of today are much more varied, more serious, and more intractable than those of the industrial countries in the eighteenth century. Their poverty is much more pressing and more limiting. The balance of international economic power is glaringly in their disfavor. And though their lag gives them the unquestionable advantage of learning from the experiences of the advanced industrial countries, and likewise of calling on a large stock of financial and technical aid from these countries, it also handicaps them by creating in their midst an explosive impatience for development and welfare and a frustration at the large and widening gap between them and the advanced countries.

Neither Marxist nor Keynesian theory, the two major offspring of the classical tradition, provides a desirable and relevant solution to the problem of underdevelopment that afflicts scores of countries in the world. The USSR and China undeniably provide an impressive example of economic and technological achievement under communism. Their success in building a modern egalitarian society on the ruins of the old order has an obvious appeal. So has their success in making their societies comparatively immune to outside pressure or attack. Lastly, the readiness of the governments of Communist countries to identify themselves with the nationalisms of Asia and Africa has created a strong affinity between them.

However, in spite of the appeal of communism on all these grounds, most of the leaders and governments of underdeveloped countries have not been eager to accept the social and political components of the Communist solution. Desperate as the situation is in the poorer of their countries, it does not seem to be desperate enough for them to tolerate the non-material costs involved. Eager to maintain, or to increase, social cohesion and harmony, they refuse to usher in an era of class

[1] The research and writings of Simon Kuznets over many years have established this point. See in particular his *Underdeveloped Countries and the Pre-industrial Phase in the Advanced Countries*, Rome, U.N. World Population Conference, 1954, and *Six Lectures on Economic Growth*, Glencoe, Ill., 1959. See also Edward S. Mason, *Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas: Government and Business*, New York, 1958, ch. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

struggle. Authoritarian and inexperienced in Western democracy as they are, they hesitate to give up the attempt to introduce some version of this democracy that a Communist solution would require them to give up. And poor as their countries are, they do not believe in the extreme philosophy of materialism and economic determinism that underlies Marxist dogma. In brief, the Communist prescription for underdevelopment, while relevant, is not voluntarily acceptable to present leaders and governments.

The Keynesian prescription, on the other hand, is quite irrelevant. The problem of underdevelopment is not the short-run cyclical inadequacy of effective demand characteristic of developed Western economies. Autonomous injections of investment income in an underdeveloped country are likely to dissipate themselves in inflationary pressures because of the general shortage of capital and intermediate goods, of skilled labor and management, and of readily usable land and water resources—or else they are likely (if foreign exchange resources are available) to leak out in the acquisition of imports. Indeed, the problem for underdeveloped countries is to provide the economy with those very things that, in a developed country, are in excess of need during a depression—capital, resources, skills. Therefore development theory involves the reversing of some fundamental Keynesian assumptions over a period of time much longer than that for which Keynesian analysis is relevant.

It is obviously true that modern economic theory in the industrial West is quite different from classical theory. The model of perfect competition is now considered neither realistic nor flawless. Western society has developed a political system that would not allow perfect competition to function, were the incarnation of the model to be possible. It is a system that intervenes actively in economic life and that sets various limits to the free play of economic forces. Nevertheless it is a system that leaves the bulk of economic decisions to businessmen in private enterprise, and on the whole succeeds in getting good results thereby.

Were such a system to be transplanted into an underdeveloped environment, it would fail to cure the basic economic problems of this environment. It would fail not because of any inherent defect—of which it has a number—but because the environment would be unprepared for it. The directions and extent of unpreparedness are too numerous and too obvious to describe in detail. Very broadly, this unpreparedness lies in the areas of economic performance, social progress, and political evolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Writings in the United States and England on the subject of development have mushroomed in the past decade. To an increasing degree they reveal awareness of the complex problems that beset poor countries. This awareness has led many writers to qualify their tools of economic analysis in order to make them usable for poorly functioning economies. A small number of writers have gone a step farther to introduce relevant non-economic considerations into the analysis of underdevelopment. However, no systematized body of economic and social thought has evolved that can satisfactorily explain underdevelopment and point to the course which development is likely to take under the special social and political circumstances of the countries concerned.

It might be argued that such a body of thought is not necessary, that it is enough for economists to be able to diagnose the ailments of individual countries and to prescribe a specific treatment for every specific ailment. It might even be argued that the West has the necessary experience and the economic systems to offer to the underdeveloped world, and that there is therefore no need to search for special experience or systems.

But can the economic theories and experience of the Industrial West be dissociated from their social and political context? And can an approach to an underdeveloped economy's problems be sound if it does not form part of a total approach to that society's problems? Inasmuch as the political and the economic systems of the West are especially suited to each other, neither of them can operate successfully if transplanted into a pre-industrial environment, any more than either system of a pre-industrial society can operate successfully in an industrial society. The two types of environment in confrontation could hardly be more different.

II. Special Ills, Special Remedies

What hopes for effective and acceptable treatment remain, then, for the underdeveloped regions of the world today?

The answer to this question calls for an understanding of the many-sidedness of underdevelopment. The operative characteristics of underdevelopment are to be found in the scientific and technical backwardness of society, the low level of education of the population, the inefficiency and inadequacy for the industrial age of social and political institutions and of economic organization, the weakness of the urge for social and political rights, and the shortage of responsible and capable leadership in the political and intellectual fields. Together, these characteristics mean a low level of income per head of the popu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lation. However, to enjoy a very high level of income per head, as some countries producing petroleum in the Middle East do, is in itself no indication of development, since the income is not the product of the performance of the society in whose territory the resource exists but of foreign capital, science, technology, and industrial leadership. Nor is the income accompanied by essential advances along non-economic fronts.

Even a well-performing economy that produces a high income per head cannot, in the writer's view, be considered developed if income differentials among individuals are very wide. A society where average income is high but in which the rich are extremely rich and the poor extremely poor has only achieved development in a very narrow economic sense. This is not the sense adopted in this article. Only with a better distribution of income and increased welfare for the masses can such a society be said to have achieved development in a full sense involving both economic and social progress. In other words, the content of development is social, political, and technological as well as economic.

The special circumstances of underdeveloped countries urge them to the quest of special remedies, though not all societies heed the urge. A large part of the effort for development in nationalist regimes where the urge is heeded becomes, as one economist put it, a search for "countervailing power" to correct the imbalance caused by foreign rule during its association with these countries, or caused by the supremacy of the small but powerful local groups that used to be allied with foreign rulers and continue to be the agents and beneficiaries of the imbalance.[2]

Manifestations of the imbalance abound—for example, the continued lopsidedness of land ownership, with a very small proportion of owners holding a very large proportion of the land; the development of a "plantation" or a "mining" sector far in advance of, and rather detached from, the rest of the economy, and the accrual of much of the benefit to foreign capital, or the leakage of some of the benefit that remains behind into scandalously ostentatious spending, into hoards, or into capital flights; the neglect of manufacturing industry under the guise of the unsoundness of protective trade policy or for the less innocent purpose of keeping the controlled market as a preserve for the manufacturers of the ruling country; the neglect of the countryside in favor of urban trading centers; the development of educational facilities well

[2] H. Myint, "An Interpretation of Economic Backwardness," *Oxford Economic Papers*, VI, No. 2 (June 1954), pp. 159-63.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

below the needs and capabilities of the underdeveloped country, and the maldistribution of facilities with regard both to groups of beneficiaries and to fields of training.

The lag in industrialization has deep roots in the social and cultural structure of backward societies. Foreign rule serves to complement the retarding effect of this structure. To overcome the lag speedily requires determined efforts, internal and external resources, skills, markets, readiness for industrial discipline and, above all, enlightened economic policy. Only a few of the underdeveloped countries of the world can muster these requirements.

To bring about far-reaching rural reform and simultaneously to raise productivity in agriculture is no less formidable a task. The presence of unused land resources in itself is misleading, since huge investment would be required to bring this land and the labor that will have to work it into the productive process. And, in the meantime, the rural sector that chronically suffers from slow progress and low productivity seems never to suffer from the underproduction of human beings. As Gerschenkron has crisply put it, "Industrial revolutions may be defeated by Malthusian counterrevolutions."[3]

In the field of foreign trade, the pattern of international division of labor faced by newly independent underdeveloped countries seems to leave little room for the "natural" development of resources or industries beyond the exportable crops or minerals already developed. The handicap of being a late-comer is one that these countries are extremely eager to bypass. They ask, not unreasonably, if a country, like an individual, can learn how to do something without trying to do it. To them there is nothing predestined or eternal about the existing pattern of comparative advantage and of international division of labor. They seek redress by blocking themselves out of this pattern and promoting industry "artificially" behind high walls of protection and subsidies, in the hope that thereby they may change the pattern in their own favor. To have a well-working and acceptable system of international division of labor, they must first have a system of non-division of labor.

None of the unfavorable circumstances so far mentioned, like lag in industrialization, low levels of education, and manifestations of imbalance, is easy to reverse. And no reversal seems to be possible without the most strenuous and sustained efforts by enlightened governments acting as the social and economic conscience of the population. However, in the few actual cases where they have been exerted, such efforts

[3] Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," in Bert F. Hoselitz, ed., *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas*, Chicago, 1952, p. 27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been bedeviled by two pressures peculiar to our age of rising aspirations—eagerness for national self-expression moving ahead of political and social evolution, and insistence on economic justice outdistancing economic performance.

These pressures create a built-in explosiveness in underdevelopment today. Neither in its nature and reach, nor in the means for its containment, is this explosiveness a purely economic type of protest. It derives from the totality of social behavior; it can only be contained, or harnessed, through all-embracing social ideology and social action. The explosiveness can no more be left to the operation of automatically acting economic forces and the guidance of the Invisible Hand, to be neutralized in God's own good time, than it can be restrained within the framework of a purely economic system of thought and action.

Many, but not all, of the backward societies to which this article relates are attempting to anticipate the explosiveness by determined economic and social measures. Although they are not at the same level of backwardness and do not share the same historical experience, these active societies are characterized by four beliefs: (1) that political independence cannot be genuine and lasting unless bolstered by economic independence, and that the latter cannot be achieved without a large measure of economic development; (2) that this development cannot be significant, and the underdeveloped countries cannot feel equal to their former rulers, without a large measure of industrialization; (3) that stability and harmony in society cannot be assured unless development is predominantly motivated by social need and is seasoned with social justice in the distribution of wealth and income; and (4) that the process of development cannot be initiated and maintained, nor can it successfully reach its objectives, without the state bearing the major responsibility of leadership, design, and action in purely economic fields as well as in other fields of action. These interrelated beliefs underlie the position of the social-minded leaderships of some underdeveloped countries on the subject of development and progress. Likewise, they determine the aspirations that these leaderships hold and define their intentions for action.

Intentions, no matter how good, do not always lead to orderly and fruitful action. Some underdeveloped countries find themselves with a very meager heritage that makes action extremely slow and unproductive. Some may even be altogether inhibited from such action. Most are luckier in their heritage, and it is to this category that the discussion applies. But whatever the quality of the heritage and its extent, the underdeveloped countries cannot hope to move in the direction of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development without first achieving a "breakthrough" in the mass of resistance offered by their mores and institutions and in the limitations of their economies. The "breakthrough" is the most crucial event in the process of development.

This breakthrough is the purposeful expression of the reaction of a social-minded leadership in a backward society to the strain of backwardness in the mid-twentieth century. It is not the lengthy act of transformation to which Rostow's "take-off" is supposed to lead, but the determination to bring about the transformation and to get into position for action. In the writer's view, this "getting into position" is as much a part of the process of development as the transformation itself, since without it social inertia cannot be broken and the thrust into transformation cannot be launched.

No doubt the breakthrough, even if defined more broadly than the take-off, will meet with much the same objections.[4] One main objection has been directed to the non-applicability of the concept of "take-off" to the historical experience of Western Europe and the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This objection is not equally valid if applied to the breakthrough in the context of the current experience of underdeveloped countries. The change of time-dimension is quite essential to the issue. The underdeveloped countries of today want quick change precisely because they cannot afford the slowness which characterized the process of transformation before and during the Industrial Revolution. The "strain of backwardness," to use Gerschenkron's phrase, will simply not let the underdeveloped of today wait long.

Whether the societies that want quick change are being realistic or suicidally rash is another matter. What is significant is that a number of them are in fact being shaken rudely by social and political shocks administered deliberately to them by their social-minded leaders. Though shock need not mean treatment, treatment cannot be undertaken before awareness of the need for it is manifest. Awareness on the part of certain leaderships, coupled with their getting into position for action, add up to the thrust for breakthrough.

There can be no breakthrough without three essential preconditions. These are: (1) a strong awareness of backwardness and underdevelopment in the society and a strong desire to bring about a change for the better, with both the awareness and the desire obsessive in their pressure, though not so obsessive as to lead to suicidal acts of frenzy in the face of

[4] Criticism has come from many quarters. The papers of Kuznets and Gerschenkron at the 1960 meetings of the International Economic Association are leading examples.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

basic economic laws or counter to tolerable political behavior; (2) a leadership able to deliberate and act purposefully and coherently; and (3) a reasonably usable stock of economic endowments within a political and social organization a little beyond the pastoral and tribal stage of evolution. The third prerequisite will not be discussed here although it relates to much of Africa south of the Sahara; attention will focus on the first two. The focus is meant to indicate the writer's conviction that the motivating force behind the breakthrough is generated in the realm of ideas, by men outside the business community.

Is there no alternative to this order of things? Can private entrepreneurs not *initiate* development without all this business of shocks, thrusts, and breakthroughs? My answer is "No." Underdevelopment is a complex phenomenon; its roots and its manifestations extend beyond the area of economics. So of necessity do the remedies for it and the agencies that prescribe and administer the *first* remedies. The phenomenon as it burdens the world today is unlike that which burdened the developed countries of the West in their pre-industrial age. Troubled by its many political and social insecurities, economic shortages, and organizational rigidities, the underdeveloped environment of today blocks private entrepreneurs from performing the economic and technological functions that devolved upon their counterparts in the West in the heyday of private enterprise and free competition.

Furthermore, because of the pressures of national aspirations and of the urgency of social and economic reform, few backward societies can wait while private enterprise builds up momentum slowly, firm by firm and product by product, ultimately to carry the economy to a reasonably high level of performance. Only very slow progress can be registered if the broad framework for enterprise changes slowly; and it can change but slowly at the hands of ruling groups that are not social-minded and that do not take upon themselves the leadership of social and economic forces striving for reform. But slow change is a poor response to the sense of crisis that hammers impatiently at the door of backward systems today. Little trust can therefore be placed in private enterprise to be the *prime mover* in the process of development.

Where success in initiating this process has been achieved in the past few decades, the pressure for action, and later the action, have almost invariably come from an articulate and activist minority in society.[5] This minority has proved to be both sensitive to the humiliation of

[5] Foreign national minorities, to whom some writers attribute an important role in technological change and development, are indeed invaluable. But, as private entrepreneurs, they emerge only later, after the initial thrust has been made.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

poverty and backwardness, and restless in the determination to express its protest in concrete acts through the instrumentality of the state. Whether stirred more by deep resentment and bitterness or by positive social-mindedness, whether given to dictatorial tendencies or imbued with liberal ideas, this group discovers, none too soon, that concrete acts can be taken only by those who assure themselves of political authority. Anyone who refuses to admit this inevitable fact will find himself well outside the inner circle of decision-makers.

The members of the leadership who ultimately converge on the center of political power come from different backgrounds. There are intellectuals and professional men; civil servants, party leaders, and idealistic politicians; revolutionaries and young army officers. Increasingly it is army officers who swiftly, and conveniently, seize power and make use of the ideas, skills, and services of the other members of the leadership group who are acceptable to the military. But what is more significant than the identity of the ruling group is the fact that it is almost invariably motivated in its drive for economic development by a political and social ideology of power and welfare, rather than by private profit. In one sentence, the ideology is one of national resurgence, involving power for the state and dignity and well-being for the citizen.

The supremacy of nationalist ideology is the most common feature of these countries seeking and designing development. A pattern can be observed in the experience of the Kemalist revolution in Turkey, as in the orderly take-over by the Congress Party in India, in Nuri es-Said's patriarchal domination of Iraq as in Nasser's social revolution in Egypt, in Mexico as in Cuba, in Syria as in the Sudan or in Pakistan —regardless of the differences in emphasis underlying the philosophy of action, in the directions in which the initial thrust may have turned, or in the varying degree of success as between one country and another.

Nationalism in most underdeveloped regions of the world is truly explosive. Pressing in pre-industrial societies where the industrial revolution has been delayed, it can, and not infrequently does, explode in political revolutions.[6] But this is only half the truth. Without the discontent and the desire for change that set off revolution, these societies remain far from the threshold of the industrial revolution. Neither the appropriate ideology and dynamism, nor the leadership of social and

[6] Writing about the USSR, Gerschenkron has said that "The delayed industrial revolution was responsible for a political revolution" (Hoselitz, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 28). Equally true is the fact that it was the political revolution that made possible the full fruition of the industrial revolution in the USSR.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic development have emerged or operated in any underdeveloped country in the past few decades without a revolution. Revolution—it remains to be said—need not be one of iron and blood; but even if it is one of ideas, it has to involve a radical shift in the pattern of power to enable the leadership groups to come to the center of authority.[7]

This trend is clearly a cardinal fact in Middle East society. The state, now the master of economic destiny, is in fact the vehicle of the ideas and ambitions and hopes of leaders. Even if initially the state seems to be the embodiment, not the vehicle, of these ideas and ambitions and hopes, it still remains an avowed vehicle, the express objective being the multi-sided liberation of the individual in society. But now, and for some time to come, the observer will have to keep his eyes focused on the center of political power, the ideology underlying political and social action, and the men wielding the power and professing the ideology, for an understanding of the drive for and the directions and quality of economic development.

The role of the leadership at this initial stage is multiple. It is first to articulate social discontent—even, or perhaps especially, of the mute mass, whose discontent is principally silent and sullen—and simultaneously to promise redress. Next, the role is to produce the dogma, the faith, or merely the avenues of action imperative for social and economic reform. Almost invariably this reform presupposes political reform. Where caution is the better part of valor, political reform is not demanded publicly. But when zero hour strikes and power is taken by bullet or by poll, the political component of reform is expounded. With the take-over of power the men in leadership move to the position of responsibility, of decision-making. All their previous attitudes, philosophy, expressions, and schemes are a mere prelude to the next part of their role. Even if they keep much of the ideas and the philosophy, the phase upon which they enter is predominantly one of activism. While in the earlier, preparatory phase they may have been judged mainly by what they believed and said, in the activist phase they will be judged mainly by what they do or fail to do.

Their role in this second phase requires them to establish nationalist resurgence as their mission and the state as the only possible agent of

[7] Only rarely do the old, established leaderships accept some of the new ideas and incorporate them in their philosophy of action. The ruling group in Iraq tried this in the early 1950's; the ruling group in Iran in the mid-1950's; the ruling group in Turkey all through the 1950's. In these and other cases, some political and social ideas of great significance to the articulate minorities were left out. Hence the revolutions of Iraq and Turkey which Iran has so far been spared. Christ's saying about the futility of putting new wine in old bottles is still as good as when He uttered it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this mission. To this end, the state must be established as the source of inspiration and of authority for action. Apart from the consolidation of law and order, this means that the state has to have a "presence"—its image must be built up as a source of power, knowledge, wisdom, resourcefulness. The state knows best and is surest to succeed: this becomes the philosophy of economic action and the bridge of communication between the ruler and the ruled. It remains to be said that this "line" is not difficult to establish in societies where the economic role of the state has always been extensive and its authority generally accepted.[8]

Only the cynic would disparage this "line." The need of the hour largely justifies this exaggeration of roles. Furthermore, since the leadership can hardly stop at this point but has to move farther in its efforts, the assumption of extensive powers by the state seems to be well justified. Intent on development, the leadership proceeds to equip society with the setting for the directly producing sectors of the economy (that is, the sectors which conventionally belong in the area of private enterprise in Western industrial countries, for the evolution of which economic and social overhead capital is created). Education and technical training are emphasized, roads are built, business legislation is enacted, land reform is undertaken, resources are developed, capital is accumulated. And all this is usually attempted within the framework of a broad plan of development covering the whole territory of the country.

At this stage the leadership does not wait long for private entrepreneurs to enter industry, transport, communications, mining, or banking, but itself embarks on projects in these and other fields, without inhibition. Nevertheless, the setting will have been prepared by then for the more daring, and later for the more cautious, among businessmen to enter the non-traditional fields of economic activity.[9] Normally, businessmen begin gradually to take over from here on, by increasingly entering the directly productive sectors and industries. With a little help or, better still, with the confidence that security is the order of the

[8] In societies where a traditional attitude of "God will provide" predominates, a shift to the attitude of "The state will provide" cannot be very difficult to make.

[9] Up to this point, business risks are likely to be oppressive and inhibiting, except for the most daring of entrepreneurs. Moreover, "Where risks are great, only the biggest bureaucracy can carry on, and not uncommonly this has been the state. As risks lessen, the private firm with state support is enabled to invest with some hope of commensurate return. It is only in unique environments that state action may retreat well into the background, with some allowance for lag in the process." (W. T. Easterbrook, "State Control and Free Enterprise in Their Impact on Economic Growth," in Hoselitz, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 66.) For an examination of the arguments for and against government-initiated development, see Mason, *op.cit.*, esp. ch. 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

day, that their efforts will receive decent reward, and that the reward will remain largely theirs, businessmen can be instrumental in developing further the directly productive sectors and industries. Within broad limits of social policy, they are worthy of every encouragement, both because of the value of their contribution to growth, and because their activity will relieve the government of part of the burden of its role as a supplier of business enterprise.

Frequently, unsure that some or all of their expectations will materialize, businessmen balk. Gladly or reluctantly, depending on the economic philosophy of the leadership and its own opinions and expectations of business, the state agency may step in. On occasion, and the occasions grow by the day, the state in its overeagerness for results steps in even before private enterprise has had a chance to decide either way, or even after it has moved in with energy. But the case of private enterprise vs. state enterprise, with its attendant question of timing, is only one of the issues or debates that arise from the breakthrough by the leadership and the role of the state it necessitates.

III. Early Development and Its Debates

The debates are numerous, but only those that are most pertinent to the relation between development and nationalist ideology will be discussed here.

The first debate is between economic realities and social exigencies. It has several manifestations. One of these relates to the pace of development, with economic realities usually dictating a much slower pace than that demanded by the pressure for social welfare. An allied manifestation can be found in the opposing pressures of immediate consumption and delayed consumption: consumption vs. saving and investment. Yet another manifestation is the tendency to impose wage levels that go beyond the improvement in the marginal productivity of labor. The countries of the West were spared this debate upon their entry into their industrial phase one or two centuries ago. For them technical advances preceded the pressure of ideas of social justice. Callous as the rich may have been on this score, they certainly were well disposed toward high saving and investment. In the underdeveloped regions of today, advanced ideas of social justice precede advanced technology. This order inhibits saving by laying heavy burdens on businessmen for the shouldering of which they are not yet fully conditioned, and reduces the share of saving in favor of immediate consumption.

In the manifestations just cited, the issue is not as fundamental as may appear at first glance; it is largely a matter of timing. For what

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is today's saving is tomorrow's consumption; what goes into wages above an economically determined level—if it can be afforded out of other factor-shares—may in fact help the very marginal productivity in violation of which it was urged in the first place; and so forth. To put the issue in the form "welfare vs. development," or "economic security vs. progress" is legitimate only in the shortest of time ranges. Increased welfare is not possible without development, and development is pointless if it is not designed to lead to increased welfare and economic security. In the long run the two issues are really one.

The second debate centers around the strategy of development.[10] It has many aspects: Will development be balanced or unbalanced? Will industrialization or rural reform receive the lion's share of attention?[11] Will investments be spread out far—no matter how thinly—or will they be made in humps for the sake of greater impact and wider radiation of benefits?[12]—and so forth.

These aspects of the debate are partly economic and technical in nature, and to that extent can be resolved or at least argued out in terms of economic theory. But in the broad context of development the debate has heavy political and psychological connotations. The strategy adopted, whatever it is, determines in no small measure the emerging pattern of development in the various sectors and industries.

Nationalist leaders in power strongly underline speedy industrialization—that is to say, they choose a strategy of imbalance and humpy investment in selected sectors. This they do because of the prestige value of industrialization and because they believe that, man for man and dollar for dollar, industry is more productive than traditional agriculture, trade, or personal services. We will not stop here to argue the value of this belief. What is relevant to the present discussion is the effect such a belief has on the physiognomy of development as it is thought about, designed, and pursued in underdeveloped countries, and what political implications are thereby generated.

The implications are many. One of these is the promotion of the industrial class to a position of economic supremacy and the relegation

[10] Only in a broad sense does the use of the term here coincide with that of Albert O. Hirschman in *The Strategy of Economic Development*, New Haven, Conn., 1958.

[11] See my "The Place of Agriculture in Economic Development," *Land Economics*, xxxv, No. 4 (November 1959), pp. 297-305.

[12] Several writers have discussed this issue. Of special relevance is Gerald M. Meier's discussion of the significance for underdeveloped countries of maximizing production rather than worrying about the choice of an optimum combination of productive resources on a production possibility or transformation curve. See "The Problem of Limited Economic Development," in A. N. Agarwala and S. P. Singh, eds., *The Economics of Underdevelopment*, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 57-59.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the landlord, the merchant-middleman, and the caterer to a lower position. Another implication is the resultant reshuffle in the seats of political power. The ministry of industry is becoming a much more coveted prize than the ministry of agriculture in the very countries where agricultural activity contributes the largest share to national income and provides the livelihood of the largest proportion of the population. And who today hears of the ministry of trade, independently or as a department in the ministry of national economy?

Yet another implication is the redefinition of foreign trade policy in such a way as to emphasize protection in favor of emerging industries, regardless of the pressure from merchants and, even more, of the inconvenience silently suffered by the consumer. Lastly, the outcome of the debate has implications for the financing of development from foreign sources, since these sources quite often ask unwelcome questions about the use of funds made available by them, whether as loans or as grants.

The foreign financing of development stirs up a hornet's nest in the East-West controversy. The Cold War rages nowhere if not on the battlefield of foreign loans and grants. Who seeks what aid from whom is eminently and principally a political question, "aid without strings" notwithstanding. To say this, however, is not to say that the borrower, or even the receiver of grants, necessarily adopts the political-social system of the creditor or donor. Indeed, the reverse result may be brought about by the psychology of indebtedness. There surely exist many more debtors who resent their creditors than who love and imitate them.

The last debate to be discussed here relates to the allocation of resources in an economy: will it be guided by the price-mechanism operating through diffuse, atomistic decision-making, or by deliberate central planning and decision? This debate is long drawn-out, and nothing much that is new has been said for many years on either side of the argument.

The argument with regard to the efficiency of the two systems of allocation of resources could be considerably shortened if the exponents of each side indicated their criteria of efficiency. Is efficiency purely technical and economic, involving the selection of the most economical combination of productive inputs out of numberless alternatives, for the production of a given output (or the production of a maximum output, or a profit-maximizing output, out of given resources), regardless of the nature of the output and the use to which it is destined? Or ought there to be some subjectively determined norms attached to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concept of efficiency, such as social justice or political equality, with some disregard of purely technical or pecuniary results?

It must right away be said that the second concept can, and usually does, conceal a multitude of sins, such as public waste, political arrogance, and not infrequently ignorance of economic theory. An image of the state as an infallible allocator of resources has usually to be projected. The planner increasingly adopts a "this-is-best-for-you" attitude. On the other hand, private enterprise operating in perfect competition through the price mechanism—if this were true to life—would also suffer from waste and from the arrogance of professed infallibility. Nor can it be assumed that maximization of welfare under perfect competition, which the theorist can prove so elegantly, would be desirable for an underdeveloped country, even if it were possible. Such maximization asks no moral questions; it assumes a certain pattern of income distribution and a certain array of goods and services that the economy, guided by the motives of maximum profit for producers and maximum satisfaction for consumers, produces. But in the underdeveloped country of the real world, it is precisely this pattern and this array that it is thought highly desirable to change. And the change, since it cannot be brought about automatically, must be effected by design, at the hands of state authorities in accordance with clearly defined principles.

The state as allocator of resources is surely no *deus ex machina.* The case for it as a superior innovator, promoter of research, producer of capital goods, and saver and investor, is still far from proven. Its mistakes can be enormous, in view of the large scale of its operations. The calculated risks it takes may turn out to be grossly miscalculated. Yet there is a compulsion behind its activities, an inevitability, in underdeveloped countries pressed hard in our world and time by the urgency of social and economic development. The more willing the economist is to consider the implications of a large discrepancy between the private marginal returns (and costs) and the social marginal returns (and costs) of certain investments, the less the shock with which he views the entry of the state into the area of directly productive investment. When the alternative to state enterprise is negligible private enterprise, the case for the public agency as entrepreneur becomes formidable. Furthermore, as Mason has pointed out, the difference between the advanced West and the underdeveloped regions of the world with regard to this role of the state is surely only one of degree, not of kind.[13]

[13] This in substance is a point made in several places by Mason, *op.cit.*; see also his *Promoting Economic Development: The United States and Southern Asia*, Claremont, Calif., 1955.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The answer to the second question posed at the start of this article has already been suggested by this discussion. The question, it will be recalled, centered around the nature of the men, ideas, and policies that are likely to lead society's thrust against social stagnation and economic deprivation.

A clear pattern characterizes the experience of most underdeveloped countries driving hard for development today. There has usually been keen dissatisfaction among a sensitive, social-minded, activist minority, and as keen a desire to reform society. This feeling is intensified by the dissatisfaction and the protest of the population at large. The activist minority frequently has a nationalist ideology—a motivating, even if crudely expressed, ideology. This ideology emphasizes the power and dignity of the nation and of the citizen, and the need for development to make the striving for full political and economic liberation possible and meaningful. Coming to power, the group thus motivated sets about the acceleration of change in society. It emphasizes industrialization heavily. Unable to entrust private enterprise with the varied and far-reaching tasks of development, it takes the tasks upon itself. To this end it proceeds along three interrelated courses: global or sectoral planning; state investment in economic and social overhead capital; and state ownership of certain means of production in directly productive sectors and industries.

The three courses differ only in degree from policy courses adopted in all countries, underdeveloped and industrial, capitalist and Communist alike. But while the first two arise from certain political principles and require certain political organizational forms, they are not necessarily associated with any political and social developments peculiar to the underdeveloped countries. It is the third course that creates the greatest interest, for it places the underdeveloped countries in a mold that is neither one of industrial capitalism nor one of socialism. Being neither, can it be both? This is the final question to consider.

IV. The Shape of Things to Come

Expressed differently, the question before us is whether the pursuit of development by a nationalist group tends to lead to the emergence of a particular and distinctive political-economic pattern of thought and organization and, if so, what this pattern is likely to be.

The recent history of underdeveloped countries bent on quick change shows a recurrence of very much the same combination of ideas, forces, and policies aiming at the reversal of underdevelopment. The nature

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of underdevelopment itself further suggests the postulate that development cannot be brought about speedily in backward societies and their poor, slow-growing economies without a strong initial thrust of the type we have discussed. On the basis both of past experience and the compulsion of circumstances in underdeveloped countries, we can now indulge in a forecast of the shape of things to come in these countries.

The major outward departure from their stagnant past is in the active role assumed by the state in the process of development. To be most effective, this entails a combination of political and economic power in the hands of social-minded ruling groups. Duality of power is safe neither on tactical grounds nor for the grand strategy of development. Only as development proceeds considerably and its future becomes more or less assured will it be wise to allow wide autonomy to development authorities.

One important manifestation of the economic role of political authorities that has heavy ideological and political implications is state ownership of certain means of production. Observation shows that only extremely rarely is state ownership resorted to in conformity with dogmatic socialist convictions. Thus even in India, where socialist ideology is professed by powerful elements in the ruling group, private enterprise is permitted large areas of ownership and operation. The signs of dogmatic rigidity are quite minor. In the United Arab Republic, where the declared target of the ruling group is a socialist, democratic, co-operative system, neither the development plans of the past few years nor the current plan projected in two stages into 1965 and 1970, is ushering in the socialist state in any but limited areas of manufacturing and banking. Pragmatism more than dogmatism underlies these decisions.

There is reason to believe that many leaderships that profess socialist leanings adopt certain socialist-like formulas of expression and of action only in the belief that the road to their final social and economic objectives lies in that direction. If these same objectives were to require a retrenchment of state enterprise, these leaderships would probably be willing to retrench. This is more a matter of idealism than of ideology.

Alternatively, one can say that the underdeveloped countries are on the way to evolving a variation on the theme of socialism as accepted in theory or as embodied in socialist states. This special brand of socialism will be one designed to serve the nationalist goals of power and dignity for the nation and welfare for the citizen. Indeed, the abhorrence of the governments of underdeveloped countries for the parliamentary form of democracy, as experienced by most of them upon

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their independence, is not necessarily a rejection of democracy in principle, in preference for socialist systems like those of the Eastern bloc. The rejection is explained by the new ruling groups as a reaction to the misapplication of democracy by the corrupt political regimes that they are now replacing.

The systems adopted by many of these new ruling groups, whatever their nature, are declared transitional systems whose purpose is to prepare the ground for the day when the citizen can genuinely and effectively exercise his right to the political self-expression and choice that underlie democracy. Economic development and the social justice it makes possible and meaningful are emphasized as a necessary means for the liberation of the citizen from poverty and ignorance and from servile dependence on corrupt politicians, landlords, city merchants, and financiers.

There is no way of telling how good the intentions of the present social-minded ruling groups are going to prove, or, if good, how effective ultimately. It is not difficult to concede the point that under the weight of their grim legacy most of the citizens of the underdeveloped countries would be incapable of exercising the right of democratic choice freely and responsibly, even if they were allowed the forms of democratic elections. Nor is it difficult to admit that many of the ruling groups are genuinely striving, according to their best lights, to prepare the citizen for the exercise of such a right.

A big question remains unanswered: will the long years of conditioning under the guardianship of a powerful leadership produce the desired objective? India is the only country that has explicitly replied "No" to this question, though some other countries have done so by implication through their actions. Elsewhere, one cannot escape the fear that the more effectively the state undertakes the political rights of citizens because of their unreadiness to undertake them themselves, the more slowly will they be prepared for the responsible exercise of those rights. Paternalism has a great deal in its favor, but it is hardly the best atmosphere for preparing minors to become independent.

In at least three underdeveloped countries there seems to be an awareness of the dangers of extended assumption by government of the citizen's political right of choice. These are the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, and Pakistan. In all three, training for the right of choice is going on by stages—through a mixture of election at the grass-roots level and selection beyond that. It remains to be seen how far these experiments will go, and how effective they will prove.

Our estimate is that this approach, or some variant of it, will con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinue to be followed, and that more of the underdeveloped countries that have abandoned the processes of parliamentary democracy altogether after military *coups d'état* will adopt some such approach. The Sudan, Iraq, and even Turkey may well be the next in line. Furthermore, many of the countries that still have the Western forms of parliamentary democracy—and their numbers are dwindling—seem to be edging perceptibly towards the approach described earlier, for very much the same reasons. In brief, the most likely political development in the coming years, barring a violent Communist take-over, is adherence to the principles of Western representative democracy and adoption of forms to express it that are neither Western nor Eastern, but fall somewhere in between. From this process will emerge a special brand of democracy alongside the special brand of socialism that is also emerging.

The confidence with which this forecast can be made arises only partly from the observable trend in underdeveloped countries. It arises in greater measure from an awareness of the necessities of the situation in these countries and of their desire to reject the systems of both Western industrial capitalism and Eastern communism. The rejection begins as a negative gesture of protest but gradually turns into a positive desire for self-expression. The widespread policy of non-alignment, or neutralism, which is gaining in appeal, is nothing but a manifestation of the same negative and positive attitudes.

It appears likely that a distinct pattern of economic systems will emerge as an expression of the special brand of socialism and the special brand of democracy in those countries pressing for speedy development. This pattern can briefly be designated as one that allows individual economic freedom of action within outer limits of constraint by the state.

One set of limits will determine the apportioning of emphasis and state attention among sectors and industries, probably giving particular emphasis to manufacturing industry and rural reform. Another set will aim at assuring the economy of a certain volume of savings and investment—both private and public. To this end, the state will go beyond building the public sector to make substantial investments in directly productive sectors and industries. But although such investments will be high on a year-to-year basis, they will probably remain a minor proportion of the cumulative stock of capital of the whole community.

The allocation of resources will accordingly be influenced by the state, though it will not be subjected to a total system of control. Certain essential industries will be assured the resources they require. The prices

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of these resources will be determined within the limits set for pricing. Other industries will compete for the balance of resources available and will pay the price determined by the forces of supply and demand—again, subject to any upper and lower limits that may have been set. As far as factor-shares in the national product are concerned, the limits will determine minimal incomes below which social assistance will be invoked, wage floors, and income and wealth ceilings beyond which income taxes and death duties will become virtually prohibitive. This limitation will also include the setting of ceilings for the rents charged by rural landlords to their tenants. Apart from these limits, there is likely to be very little direct herding of people into specific sectors or industries or fields of training. But the facilities provided for training and the relative attractiveness of job openings will probably be designed to produce push-and-pull effects on managerial and labor resources.

In the field of pricing the probability is that essential, mass-consumption commodities will be subject to rigid price limits, even if this calls for subsidies or state trading. Beyond this category of prices, there will be little price-fixing, although upper price limits may be set as a deterrent against speculation and artificial scarcities.

Finally, in the field of foreign trade, the outer limits will probably determine the global volume of imports to be allowed, as well as the sources of imports. Likewise, protective policy for the purpose of promoting manufacturing industry and agriculture will define the industries and the types of agriculture that it is desired to promote.

In all these illustrations, a certain measure of flexibility and freedom in economic choice and decision is preserved within the areas of constraint. The measure will be large or small, depending on the evaluation by the ruling group of the significance of the activity involved in each area of constraint. Generally speaking, the more significant the activity for the process of development and for the country's national and social objectives, the smaller the measure of flexibility and freedom of action that will be allowed. In total, such a system allows for the functioning of the Invisible Hand under the guidance of profit motivation, while at the same time it allows for the constraints and the functioning of the Visible Hand of the state, acting under the guidance of social motivation. Even if the system proves highly inefficient, or arbitrary, or too illiberal, it will probably still seem their best choice to countries desirous of speedy development.

The picture that has been portrayed of the thrust of men and ideas against underdevelopment is admittedly an idealized one. So perhaps

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is the system that is expected to formalize the relations between the political and the economic forces and define the functioning of these forces. In contrast, it may be said, the appeal and the applicability of industrial capitalism and of communism have been minimized. Both instances of exaggeration are deliberate. A system that is theoretically available is really irrelevant if it is impossible to apply, or if its application leaves inadequately answered the fundamental economic and social questions of a society. The contention in this article has been that no alternative system is both relevant *and* desirable for the situation at hand. If only by default, the underdeveloped countries have had to embark on their own systems. These systems will be elaborated and will continue to be distinctive for many years to come. The nature and dimensions of the problems of underdevelopment necessitate this trend. The logic of underdevelopment itself forces a joint solution by the Visible Hand as well as the Invisible.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOME ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA

The Problem of Accelerated Reaction

By KARL VON VORYS

IT is becoming increasingly apparent that the rate of economic growth in India will have to be increased if the standard of living is to rise significantly within the foreseeable future. At the moment India is completing her Second Five-Year Plan. The objectives of the plan are indeed very modest. They provide for a 25 per cent increase in the national income and an 18 per cent increase in the per capita income over a five-year period.[1] To reach these objectives, investment in the private and public sectors was to be increased to a rate of 10.68 per cent of the national income by 1961.[2] An 18 per cent increase would raise the per capita income of India to only Rs 331 ($69.50)[3] and the investment rate of 10.68 per cent may be just about sufficient for a take-off into economic development.[4] Nevertheless, almost immediately after these targets were approved, doubts appeared whether the necessary funds for investment would become available.[5] Although more foreign aid was provided than was originally expected,[6] this was more than offset by the difficulties faced in mobilizing domestic resources. By 1958 the total objectives were revised downward by about 12 per cent.[7]

The total achievements of the Second Five-Year Plan of course cannot yet be determined. The general estimate is, however, that there will be a further shortfall of from 10 to 12 per cent of the revised targets.[8] If this expectation is borne out, the per capita income in 1961

[1] Government of India, Planning Commission, *Second Five Year Plan*, New Delhi, 1956 (hereafter cited as *Second Five Year Plan*), p. 74; and C. D. Deshmukh, *Economic Developments in India—1946-1956*, New York, 1957, pp. 101-2.

[2] *Second Five Year Plan*, p. 11.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge, Eng., 1960, pp. 20, 45.

[5] See budget speech of Shri T. T. Krishnamachari, Finance Minister in 1957 (Indian Parliament, *Lok Sabha Debates*, Series 2, May 10-22, 1957, 1, p. 474). See also comments in *Times of India* (Bombay), June 9, 1957, p. 1; June 18, 1957, p. 6; July 25, 1957, p. 6.

[6] The Five-Year Plan estimated the expected foreign aid at $1.6 billion (Rs 800 crores). During the first two years of the Plan alone, the United States and other Western powers committed $1.4 billion and Soviet aid approximated $0.3 billion. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Foreign Policy: Asia*, Study No. 5, prepared by Conlon Associates, Ltd., Washington, D.C., 1959 (hereafter cited as *Conlon Report*), pp. 38-39.

[7] *Times of India*, May 5, 1958, p. 1.

[8] *Conlon Report*, p. 39; and Edward S. Mason, *Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas*, New York, 1957, p. 76.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will not exceed Rs 318 ($66.78) and the rate of capital formation may very well fall below the minimum level required for a take-off into sustained economic growth. The prospects for the Third Five-Year Plan, currently in the planning stage, do not appear to lend hope for substantial improvement. One source already estimates a deficit of $1 billion (Rs 500 crores) per year to be made up by foreign aid.[9] Another believes that even if the proposed targets are met, the gap between food supplies and the target will be 28 million tons by 1965-1966. This will amount to a shortfall of about 25 per cent in terms of need.[10]

Clearly, the political leadership is concerned. The confidence of the electorate and hence to an important extent the stability of the government and the careers of individual political leaders are at stake. The Western powers are also concerned. South Asia, and more specifically India, is held up as a test case of whether rapid economic growth can indeed take place in a non-totalitarian political framework. Furthermore, it is assumed to be axiomatic that political unrest in any part of the non-Communist world is detrimental to Western interests. Hence, the general desire among political leaders and scholars to identify the causes of the predicament.

I

At the core of the problem of economic development lies the "problem of accelerated reaction." It seems that the forces which sustain economic development, at least in the initial stages, also evoke counterforces whose rate of increase tends to accelerate rapidly and thus retard or counteract the forces producing growth.[11] There may be many counterforces, but the two we shall analyze in detail are rising population and rising expectations. In the early stages of economic development, both tend to accelerate more rapidly than the national product. Yet unless these counterforces are controlled, they may very well not only slow down economic development but bring it to a standstill.

Let us first describe the demographic problem. It appears that the initial stages of economic development are accompanied by a rapid increase in the population.[12] Although there may be some slight in-

[9] *Conlon Report*, p. 39.

[10] Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation, *Report on India's Food Crisis and Steps to Meet It*, Delhi, National Printing Works, 1959, pp. 3-4.

[11] Cf. Harvey Leibenstein, *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth*, New York, 1957, p. 16.

[12] For a model of the relationship between the rise of income level and population growth, see Everett E. Hagen, "Population and Economic Growth," *American Economic Review*, XLIX (June 1959), pp. 310-27. See also comment on model by H. H. Villard and reply by Professor Hagen in *ibid.*, L (June 1960), pp. 438-41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crease in the birth rate owing to improved public morale, most of the additional increment to the population is the result of sharply falling death rates. Ultimately there may be a reduction of birth rates as well, causing a reduction in the rate of population growth. But there is a significant time lag, and at least during the first part of it population increments accelerate rapidly. India is a case in point. Starting with the decade of 1921-1931, the rate of population growth has consistently increased, and it is estimated that the peak has not yet been reached.[13]

The special significance for India of the condition of rapidly falling death rates accompanied by constant or slightly rising birth rates is, of course, that it occurs during the initial period of economic development: the take-off into sustained economic growth. The following illustrates the magnitude of the difficulty. Assuming a favorable capital/output ratio of 3/1 and a conservative 1.5 per cent annual increase in the Indian population, it would take an annual investment rate of 4.5 per cent merely to remain stagnant.[14] Since the current annual investment rate is only 8.9 per cent, the annual net growth is less than 1.5 per cent.[15] There seems to be little relief in sight in the immediate future. An increased rate of investment is projected by the Plan, but these projections are rarely met. In the meantime, the rate of population growth continues to rise.

Another counterforce to Indian economic growth is the rising expectations or, perhaps more accurately, the widening gap between attainment and expectations of the people. Before proceeding further, it might be best to describe just what we mean by level of attainment and level of expectation. The level of attainment is a subjective estimate of a person's well being. In modern societies the economic standard of living is a fundamental ingredient of such an estimate. Other considerations, such as personal power and prestige or the psycho-political

[13] Recent rates of population growth in India have been as follows: 1921-1931—11.04%; 1931-1941—13.53%; 1941-1951—14.06%; 1951-1961 (projected)—17.60%-18.80%. During the period 1921-1955, the birth rate in India declined from 46.4 to 27, or 41.81%. During the same interval, the death rate dropped from 36.3 to 11.7, or 67.76%. (Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*, Princeton, N.J., 1958, pp. 30, 35-36; and United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook, 1957*, New York, 1957, pp. 168-69, 192-93.)

[14] The Planning Commission estimated a capital/output ratio of 2.3/1. Other sources, however, suggest a higher estimate. *Second Five Year Plan*, p. 9; Jan Tinbergen, *The Design of Development*, Washington, D.C., 1956, pp. 7-8; Charles P. Kindleberger, *Economic Development*, New York, 1958, pp. 42-47; and W. Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth*, Homewood, Ill., 1955, pp. 201-8.

[15] The Second Five-Year Plan estimates the investment rate at the beginning of the Plan to be 7.31% and projects it to reach 10.68% at the end. The average rate during the five years of 1956-1961, if the Plan expectations were fulfilled, would therefore be 8.9%. (*Second Five Year Plan*, p. 74.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rewards accruing from matters of national pride (e.g., collective achievement of new industrial plants, excellence in athletic competition, influence in international relations), may increase or decrease this estimate of one's attainment. In contrast, the level of expectation is the expression of a desired condition. This concept is also a composite. It is a blending of an ideal image posited by the ideology and some concretely observable example, such as the conspicuous consumption of a domestic elite or the consumption pattern of a foreign society.

As long as the gap between the level of expectations and the level of attainment is small and the population is confident that its expectations are realizable, this discrepancy contributes largely to the motivation for improvement and progress. In fact, one of the major requirements for economic development is that such a differential should exist.[16] The problem arises when the gap is excessive and the people gradually become convinced that efforts to reduce it substantially are futile. Here lurks a danger. For the ideology of modern India legitimizes the demonstration effect of Western consumption patterns as the objective of economic, social, and political aspirations. Since the difference between the standard of living of the West and that of India is very great,[17] the gap between the level of expectation and the level of attainment in India is very wide indeed. Moreover, this close association between Western consumption patterns and India's level of expectation occurs during the initial stages of economic development when, owing to a need for a high rate of reinvestment, the material rewards (consumer goods) to the population appear to be especially slow in coming. Hence, unless some compensating forces affecting the level of attainment become operative, the already wide gap between level of expectation and level of achievement appears to the Indian consumer to be widening even further.[18] The consequences of such a development are far-reaching. First, an optimistic estimate of the future is undermined and destroyed, and unless a significant segment of the population holds such an optimistic estimate, investment and entrepreneurship, so vital to economic development, cannot flourish.

[16] Rostow, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

[17] The Second Five-Year Plan estimates that at the end of the Fifth Plan (1976) the per capita income will have risen to Rs 546. Even if this estimate is correct, this amounts to little more than $100 a year. (*Second Five Year Plan*, p. 11.)

[18] We assume here that there is no substantial difference in the annual increments to national income of a Western advanced country and of India. As a matter of fact, the net national income of the United States increased from $384.8 billion in 1956 to an annual rate of $448.3 billion in the first quarter of 1960, or 19.1%. This is about the rate of planned increase, and more than the actual increase in India. (*Federal Reserve Bulletin*, XLVI, May 1960, p. 561.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The propensity to save is very small in a society which is in the proximity of subsistence level. Without any confidence that attainments may approximate expectations, the propensity to save will approach zero. The margin above subsistence will either be consumed or hoarded, but not reinvested.

A further consequence of a widening gap between the level of attainment and the level of expectation is the undermining of public morale[19] or even the alienation of increased numbers of the population from the nation's social and political institutions. People remain loyal to institutions if these appear either inevitable or useful for the achievement of their aspirations. A non-totalitarian social and political system can never appear inevitable, and if it fails to persuade the people of its ability to further their aspirations its position will be extremely tenuous. The weakening of institutions in turn serves as a disincentive effect for such collective efforts as economic development.

II

An increasing rate of population growth and a sharply rising level of expectations retard economic growth and hence may be characterized as reactionary. But even more significant is the response of governments and populations as these problems become more apparent and pressing. For there are two possible approaches that may be followed, singly or in combination: efforts to increase capital formation and output may be continued with reinforced vigor, or a new emphasis may be placed on the reduction of consumption. It is symptomatic that while India's preoccupation with increased production has continued, in recent years the inclination to resort to solutions of consumption control has also grown at an accelerated rate. A public policy of population control and the establishment of a "guided democracy" appear more and more compelling to the people and to the government. A public policy of population control follows the logic of reducing the number of consumers. Guided democracy as a form of government gains its persuasiveness through its efficacy in controlling the level of consumption.

Birth control, of course, is nothing new in India and South Asia. For some time now, efforts have been made to encourage this practice. These, however, have generally been initiated by privately organized groups. The Indian government, while sympathetic, is not especially active in this respect. It has limited its efforts to allocating relatively small funds for birth control research and experimentation and for

[19] Cf. David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology*, New York, 1948, pp. 408ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

medical advice and facilities.[20] More recently, however, the pressure for increased action on the part of the government has been mounting. The government of India, it is argued, should follow the example of Japan[21] by playing a greater and more active role in reducing the birth rate, through a public campaign identifying birth control as a public necessity for individual and national welfare. Obviously we are not concerned here with any possible moral implications of birth control, nor are we concerned with individual family planning. The issue simply is whether a public policy to endorse, to espouse, and to promote birth control would in fact help increase the per capita share of the national income.

There are, of course, many practical hurdles which such a public campaign would have to overcome. To begin with, there is a marked and widespread cultural resistance, especially among the rural masses.[22] This resistance is somewhat strengthened by Gandhi's opposition to any method of birth control other than continence and late marriage.[23] Thus, the educational (or informational) program to be undertaken is overwhelming. Moreover, an official study indicates that while most people may be receptive to official propaganda intended to encourage family planning, only a few seem to be ready to take any effective action to reduce the size of the family.[24]

Yet, difficult as the task of a significant reduction of birth rates through a public propaganda effort for family control may be, it is not impossible. Moreover, it is clear that any reduction in the birth rate represents a gain, however small. It is less certain, however, whether this would produce a *net* gain. If the price paid for a reduction of the annual population increment is a deceleration of the pace of the total economic growth, then indeed the gain is at best illusory. And there are indications that this could be the result.

There is some evidence that a public campaign for birth control must reach a rather high intensity before it has any noticeable effect on the birth rate. A case study of Puerto Rico, for example, reveals that although 41 per cent of the population uses some sort of contracep-

[20] Warren S. Thompson, *Population and Progress in the Far East*, Chicago, pp. 144-45.

[21] Irene B. Taeuber, *The Population of Japan*, Princeton, N.J., 1958, pp. 311, 373, 378; and Willem Brand, *The Struggle for a Higher Standard of Living*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, p. 102.

[22] William A. Morrison, "Attitudes of Males Toward Family Planning in a Western Indian Village," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, xxxiv (July 1956), pp. 262-86.

[23] S. Chandrasekhar, *Population and Planned Parenthood in India*, London, 1955, pp. 50-51.

[24] Warren S. Thompson, "The Population Barrier," in James W. Wiggins and Helmuth Schoeck, eds., *Foreign Aid Re-examined*, Washington, D.C., 1958, pp. 160-61.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive, the birth rate in these families is not appreciably lower than in those where there is no restraint on maternity at all.[25] An intensive public campaign for birth control, of course, costs a great deal of money[26]—which must be diverted from public capital funds.

Secondly, we must consider the possible effect of such a campaign on investment. It is generally conceded that a take-off into sustained economic growth requires an increasing rate of investment. Investment in turn is stimulated by incentives. In fact, it is suggested that investment incentives are the key to economic development and, once they are stimulated, the other causes of low capital formation will be alleviated as part of a multiplier effect.[27] One of the most dynamic of these incentives is a general atmosphere of optimism. The members of a significant segment of society must have high hopes for their individual and collective future. It is this optimistic view which, in fact, provides the incentive for maximum investment and entrepreneurial activity. In a few newly independent countries the successful struggle against the colonial power generated a creative optimism. This stimulus is now gradually declining. Hence, in the interest of sustained economic growth, it is incumbent upon the government to do everything in its power to disseminate and to reinforce the optimistic aspects of national ideology.[28] It is probable, however, that a public campaign of birth control would strike a discordant and disturbing note in a general atmosphere of optimism, especially if confidence in the future were not yet firmly established. Hence it would result in a disincentive effect and thus retard capital formation.

Thirdly, we must consider the possibility that birth control may change the age distribution of the population and that this change could affect economic development. As we have noted above, the rapid population increases in underdeveloped countries in general and India in particular reflect not so much an increased birth rate as a sharply declining death rate. Admittedly, population projection is a rather

[25] Reuben Hill, Mayone J. Stycos, and Kurt W. Back, *The Family and Population Control*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959, pp. 172-75.

[26] The Second Five-Year Plan allocated Rs 4 crores for a family-planning program. Official estimates call for the establishment of 300 urban and 2,000 rural clinics. Even if each clinic could serve ten villages, the total served by 1961 would be only 20,000. There are, however, approximately 600,000 villages in India. Assuming that the expenditure of Rs 4 crores provides for 3.3 % of the total need, an effort to provide a clinic within reach of each person would require an appropriation of Rs 132 crores.

[27] Nathan Rosenberg, "Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries," *American Economic Review*, L (September 1960), pp. 706-15.

[28] Karl von Vorys, "Some Political Incentives for Economic Development in India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon," *Western Political Quarterly*, XII (December 1959), pp. 1061ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

risky business.[29] It is even more questionable to isolate specific changes in the age groupings of the population. In spite of these reservations, it appears that where the birth rate remains constant, the age groups at each end of the continuum (i.e., 0-14 and 65 and over) appear to gain by the reduction of the death rate to a somewhat greater degree than the groups in between. It is generally assumed that at least some reduction in the birth rate would accompany the declining death rates.[30] This would tend to counteract any marginal increment in the 0-14 category, but would further increase the share of the 65-and-over category. A case in point, of course, is the United States. In 1910 only 4.3 per cent of the population was over 65 years of age. In 1950 the comparable figure was 8.1 per cent; a marginal increase of 88 per cent.[31] Interpolations of available population projections of India do not contradict the United States trend. By 1981, all available estimates agree, the ratio of persons over 60 years of age to the total population will have increased by no less than 21 per cent, and perhaps by as much as 45 per cent.[32]

Thus there is an expectation that the relative number of elderly persons in the society, and at the polls, will significantly increase in India. This process, however, would be accelerated by a successful public campaign for birth control. Although the segment of those over 60 in the over-all total would remain relatively modest, their right to vote—a matter which naturally does not arise in the case of those at the other end of the age grouping—and their social position would entitle them to a more than proportionate role in political decision-making. It is, of course, very dangerous to generalize about the values of the various age groups, and people over 60 have at times been noted for eccentricity. They are rarely characterized, however, as being highly receptive to new ideas and suggestions for social and political changes. Nor are they likely to support deficit financing or inflationary policies.[33]

[29] John Hajnal, "The Prospect for Population Forecasts," *Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1954*, III (Rome, August 31-September 10, 1954), pp. 43-51.

[30] Hagen, *op.cit.*, p. 315; F. W. Notestein, "Economic Problems of Population Change," *Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference of Agricultural Economists*, London, 1953; and Lewis, *op.cit.*, p. 312.

[31] George W. Barclay, *Techniques of Population Analysis*, New York, 1958, p. 226.

[32] Coale and Hoover, *op.cit.*, pp. 35-37; United Nations, Bureau of Social Affairs, *The Population of Asia and the Far East, 1950-1980*, Population Studies No. 31, Report IV, New York, 1959, pp. 100-2; and J. N. Sinha, "Population Growth and Balance in Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VII (April 1959), pp. 224-27.

[33] Admittedly, it is hazardous to project such general trends. There are, however, some studies which might be interpreted to support such a contention. See, for example,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In other words, at the time when political, social, and economic progress is imperative, an important and growing segment of the Indian population may be firmly committed to the status quo and strongly disinclined to experiment. The result may be a serious loss in initiative and entrepreneurship and a consequent phasing-out of the development programs.

III

The second condition which retards economic development in India is the widening gap between attainment and expectations. As we noted, this condition finds an ambivalent expression. On one hand, there is an intense resistance to anything that would divert any part of the family income from consumption. There is little propensity to invest and no inclination to pay higher taxes. On the other hand, there is an insistent and impatient demand for the government to maximize capital formation and thus increase income and production facilities. The difficulty of course is compounded by the fact that the political leadership in a democracy must be responsive to *both* contradictory pressures. Thus it is the task of the political leadership to institute and encourage economic growth. Economic development requires the mobilization of savings. In an agricultural country—and underdeveloped countries are necessarily predominantly agricultural—this means a conversion of the individual surpluses (however small) of the rural households into public investment primarily affecting the urban centers. It is, however, also the task of the political leadership to achieve this intersectoral transfer of wealth with the consent and support of the rural masses. The political leadership is dependent for tax policies and appropriations on the approval of the legislature, and it is dependent for its continued power on the periodic approval of the voter. In view of this dual and interlocking responsibility, when the electorate is somewhat hesitant to sacrifice a substantial measure of its material possessions by investing them in public capital formation, the national political leadership may feel that it is forced to make a choice between economic development and democratic political processes.

There are few (other than the Communists) who advocate that South Asian countries should follow the ruthless totalitarianism of China, although some may envy its achievement. On the whole, there

Raymond G. Kuhlen, "Changing Personal Adjustment During Adult Years," in John E. Anderson, ed., *Psychological Aspects of Aging*, Washington, D.C., 1956, pp. 21-29; and Frank Pinner, Paul Jacobs, and Philip Selznick, *Old Age and Political Behavior*, Berkeley, Calif., 1959.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appears to be little inclination among either the population as a whole or the elites to exchange a totalitarian dictatorship for a recently deposed colonial administration. There is, however, increasing attraction in a program of "guided democracy." Democratic political processes, it is suggested, are suited to reflect gradual social and economic changes. They are unable to cope, however, with as rapid and as fundamental a social and economic transformation as is required of newly independent, underdeveloped countries. Hence, it is thought that in the interest of the ultimate establishment of democratic values, democratic political processes should be suspended, and unchecked political power "temporarily" exercised by either the civilian or the military bureaucracy.[34] Proponents of these arguments may point to the unwillingness of legislatures, reflecting the view of rural majorities, to support intersectoral transfer of wealth away from agriculture.

India, of course, is constitutionally a democratic republic. There are periodic elections with universal and secret suffrage. The national legislature is invested with the broad powers of the British Parliament. But the precedents and the procedures which were established during the past decade demonstrate the desire of the political leadership to rely primarily on the civilian and military bureaucracies for the formulation and administration of policy. Neither the electorate nor the legislature is encouraged to play a significant role.

The government of India has not shown any great interest in developing effective local government. Local legislation rarely arises from popular demand. Rather it is the result of an official policy decision which filters down from the national executive.[35] Nor does the ruling Congress Party exhibit any enthusiasm for strengthening local party organization. Whenever the subject of decentralization is suggested, the party leaders call for delay and express doubts about the wisdom of "democratic organization at the local levels."[36] The result is that there are no meaningful democratic political outlets on local levels; a fact that causes some popular dissatisfaction. It is even suggested that the continued lack of local representative bodies is

[34] See, among others, Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Politics of Underdevelopment," *World Politics*, IX (October 1956), pp. 55-75; Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *ibid.*, XI (April 1959), pp. 342-45; and John H. Badgley, "Burma's Political Crisis," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXI (December 1958), pp. 350-51.

[35] Hugh Tinker, *The Foundations of Local Government in India, Pakistan and Burma*, London, 1954, p. 339; and Richard L. Park, "District Administration and Local Self-Government," in Richard Park and Irene Tinker, *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*, Princeton, N.J., 1959, pp. 337ff.

[36] *Times of India*, May 13, 1958, p. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

responsible for the inclination to violence as a method of settling local disputes in India.[37]

Perhaps even more important is the lack of serious effort to fortify democratic political institutions on the national level. More specifically, there is no demonstrable major effort on the part of the political leadership to build up the national legislature to serve as an effective communication link between the electorate and the leadership and to involve it in the decision-making process. This is especially true with respect to the formulation of economic policies.

The annual budget debate in the *Lok Sabha* is not much more than a ritual. After introduction by the Finance Minister, the budget is supposedly scrutinized by the Estimates Committee and the entire *Lok Sabha*. The Committee's report is couched in very general terms and its recommendations do not lead to immediate modification of the expenditures which have been proposed.[38] In any case, the report of the Estimates Committee may not be debated by the House.[39] On the floor of the House the *entire budget* must be considered, although specific questions may be asked of the minister. The debate, however, must be concluded and the Finance Bill approved within one month.[40] Under the circumstances, no meaningful budget analysis can take place. There are general statements by legislative leaders—but not much more. Recently, there have been signs that the scope of parliamentary questions regarding public enterprises will be limited even further.[41] Finally, the legislature may make changes in the budget only with the consent of the Finance Minister. Without such consent, any adjustment, however small, is considered tantamount to a vote of no confidence, which in view of the size of the opposition parties is, at least for the time being, a rather useless effort.

If the yearly budget debate in Parliament is little more than a ritual, any legislative control after allocation is purely imaginary. To be sure, the Committee of Public Accounts is entrusted with the

[37] Wilfred Malenbaum, "Some Political Aspects of Economic Development in India," *World Politics*, X (April 1958), p. 381.

[38] Asok Chanda, *Indian Administration*, London, 1958, p. 188.

[39] See exchange between the Speaker and Mohamed Imam in *Lok Sabha* (*Lok Sabha Debates*, Series 2, May 10-22, 1957, 1, pp. 934-35).

[40] Chanda, *op.cit.*, p. 216. During the first *Lok Sabha*, the total debate on the budget lasted between 15 and 21 hours. (W. H. Morris-Jones, *Parliament of India*, Philadelphia, Pa., 1957, p. 321.) It is not surprising therefore that there is very substantial difference between sums allocated and sums spent. In 1954-1955, for example, the capital budget savings amounted to Rs 184 crores, or 41.5% of the allocations. The corresponding figures for 1955-1956 were Rs 147 crores, or 41.2% of the total budgeted. (*Ibid.*, p. 226.)

[41] John Kenneth Galbraith, *Studies Relating to Planning for National Development*, Calcutta, Indian Statistical Institute, 1956, p. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

responsibility of ensuring that the Executive spends the money for purposes granted, and that it does not spend more than is granted. There is, however, no pre-audit control. The Comptroller and Auditor-General merely prepares a post-audit report which he then presents to the Committee. There is no independent investigation or formal debate. This method is utilized, we learn, because "Parliament could hardly spare the time for the necessary scrutiny in detail. . . . A debate in the House might also destroy the non-party character of the examination and distract it from its perspective."[42] Significantly, pressure has recently been mounting to limit the powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General,[43] and the transfer of the accounting function from his hands to the government department concerned has in several instances already occurred.

The limitations on legislative participation in budgetary matters are serious indeed. It is even more significant, however, that in the process of economic planning, perhaps the most important aspect of public policy in an underdeveloped country, the legislature hardly plays any role at all.[44] During the formulation of the last two Five-Year Plans, production objectives, investment priorities, and monetary and fiscal policies were deliberated upon by the Finance Minister, the Planning Commission, the "Panel of Economists," the local development officers, and even the Working Committee of the Congress Party,[45] while Parliament received the Plans only *after* they had already begun "functioning."[46] Some consultations between the planners in the executive branch and the legislative committees did take place, but the recommendations of these committees were not considered by the Planning Commission.[47] Four committees were selected to study the Second Five-Year Plan and report on it to the whole House, but almost half of the debate took place before the reports of the committees were available.[48] Sixteen amendments were introduced, of which six expressed approval of the Plan and merely called upon the population to support the program. In the end, only three amendments were voted

[42] Chanda, *op.cit.*, p. 172.

[43] Paul H. Appleby, *Re-examination of India's Administrative System with Special Reference to Administration of Government's Industrial and Commercial Enterprises*, New Delhi, Government of India, 1956, pp. 27-29; and Chanda, *op.cit.*, pp. 247-50.

[44] Park and Tinker, *op.cit.*, pp. 29-30.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 301-28.

[46] *Lok Sabha Debates*, Part 2, May 9-30, 1956, v, p. 8362.

[47] *Ibid.*, v, p. 9421.

[48] The Second Five-Year Plan was debated by Parliament on May 23, 25, and 26 and September 8, 11, 12, 13, 1956. The Committee reports were presented to the *Lok Sabha* late in July and early in August.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

upon: two suggesting changes were defeated, one appealing for public support was passed. In fact, not a single provision of the Plan was changed by the legislature.[49]

The total effect of the budget and planning procedure is therefore that the formulation of economic policy appears very far removed not only from the electorate, but also from the elected representatives. It may of course be argued that these procedures and precedents merely follow the pattern of British institutions or are only extensions of practices initiated during the colonial period. Indeed, this is true to some extent. The Indian Constitution accepted the British example to a remarkable degree, and the prominent role of the executive is part of this heritage. Indian practice, however, has gone beyond the British example in limiting the role of the legislature in budgetary matters by more severely restricting both the time and the scope of debates and by accepting much less vigorous and effective audit controls.[50] Moreover, the fact remains that during the last ten years the participation of the legislator in the formulation of policy in the areas of budgeting, control of public corporations, and the over-all economic planning process has diminished and the share of a bureaucracy which is distrusted by the elected representatives and which in turn distrusts the elected representatives has substantially increased.

There is, however, one area of economic policy where the legislature of India still exercises considerable control—namely, tax rates.[51] Although some revisions were made in the revenue structure—notably, the introduction of an expenditure tax[52]—the legislature has resisted fundamental tax reform. A substantial shift of agricultural savings to industrial investment is certainly not taking place as yet. The agricultural sector is responsible for about 50 per cent of the national income, but only 9 per cent of the total revenue originates from land taxes.[53] The consequent frustrations to the political leadership who are charged with the responsibility of economic development are not inconsiderable and, as the popular pressure for economic rewards rises, the already existing appeal of guided democracy can be expected to accelerate.

[49] *Ibid.*, Part 2, August 27-September 13, 1956, VIII, pp. 7144-48.

[50] For a discussion of the budgetary system of the United Kingdom, see Eric Taylor, *The House of Commons at Work*, Harmondsworth, Eng., Penguin, 1951, pp. 189-225; and Sir Herbert Brittain, *The British Budgetary System*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1959, pp. 230-71.

[51] This is true of both the national and the provincial legislatures.

[52] Cf. Nicholas Kaldor, *Indian Tax Reform*, New Delhi, Ministry of Finance, 1956.

[53] Haskell P. Wald, *Taxation of Agricultural Land in Underdeveloped Economies*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p. 62.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

Clearly, in the realm of economic development, guided democracies must be granted several advantages. They can impose a greater measure of efficiency in the collection of revenue. They can also utilize capital funds more economically. They are not hampered by parliamentary debates and periodic elections and hence can pursue an unpopular policy if they consider it necessary. More specifically, guided democracies can arbitrarily freeze the standard of living and thus divert an increased share of revenue to public capital formation. The short-run effect may therefore be an acceleration of the growth rate.

In contrast to these advantages, a guided democracy may very well have a disincentive effect over an extended period and the total result may be a net loss. Guided democracies can temporarily restrain some of the political consequences of the expectation-attainment differential, but they cannot solve the problem itself. For a guided democracy not only freezes the economic ingredient of attainment, but provides very limited opportunities for a compensating growth of the non-economic ingredients. To be sure, some non-economic returns may flow from participation in charisma, as individuals receive satisfaction from a self-identification with the great leader.[54] A guided democracy, however, sacrifices the very substantial incentives to investment (and non-monetary rewards) that flow from group participation in decision-making.[55]

Significantly General Ayub Khan of Pakistan is apparently aware of this handicap. He seeks to recapture these incentives by providing on the local level a façade of democratic institutions. As one scholar concludes, "The whole scheme of Basic Democracies [Pakistan's variety of guided democracy] is an attempt to bring the planning and implementation of development schemes to the immediate consciousness of the people."[56] In line with this reasoning, elections for about 8,000 local Union Councils were held in December 1959 and January 1960. Some features of such local participation are noteworthy. First, "participation" itself is rather limited. A Union Council is not an entirely

[54] There is, however, considerably less popular identification with the bureaucracy. R. Dwarkas, *The Role of Higher Civil Service in India*, Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1958, pp. 185-95.

[55] Cf. Kurt Lewin, "Group Decision and Social Change," in Eleanor E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in Social Psychology*, New York, 1958, pp. 197-211. See also Kurt Mannheim, *Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning*, New York, 1950, pp. 149-53.

[56] Harry J. Friedman, "Pakistan's Experiment in Basic Democracies," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIII (June 1960), p. 109.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elected body. About one-third of its members are appointed by the leading administrative official in the area. Moreover, the "Controlling Authority," a high-level bureaucrat, may quash the proceedings, suspend the execution of any resolution passed or order made by the Council, and even require the Council to take some specific action. In short, the "Controlling Authority" not only can prevent the Council from taking such action as the Council chooses, but in fact may require the Council to take such action as the "Controlling Authority" is determined to foist upon it. Secondly, every effort is made to ensure that "participation" remains strictly local in character. The "election campaign" is limited to the most localized problems. The discussion of national issues is prohibited. The same is true of any interregional disagreement or divergence of interest.

The difficulty, of course, is that economic development is truly a national problem, and hence participation must have a total, national context. It involves not only intersectoral, but also interregional, transfers of wealth. It is therefore not enough that the farmer is interested in the improvement of the streets of his village or the irrigation of the land in his immediate vicinity. He must be ready to invest voluntarily in a distant dam or an industrial plant that he may never see. Moreover, unless his participation in decision-making (whether this is direct or representative) is genuine and meaningful to him, the danger is very real indeed that the Union Councils will not only fail to yield any incentives, but will have a disincentive effect through disillusionment.

Closely related to this is another disincentive effect—namely, one flowing from the elimination of the national legislature. For in a newly independent, primarily agricultural country, the national legislature plays a most significant function. It is its unique role to reconcile the conflicting forces of national unity and local interest. The national executive has always been viewed as the guardian of national unity. The provincial governments, on the other hand, are expected to espouse parochial needs and desires. The national legislature alone can bridge the gap between these two poles of power. Its members represent small, regional constituencies. Yet when it acts collectively, it acts for the entire nation. Without an effective national legislature, the process of polarization of power continues and can be resolved only if one side or the other is completely subordinated. If parochial interests became pre-eminent, no national effort would have any meaning and the economies of scale would remain unutilized. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to initiate economic development under such adverse

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

circumstances. If, on the other hand, national objectives were defined without the consideration and participation of local interests, the agricultural masses could hardly be expected to identify themselves with these objectives. Consequently, they would be disinclined to invest *voluntarily* in national capital formation. The national leadership could, of course, resort to the persuasion of force. It is proverbial, however, that in a society which lives in the proximity of a subsistence level and whose propensity to consume is extremely high, the ingenuity of the agricultural population in deceiving the tax collector and hiding non-monetized savings is nothing short of astounding. Unless a "guided democracy" is prepared to apply the most brutal police methods—reminiscent of those employed in the liquidation of the *kulaks*—any increase of pressure on the agricultural element to invest in public capital formation will result in accelerated hoarding and tax evasion.[57]

The following conclusion is therefore compelling. In the initial stages of economic development, rapidly rising populations and expectations will tend to slow down the economic momentum. Even more important, faced with the prospect of deceleration of the impetus toward growth, on one hand, and of acceleration of the popular demand for a substantial rise in attainment, on the other, the temptation to concentrate on public efforts to control consumption is almost irresistible. The arguments of advocates of population control and compulsory intersectoral transfer through a guided democracy seem to be most persuasive. Initial gains may even appear to demonstrate the effectiveness of such methods. The cost in disincentive effects becomes apparent only later, but the net result will be a slowdown of the growth momentum and a phasing-out of development programs beyond the tolerance level of the population. The critical danger to economic development is therefore that non-totalitarian governments intent on maximizing growth rates, yet faced by functionally autonomous counterforces, will *choose* remedial policies which will result in an over-all disincentive effect and hence will accelerate reaction. And by the time this trap is discovered, it may be too late for either economic development or the maintenance of non-totalitarian political institutions or both.

[57] For estimates and a discussion of current tax evasion and hoarding in India, see Kaldor, *op.cit.*, pp. 103-20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

PROFESSOR MILLS ON THE CALLING OF SOCIOLOGY

By EDWARD SHILS

C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959, 234 pp. $6.00.

I

PROSPERITY brings its own disorders. When American sociology, unregarded and undemanding, was pleased to be allowed an academic existence, it suffered from lack of self-confidence. The other academic disciplines thought little of it and it was unknown to the outside world. Its rustic naïveté and its simple enthusiasm aroused no antipathies within its own parochial confines. When, however, it began to thrive—when its output became more interesting intellectually, as it did in the 1930's, and the attention of the great world, of foundations, governments, and publicists, was drawn toward it—it also began to suffer the malaise of the prosperous. Professor Robert Lynd was probably the first of those who found that the subject they had fostered had not kept pace with their own political development toward the radical populism which was one trend in the leftward movement of the 1930's. In *Knowledge for What?* he accused his sociological colleagues of the evasion of the responsibilities implicit in the potentialities of their discipline. He was strongly for planning, for equality, and above all for radical political engagement; American sociologists—indeed, American social scientists in general—were charged with indifference, academic triviality, and subservience to the reigning authorities of state and economy.

In the twenty years since Professor Lynd published his book, sociology has grown greatly. Its output has increased vastly, its techniques have become more subtle and complicated, the numbers of its practitioners and the scale of its operations have multiplied many-fold; many sociologists are employed publicly and privately for the provision of more exact information about current social phenomena than casual observation and executive experience unaided could provide. It has, moreover, entered into the public debate. Its literary infelicity has been execrated, and its historical myopia deplored. Its enhancement of the common good has been proclaimed, aspired to, and sometimes even thoughtfully

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weighed. Some of its small substance has even become part of the intellectual public domain.

Columbia University has been a major agent and beneficiary of the prosperity of sociology in these two decades. It was at Columbia that some of the major lines of progress were traveled and that much of contemporary sociology could be seen in its most modern form. If Professor Lynd had not written his book there, then someone else at Columbia would have had to write it. Now, from the same platform and several decades later, Professor C. Wright Mills has taken up the charge which Professor Lynd brought earlier. His recent book, *The Sociological Imagination*, is a critique of the hitherto prevailing sociology, and it is a vehement invitation to sociologists to do something much different from what the overwhelming majority of them have been doing. His critique is more than a collection of random animadversions and eclectic fault-finding. It is the application of a fundamental disposition which is manifest in all that he says.

II

This fundamental disposition is expressed in individual bearing, in the criticism of contemporaries, in a diagnosis of the present age, and in a program. The right style for the profession is depicted by Professor Mills in his portrait of the ideal sociologist, who is sometimes impersonally portrayed and is sometimes openly identical with Mills himself. He works alone or with a small body of apprentices. He eschews team research, he stays off committees, he goes the way of the traditional craftsman, fashioning his own tools as he needs them. Unlike other sociologists, he elaborates terms only when he requires them, i.e., when it is clear that to do so "enlarges the scope of sensibility and furthers the reach of reasoning." He "examines social structures," in which he tries " 'to locate' many smaller milieux" instead of focusing on "small-scale milieux." He works "in a fully comparative way," and "directly on the national social structures of the world"; he is concerned exclusively with "issues which are only apparent in long historical perspective"; he confronts "the variety of history, biography, society" (pp. 20-21). He possesses and exercises the "capacity to shuttle between levels of abstraction, with ease and with clarity"; this is what distinguishes him as an "imaginative and systematic thinker" (p. 34).[1] He has a great knowledge of history; he is at home in any epoch, in "Nazi Germany in 1936, Sparta in seventh century B.C., the United States in

[1] Cf. also p. 73.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1836, Japan in 1866, Great Britain in 1950, and Rome at the time of Diocletian" (p. 44). He is a man who espouses freedom and reason, although he is ready "in the end, if the end comes . . . to beat those who disagree with us over the head" (p. 77). He is a sophisticated man of the world, who knows the vicissitudes of existence and the variety of human conditions. He fears no harsh truth. He spurns small-town narrowness, the simplicity of mind and manner of the *petit bourgeois* proponents of "liberal practicality." He is unattached, not a member of cliques. He serves only the great traditions of freedom and reason and, in that capacity, he is the heroic custodian of "classic social science" (pp. 90, 111, 128).

This wide-ranging sociologist is no pedant who masks his thoughts in ponderous academic verbiage. He writes with the awareness of himself "as a representative of a great language" (pp. 133, 222).[2]

Tough-talking, slangy, learned, deadly serious, indomitable, he is a composite of the Lone Ranger, Prometheus, Trotsky, and Max Weber—he is one of nature's noblemen, equally at home in the courts of old Europe and with "the girl next door."

III

Professor Mills is dissatisfied to the point of outrage with practically everything in the present state of sociology. He dislikes its conception of its calling; he abominates its procedures; he is contemptuous of its incapacity and indifference to the task of understanding contemporary society. Sociology should be the consciousness of the epoch in which we live. This epoch is unique in human history. In this epoch, men "feel entrapped"; they feel "threats which transcend their immediate locales" (p. 1). This is an age of "uneasiness" and "indifference" (p. 11), an age of "catastrophe" (p. 4), of "threats," of "troubles," of "earthquakes of change" (*ibid.*). It is an age of "terrorized masses and excited mobs; crowds and movements" (p. 42), of " 'mass men,' each trapped in quite powerless milieux" (p. 52). The two "central facts about Western societies" are "the frequent absence of engaging legitimation and the prevalence of mass apathy" (p. 41).[3] "Contemporary man," when he is

[2] Here are a few instances of the manner in which that great language is used for clear expression: "Power . . . *has to do* with whatever decisions men make about the arrangements under which they live" (p. 40); "The classic practitioner *verifies* a statement by detailed *exposition* of whatever materials are relevant" (p. 126); "Ours seems to be a period in which key decisions *or their lack* by bureaucratically instituted elites are increasingly sources of historical change" (pp. 115-16). (Italics added.) Terms like "structural mechanics," "structural transformations," "generic unit," abound and show that vigorous expression is fully compatible with portentous ambiguity.

[3] Also p. 148.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

self-conscious, views himself "at least as an outsider, if not a permanent stranger," in his society (p. 7). Modern Western, and especially contemporary American, societies constitute an "overdeveloped world" in which "the means of authority and of violence become total in scope and bureaucratic in form" (p. 4).

Much of this concentrated power is manipulative; it "is successfully employed without the sanction of the reason or the conscience of the obedient" (p. 41). Unlike earlier ages, which appear by implication to have been golden ages of reason and freedom, "in the modern world . . . power is often not so authoritative [i.e., legitimate] as it appeared to be in the medieval period; justifications of rulers no longer seem so necessary to their exercise of power" (*ibid.*).

Because power is so concentrated and men feel so powerless, their beliefs make little difference to what goes on. Their values, insofar as they possess or "cherish" them, are powerless; the values which they embody "do not form some autonomous realm within a society; their social relevance lies in their use to justify or to oppose the arrangement of power and the positions within this arrangement of the powerful" (p. 37). In this contemporary society—presumably unlike the Eden-like past of Western society and unlike other societies at any time, in which "values" and "beliefs" are an autonomous and powerful realm—freedom and reason have little chance: "the forces that imperil them today seem at times to be co-extensive with the major trends of contemporary society, if not to constitute the characterizing features of the contemporary period" (p. 130).

This picture of modern Western society and the implicit picture of other epochs and places are probably both wrong; they are certainly not novel. Professor Mills does not claim originality for his landscape. Some of it one sees in the German romantic glorification of the Middle Ages; one sees its robust praise of the past in Cobbett. One sees the bloodcurdled horror in the writings of Franz Kafka, Karl Jaspers, Karl Mannheim, Hannah Arendt, and the critics of "mass culture." Of course, there is a bit of truth in it; but its plausibility derives more from its correspondence with the current highbrow clichés than from its correspondence with the dispassionately observable facts of contemporary life and history. There have been years in Western history—e.g., in Germany during the last years of the Weimar Republic and under the Nazis—when reality approximated this picture more closely. The existence of nuclear weapons and the newest methods of delivering them certainly have introduced a very profound peril which the educated classes and the political elites of the great states are insufficiently willing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and insufficiently imaginative to overcome. But as a picture of Western societies, and not just as an ideal type of extreme possibilities which might be realized if so much else that is vital were lacking, it will not do.

In any case, it is not a picture of any society which is disclosed by contemporary sociological research or theoretical reflection. The discrepancy between his own picture of reality and that which is proffered by the results of research and theory is the most immediate occasion for Professor Mills's antipathy.

IV

What can a man who seems to regard himself as shaped in the mold of the great warrior-intellectuals, and who views the world in such grandiose and traumatic terms, find to please him among the pygmies of American sociology?

Any sociological inquiry which strives for precision through systematic, explicitly standardized procedures of gathering, codifying, and assessing data is denigrated as "abstracted empiricism." By this, Professor Mills presumably means that it has separated the situations which it studies from the context of more fundamental variables which determine them. He might also mean that certain properties of the individuals studied are "abstracted" from the "whole" concrete individual. Professor Mills implies that "abstracted empiricism" is a superficial form of contemporary history, since he says that any generalization at which it arrives is a generalization which holds only for American society during the period of inquiry. This seems to me to be a fair criticism, although not fatal. After all, it is quite legitimate to describe a condition existing at a particular moment in time,[4] and the results of such inquiries can certainly be illuminating to intelligent persons with interests as broad and deep as Professor Mills's.

He makes many other criticisms. He points to the imperative force of purely technical standards in determining the selection and formulation of problems, the unconnectedness of much empirical research with the literature of research and reflection which has gone before, the tendency to adduce explanatory variables which have not been included in the inquiry in order to interpret statistical relationships discovered among the investigated variables. He is certain that only minor problems can be studied by these methods (p. 14). The results obtained by

[4] In principle, Professor Mills's own position, in other parts of his argument and above all in his rejection of "grand theory" and his preference for "middle principles," should render acceptable the limited temporal aspiration which characterizes "abstracted empiricism."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"abstracted empiricism" are incapable of synthesis into a picture of the larger society.

Interviewing as an admissible technique of inquiry gains acceptance only occasionally: e.g., in a brief reference to S. L. A. Marshall's *Men Under Fire*, which is used as a foil to *The American Soldier* (pp. 54-56); or in a statement that he intended to interview some members of "the power elite." The use of semi-skilled interviewers and of standardized interviews guarantees the omission of the "kinds of depth materials which we know, from the most skilled and prolonged interviews, are there to be gotten" (p. 70).

In his interesting appendix "On Craftsmanship," he gives, in passing, a legitimate place to small specific investigations as parts of a larger scheme; but none of those he proposes would pass muster as a respectable piece of empirical research (p. 210).

His denial of the scientific value of systematic empirical research which attempts to exercise intellectual control over its procedures is, however, only a prelude to what he regards as the obnoxious cultural and political features of this kind of sociology. He is perturbed because, in order to obtain financial support for their research, academic scholars allow the decision as to what is to be studied to pass from their hands into those of administrators and businessmen and foundation officials. He regards all this as a monstrous "bureaucratization of reason," on behalf of powers who already have too much power which is not wisely or liberally used. He sees it as part of a general tendency for sociologists to renounce their civic responsibilities and to make themselves into the servants of authority. He despises teamwork and the bureaucratic organization rendered to some extent inevitable by the scale of systematic empirical inquiry. He is repelled by the half-educated sociologists attracted to large-scale empirical research.

Systematic research based on standardized interviews, with standardized methods of treating the data, possesses no qualities which offer the possibility of redemption. Although Professor Lazarsfeld at one place is said directly to be a person who expresses his thoughts clearly, and in another passage it is hinted that he is a cultivated man as well, he is thought to be too steeped in the sin of antihistorical, segmental, bureaucratic empiricism to redeem his subject.

The other object of Mills's even more unsparing scorn is the theory of action, which he contemptuously designates as "grand theory." The chief proponent of this heresy, Professor Parsons, does not get even the alleviatory sympathy which is accorded so meagerly to Professor Lazarsfeld. A clear and trenchant style becomes the patriotism of many a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sociological scoundrel—even one who does not possess such a style himself—whenever the name of Professor Parsons is mentioned. Professor Parsons' style is certainly prolix and turgid; and Professor Mills makes full use of the opportunity which it provides for some elephantine jollity. One-third of the chapter is spent on witty capers over Professor Parsons' style. Two-thirds are devoted to a little of the substance of the "grand theory."

At best, it is interpreted as the "association and dissociation of concepts." Forty per cent consists of verbal deformation of the sensible commonplaces of the textbooks, fifty per cent is "verbiage." In a chapter which, for studied rudeness, is not easily equaled in a profession not notable for refinement, Mills claims to demonstrate that there is nothing worthy of consideration in the theory of action. It is abstract on a level at which nothing can be realistically analyzed, and it has "no genuine problems" (p. 32).[5]

His more relevant, if also intellectually more problematic, criticisms of "grand theory" attribute to it the belief that there is a comprehensive and seamless consensus in all societies, an incapacity to deal truthfully with power, and, through its postulation of categories common to all social systems, a falsification of the uniqueness of every epoch and society, particularly our own. To the accusation of intellectual nullity, and more fundamental error, Professor Mills adds the further charge that "grand theory" has, to the extent that it has any function, the function of an ideological argument for conservatism.

V

When a powerful windstorm blows through a town, it breaks off some branches, tears down loosely hung shop signs, breaks a few windows. When a hurricane of criticism blows against a rambling structure built in many styles and by many hands, it is bound to stave in some weak spots and to scatter a lot of debris. It knocks over a few things, blows mightily against the stronger points, and often leaves untouched, as by a freak, parts which look as if they would fall down just from their own feebleness. This is the nature of Professor Mills's criticism of contemporary American sociology. Here and there, he touches strongly on a very weak spot. He is right when he says that there is far too much unreflective busywork in sociological research, that there is

[5] It is hard to know how seriously to take Professor Mills on this. On page 32, he says that Professor Parsons' problem is "How is social order possible?" I would readily agree that this is Professor Parsons' problem; but Professor Mills surely must accept it as an important one. Otherwise, how can one impute to him a rational ground for his own concern with power?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

too little thought about what the indices really indicate, that there is too little attention given to the wider structure of American society, and that there is insufficient study of the variables which are adduced for explanatory purposes. He is right when he criticizes American sociologists for ignorance of history and for a loss of contact with the great figures of sociological analysis—although American sociology is far more in contact with the great classics of sociological tradition than is British, French, Polish, or German sociology of the present day. He is right when he complains about the bureaucratization of research, the unintellectual training of post-graduate students on large-scale projects, the lack of firsthand contact of the directors of large-scale projects with the human beings under inquiry. He is right when he complains about technocratic euphoria and the self-congratulations about bigness, affluence, and the service of the mighty, as well as in his warnings against the facilitation of manipulative or unethical practices through empirical research.

Professor Mills could have performed a more useful service to the profession, which he so much deplores and which he so anomalously calls to such high action, if he had provided a more matter-of-fact and juster picture of the deficiencies of his subject. He turns a too indiscriminately censorious eye on the whole output. Does he deny that sampling, standardization of interview questions, and the statistical processing of the data gathered by interviews can make our picture of at least certain sectors of reality more reliable—even if it cannot depict all of that reality which properly interests us? Does he really believe that nothing that has been learned or could be learned by systematic empirical research can ever enrich our self-awareness and give us a more differentiated picture of the society in which we live? And does he really believe—as he says he does—that the sins of systematic empirical research arise simply and exclusively from the self-denying ordinances decreed by a false conception of science and by a desire to stay on the right side of the powerful?

It seems to me to be at least equally true that the shortcomings of empirical research arise from the sheer intellectual difficulties of the subject. They also stem in part from the unrealistic remoteness of sociologists from those whom they study, from their lack of deeper affinity with the subjects they interview and contemplate, from a matrix of impoverished and distorted imagery. What is wrong with empirical sociology is not simply a product of the idolatry of certain techniques of data-gathering or of data-processing, but rather the deficient sensibility which underlies their employment. The fault lies in the empathic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

poverty of sociologists. The techniques do occasionally assume an imperious autonomy, but only in the hands of persons lacking confidence in the presence of affect and an openness toward other human beings. Professor Mills's judgments about the contemporary scene seem to me to show just as little sense of the way men live in our own society as the worst of the "abstracted empiricists" he denounces. For all his talk of sociological imagination, his own is just as threadbare as that of the sociologists he reproves. If sociologists had more feeling for their fellow-men, they would improve their use of the existing techniques and would invent better ones. If Professor Mills had more feeling for his fellow-men, he would study them more carefully and not just find illustrations which support his prejudices.

Professor Mills thinks that sociologists of the sort he execrates are excessively incorporated into their society. He would have them become outsiders like himself. I think, on the contrary, that some of the flaws which he detects—and some of which, I agree, are flaws—arise because sociologists, himself included, draw their basic imagery from an alienated relationship with the lives of ordinary men and women. The sociologists employed by market research firms have no more empathy for their subjects, feel no closer to them, simply by virtue of drawing their salaries from big business. They are as distant from their society as Professor Mills, and for the same reasons. They do not know their own fellow-countrymen because their traditions as intellectuals, as well as their institutional segregation, attenuate their vital contact with ordinary life. The intrusion of various forms and derivatives of Marxism, since the 1930's, although it has immensely widened intellectual perspectives, has contributed to this alienation.[6]

Whether these techniques are inextricably associated with technocratic attitudes which entail the manipulation of other human beings, and whether they are inevitably psychologistic—both of which assertions are made by Professor Mills—are at best open questions. It seems to me that there is no logical relationship between systematic empirical research and a technocratic attitude, or between that kind of research and psychologism, which is not coextensive with systematic empirical research. The psychologistic bent of much of systematic empirical research grows out of the original development of these techniques, in their more precise form, from psychology; the technocratic bias which

[6] Professor Mills implies that sociology has more to gain from a hostile attitude toward the existing order than from uncritical incorporation into it. It is true that, in taking this position, he stands in a distinguished tradition. Nonetheless, neither his viewpoint nor its opposite is correct. Neither the unqualified hatred of the outsider nor the uncritical affirmation of the patriot opens the path to truth about society.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

certainly exists, but which must not be exaggerated in sociology, seems to me to be more a function of the kind of people who come into the field of sociology and are drawn to this kind of research than an inner necessity of the technique. It is likely that certain research procedures are more congenial to the manipulative utilization of their results, but that is not true of all of them.

Some measure of bureaucratization—i.e., organization, division of labor, and hierarchy—seems inevitable if empirical sociological research is to be pursued on a large scale. It is entirely likely that more of this is done today than is useful for intellectual development. It cannot, nonetheless, be denied that much interesting and—in principle—scientifically relevant information can be gathered by survey techniques, and that it can be done for morally acceptable ends. It is also undeniable that certain kinds of valuable data can be obtained only by survey techniques, and these inevitably require large-scale administrative arrangements. It would have been useful if Professor Mills had considered the means of reducing the extent of bureaucratization, especially in university research, and of ameliorating its intellectual consequences in para-university organizations. It would also have been useful if he had given the impression that he had really considered the question of the worthwhileness or worthlessness of organized, large-scale social research in an honest matter-of-fact way. I myself am not an enthusiast for this kind of research, and I share some of Professor Mills's judgments; but neither the evidence, tone, nor logic of his argument impresses me as being the work of a dispassionate seeker after truth.

Professor Mills's major criticisms of "grand theory" are even more loose-jointed than his criticisms of "abstracted empiricism." After all, the latter is only an annoyance; the former is a rival to his claim to represent the classic tradition of analysis of major societies. The contention that grand theory asserts the invariable autonomy of the value system,[7] or, more generally, of the cultural sphere—which Professor Mills seems to believe exists in most societies other than our own American society of the middle of the twentieth century—is obviously incorrect. That theory asserts, time and again, that the unfolding of the immanent possibilities of the sphere of cultural values, as well as its effective self-reproduction in recurrent situations, depend on the "articulation" of the cultural system with the exigencies of the situation of action and the

[7] Professor Mills certainly must believe that there are possibilities of development inherent in a system of cultural values—otherwise, how could he claim to believe in the value of reason and the freedom to exercise it, or why should he proclaim his adherence to the "classic tradition" of sociological analysis which he believes he is extending in accordance with the dictates of reason?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

personality system. The value system is by no means always sustained, or even often fulfilled, in action because it is not the sole determinant; it is, however, an ever-present component of action. The sociology based on the theory of action has turned its back on the utterly wrong-headed division of human life into substructure and superstructure that Professor Mills still accepts.

This leads us to the associated criticism of the general theory, namely, that it postulates a complete consensus in society. Professor Mills, like other critics who at one time or another have come under Marxist influence, is troubled and enraged by any mode of analysis which even remotely suggests a "harmony of interests." These critics may no longer believe in Marxist politics, but the Marxist view of the world dies very hard in them. Professor Parsons seems to them to be, therefore, the epitome of all that originally enraged them. He talks of "social order," and he ponders the questions of the "identification of interests" whereby "society" is formed out of a "state of nature." There is nothing in the theory of action that warrants the attribution of unbroken and inevitable consensus. Its stress on the imperfections of the system of socialization, on the strains inherent in institutionalization and the consequent pressures toward withdrawal and rebellion, as well as its attention to the differentiation of subsystems, each of which tends to develop its own culture, seem to me to be ample evidence—as they would be to any reasonably fair-minded judge—that Professor Mills's accusation is groundless.

The utility of a simple model of harmonious interaction is only a point of departure for the introduction of further variables, such as differences in expectations, connected with age, sex, power, facilities, rewards, etc. These latter explain why in reality the interaction is not often harmonious, and they do not involve a denial that in some measure consensus does nonetheless manage to exist in important sectors of society and at important moments.

A companion to this canard is the allegation that the general theory has no place for power. It can scarcely be anything better than unseeing prejudice which causes Professor Mills to assert that the general theory is unable to deal with power and in fact does not deal with it. It is true that the general theory does not deal apocalyptically with power in society, and it does not regard power as the sole means of co-ordination or of the creation and maintenance of order—such as it is in Professor Mills's supercharged fantasies about modern society—but that is certainly not tantamount to showing that it disregards power and is logically required to disregard it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, we must refer to Professor Mills's refusal to acknowledge any place for such an abstract theory. This is a point which may be discussed without particular reference to the general theory; the question is whether any abstract theory is at all possible, and, if it is possible, whether it has any intellectual utility.[8]

Professor Mills criticizes the theory for its high level of abstraction. From a rhetorical point of view, he is probably justified; and it is quite possible that the fairly unbroken procedure of abstraction causes the theory to fail in its applicability to concrete societies. But these are matters of procedure and of the present level of development of our analytical capacities, and not of principle.

One could make all sorts of derogatory imputations to elucidate Professor Mills's gross account of the theory of action and his denial of its right to existence—and, if one were to traffic with Professor Mills in his own coin, one would have to do so. I shall, however, do him the credit of attributing his fundamental rejection, not to his obvious incapacity to study a divergent viewpoint patiently and courteously, but to a real intellectual difference. Professor Mills is a "historicist." He believes in the uniqueness of every epoch and every society; he believes in "wholes" which are not capable of exact analysis (p. 73).[9] He regards these "wholes"—whole societies, nation-states—as the only fit objects of sociological inquiry.[10] He repeatedly stresses the need for history in sociology,[11] and he believes that no concepts can be trans-historical in scope. Social laws are valid only for a particular epoch.[12] He does not believe that there is any "human nature" other than the diverse and apparently discontinuous manifestations of the individual organism which appear so differently in different epochs and societies.[13]

[8] Naturally, I do not for a moment concur with Professor Mills's preposterous assertion that the general theory is the association and dissociation of concepts. It is an effort to discern and delineate the most essential elements in the most simple model of a social system and then, by the successive addition of complicating elements, to build up a differentiated picture of the working of a society. It is, accordingly, a set of categories which designate the variables that constitute social systems and societies. The variables possess dynamic properties; the scheme is therefore not merely classificatory.

[9] Only small, unreal, trivial things are capable of exact analysis.

[10] "It is his job to make that structure explicit and to study it as a whole" (pp. 78-79).

[11] Although, strangely enough, he says that it is not necessary to know American history in order to understand American society (pp. 156-57)!

[12] He is rightly skeptical about the validity of any laws which are asserted from the general theory or from systematic empirical research. But does he know of any really valid laws of particular epochs, including his own apocalyptic visions of contemporary Western society?

[13] "The idea of some 'human nature' common to man as man is a violation of the social and historical specificity that careful work in the human studies requires; at the very least, it is an abstraction that social students have not earned the right to make" (p. 164).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The truth of the matter is that Professor Mills, despite all his allegations of historical interest, is concerned only with contemporary society; and historical and comparative knowledge is, at best, intended only to serve to elucidate its uniqueness. He formulates the questions which should interest the real social scientist, the exponent of the classic tradition, as follows:

> (1) What is the structure of this particular society as a whole? What are its essential components, and how are they related to one another? How does it differ from other varieties of social order? Within it, what is the meaning of any particular feature for its continuance and for its change?
>
> (2) Where does this society stand in human history? What are the mechanics by which it is changing? What is its place within and its meaning for the development of humanity as a whole? . . . And this period—what are its essential features? How does it differ from other periods? What are its characteristic ways of history-making?
>
> (3) What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? . . . What kinds of "human nature" are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society and in this period [pp. 6-7]?[14]

VI

Where does this hyper-political historicism lead him? What problems does he regard as significant, as intellectually legitimate? What variables does he regard as interesting in themselves or important in their consequences? What procedures and categories does he recommend?

Professor Mills really believes in the power of the powerful—at least in contemporary society, which is all he is concerned with. He believes that what happens in the public sphere, in the sphere dominated by the powerful of the economy and the polity, determines what happens elsewhere in the society. Families, workshops, professions, friendships, all these are only "milieux"—which is, I must acknowledge, an original mode of derogation. They possess no intrinsic interest. No sociologically or intellectually interesting results can be obtained by studying them except as epiphenomena of power. They should enter into sociological study to show that "private troubles" are functions of public issues.[15]

[14] The informed reader will soon recognize the identity of Professor Mills's historicism with that of Karl Mannheim as he expounded it in *Man and Society in an Age of Transformation*, London, 1940, Part IV, "Thought at the Level of Planning." The foundations of Professor Mills's position are clearly delineated and emphatically criticized in Professor Popper's *The Poverty of Historicism*, London, 1957.

[15] Professor Mills's recommendation that sociologists help ordinary men to translate their "private troubles" into public issues is reminiscent of the Marxian idea of "false consciousness" and its transformation into "class consciousness" through the adoption of the Marxian outlook.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In other words, he apparently believes that the subsystems of the larger society have no self-reproductive power, no internal coherence or equilibrium; he thinks that whatever happens in them happens because of something outside. Now what is it that happens outside, and what is it that is constitutive of the nature of the nation-state? It is power.

Power, who has it, and how it is exercised, are the sole legitimate objects of study for sociology. Professor Mills is scornful of those who, like Professor Parsons, would include the study of the central value system, its differentiation, its incompleteness, its variants, and its competitors as a major object of sociological inquiry. He treats this as no more than ideological apologetics on behalf of the injustices of present-day society. He acknowledges that, in addition to coercion and manipulation, which he regards as the main forms of power in our own epoch and society, there can also be legitimate power or authority; but he does not allow himself to enter into that. He is so fascinated by an image of the world as "a darkling plain . . . where ignorant armies clash by night," where everything lies at the margin of extremity, that the possible existence, as objects of sociological inquiry, of love and loyalty, of devotion to a task or attachment to a locality or persistence in the pursuit of an ideal value like truth or the public good, is meaningless to him. He disparages any kind of small group studies unqualifiedly and very briefly. Voting studies are written off because they disregard "the dynamics of American politics."[16]

Of the various special "fields" within sociology, only industrial sociology gives the appearance of "promise." It is not the industrial sociology which we know—although it is the only "field" in which a fair number of the workers come in for a word of praise. It is not the industrial sociology which is concerned with primary groups in industrial settings, or the acceptance of technological innovation, or responses to various modes of remuneration. It is much more epochal, and it is of a degree of pompous vagueness which reminds me of the windy formalities of the University of Frankfurt before Hitler closed down German sociology in 1933. According to Professor Mills: "The theoretical problem of industrial sociology, as it comes to an intellectual and political climax in the conception of morale, is a problem of exploring

[16] He does make a good point when he observes that one of the most famous voting studies did not study the role of the party machine "in getting out the vote" (p. 50)! Yet how could he have any sympathy for voting studies, which show that much of the individual's decision as to which party he will vote for is a function of traditionally accepted religious affiliations, of vaguely conceived class identifications and interests, and of the traditional orientations of urban, small town, and rural life? These studies support neither the view that people are coerced or manipulated nor the view that they are rootless, traditionless, beliefless, frightened "mass men."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the several types of alienation and morale which we come upon as we consider systematically the structure of power and its meanings for the individual lives of workmen. It requires us to examine the extent to which psychological shifts have accompanied structural shifts; and in each case, why. In such directions lies the promise of a social science of modern man's working life" (p. 95n).[17] The rest of current American sociological endeavor is consigned to the rubbish-heap of intellectual error and misspent exertion.

Accordingly, macro-sociology is the only legitimate sociological undertaking. This could be a perfectly consistent view—although Professor Mills does not hold to it consistently—if it is assumed that highly centralized political and economic power and the central value system are the sole determinants of all that goes on in a society. Professor Mills does not however appear to think that this is true of some other societies—e.g., Western society in the nineteenth century, which apparently did have some relatively autonomous spheres.[18] But in our present condition, where power is concentrated and the "troubles" which occur in subsystems ("milieux"?) are functions of "public" events, these lesser phenomena are not worth studying except as emanations of that all-creative essence: power.

VII

Professor Mills's alternative to systematic research and general theory, as means of gathering information and assessing it, is "the sociological imagination." The term is a good one, and it could mean something very important. One will, however, have a hard time in trying to find out what he means by it. Even in his intermittently admirable appendix "On Craftsmanship," in which, presenting himself as a model, he advises the neophyte on how to proceed as a sociologist, there is practically nothing about the substance of "the sociological imagination."

The capacities of the sociological imagination are floridly but vaguely described. It is claimed that it "enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals" (p. 5). It permits him

[17] Professor Mills does not say here whether the investigators who attempt to realize this program will be able to dispense with the techniques which have been developed by "abstracted empiricism." They certainly will not if they are to do a good job.

[18] These spheres were, it seems, co-ordinated into a relatively ordered society by the identity of orientation of men in the different spheres—a very anomalous occurrence from the standpoint of one who vigorously denies the autonomy of value orientations as well as the possibility of a consensus of value orientations. Are we to infer that the general theory of action is applicable to nineteenth-century liberal society but not to the twentieth century?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to "understand his own experience and gauge his own fate only by locating himself within his period . . . by becoming aware of those [chances in life] of all individuals in his circumstances" (*ibid.*).

In other words, the sociological imagination is a procedure which enables one to see the world just as Professor Mills sees it. But what is it as a procedure? It is ". . . the capacity to shift from one perspective to another—from the political to the psychological; from the examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the theological school to the military establishment; from considerations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self" (p. 7). It is, that is to say, the way of describing the all-permeativeness of power.

One thinks of Max Weber's vast comparisons and his identifications of social and historical events remote from each other in apparent structure and in time and space. But Max Weber used these comparisons and identifications to illustrate general categories and themes, and he was not obsessed with a single variable. He was, moreover, no historicist. Professor Mills's denial of the possibility of transhistorical categories and hypotheses greatly diminishes the scope of this impressive intellectual ballet and makes it less interesting.

Yet it would be a great loss to our enterprise if Professor Mills's slambanging exposition caused this valuable notion to be dismissed. The sociological imagination is valuable because, insofar as sociology aspires to and is called upon to enter into the arena of public opinion as a more differentiated, deeper, more realistic mode of forming and holding opinions, it will do so through the cultivation of a substantive sociological imagination. After all, it is not the specific results of particular sociological inquiries nor the cumbersome general theories which can become the intellectually fruitful possession of the educated public, or even of specialized sociologists. What is living in sociology is the intellectual sensibility behind the specific research and the elaborate theory. It is a sense for overtones and possibilities which our explicit theories and procedures have not yet succeeded in articulating. It is not bound to a particular substantive outlook, as Professor Mills would have it. It can be micro-sociological as well as macro-sociological.

The sociological sensibility or imagination is not an alternative to systematic empirical research or general theory. It is a necessary condition for their realism and relevance. It is the matrix out of which they both arise. It is the substratum of perception, what psychologists used to call the "apperception-mass" of systematic sociological work. For this

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reason, I disagree thoroughly with Professor Mills when he thinks of the sociological imagination as a replacement for the intellectual errors now current in professional sociology. Systematic work in sociology begins when the sociological imagination has gone as far as it can go; the results of that work feed back into the sociological imagination and, if our hopes are not belied, the relationship will be a figure of interlacing spirals.

One could say that the best that sociology has to offer today to the educated public, to students at large, and to the oncoming generation of sociologists, is the sociological imagination. The sociological imagination may be understood as that body of categories, estimations, and predictions which an experienced and realistic sociologist carries in the boundary area of the mind beyond the systematic articulations of research and theory. It is the unformulated categorical apparatus, which Professor Michael Polanyi has called "personal knowledge." It is the precipitate of intelligent curiosity, the assimilation of the results of systematic inquiry, long study, experience of the world, and ordered reflection. The particular results of "abstracted empiricism" are not only particular, as Professor Mills stresses; they are also not very determinate. Their chief intellectual value is to stimulate and discipline the imagination concerning the possibilities of human activity and the kinds of situations which generate it and which are generated by it.[19] The sociological theory of action, derived from Max Weber, Durkheim, and Freud (and the same is true for the classificatory schemes of Professors von Wiese and Gurvitch), is still too abstract; its categories, despite their vagueness, are not supple enough—at least for the present—to be used, in a full panoply, for the interpretation of concrete phenomena. In the intellectual exercise of an experienced person with some confidence in his own capacities of observation and judgment,[20] it can, however, provide a constellation of perceptive dispositions, of categories and expectations which enable one to see, in a more orderly and coherent way, the richness of social reality and its central tendencies. The fundamental variables are

[19] Professor Mills thinks that "facts" only discipline "ideas" (p. 71). Do they not also stimulate them? He regards the results of sociological research only as epiphenomena of no intrinsic or scientific value. This is quite in agreement with the general disposition of his thought. Yet, on page 74, he seems to believe that "detailed investigations" ought to be used to "reshape ideas." This is only one more instance of the slapdash way in which Professor Mills deals with complicated problems.

[20] Professor Mills says that every man should be his own theorist. In one sense he is correct. No theory is worth anything unless it becomes the theory of the person who uses it, i.e., unless it has been deeply assimilated and adapted to that person's own mind and relationship to reality. Otherwise, it remains a set of phrases. One of the defects of our general theory is that it is difficult for young people to assimilate it selectively and individually.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not yet capable of subjection to precise definition, and their behavior is far from exhaustively understood by sociology.

Yet, not all sociological effort has been wasted. The intellectual usefulness of sociology consists not in its exact results, but in the establishment of foci of attention, expectations, or assessments of the probable ramifications and variants of the objects on which our attention has been so focused. Let us, for example, take a matter close to Professor Mills's heart, namely, power. We do not know much about it, and what we do know we find very difficult to articulate. When we do articulate, the result always seems to fall short of what we think about it, just below the level of explicitness; what we articulate is not quite what we notice and interpret when we consider concrete acts of the exercise of power. We do not yet have any theory which systematically takes into account what the incumbency of positions of great power, the mere fact of being endowed with power, and the nature of the task of exercising it, do to the outlook and conduct of those who exercise it, and how those changes influence their exercise of power. We know nothing precisely of how persons in power conceive of those below them, why they think of them as they do, and how that affects their response to them. We have no theory about what subjection to power does to people, how they adapt themselves to it, how they yield to it, evade it, resist it, and transform it. We have nothing like an adequate theory of the interaction of rulers and ruled. Yet, thanks to great writers before and outside sociology, like Aristotle, Cicero, Hobbes, Clarendon, and Churchill, thanks to interviews with politicians, to public opinion polls, to odds and ends of research, to high-grade journalism, and to Max Weber, Lasswell, and de Jouvenel, our imaginations have been steered to the state in which they can encompass these phenomena as sets of possibilities which the mind should consider when it contemplates situations of the exercise of power.

The same remarks could be made about relationships of conviviality, friendship, and love—the personal primary groups, the primordial relationships of kinship and locality, the impersonal obligations of life in organized corporate bodies. What we perceive is more diversified and more just to reality than what we have yet succeeded in incorporating into our systematic theory, or in formulating in our systematic empirical methods, or in discerning by means of them.

I think that this is as it should be, since it is only by the fortification and elaboration of our sociological imagination that our theory will receive sustaining nutriment and our empirical research, more pertinent guidance. And for the members of the public who have some contact

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with sociology in the course of higher education and in reading thereafter, it is through the enrichment and training of their sociological imagination—and not by "mugging up" the concepts of the general theory or the precise results of numerous systematic inquiries—that their minds will be improved. If sociology is to have value as an element in a liberal democratic polity, and as an element in a reasonable man's self-understanding, then it can do so only as it becomes a part of opinion.[21]

Despite our many disagreements—about politics, science, literary style, etiquette, the value of systematic empirical research and general theory—my own views and Professor Mills's converge at this point, as they do at many others. But no sooner do they converge than they diverge once more. For example, Professor Mills does not care for sociologists in their role as advisors or as suppliers of intelligence to the powerful in the government or in business. For my own part, I find nothing dangerous in it. On the contrary, I would place the education of our rulers high on the agenda both of democracy and of sociology. There is everything to gain in making our rulers, who are part of ourselves, wiser and more realistic. If they are not wise, it is because we are not wise; if they are not realistic, it is because we are not. If sociology has something important to say, it should be at the disposal of rulers as well as citizenry. Of course, it is true that technocratic or supine sociologists in the service of tyrants and demagogues can do some harm—limited by their meager knowledge and the distance at which they are kept by the rulers—but so can "free" sociologists who infuse into public opinion harum-scarum, nervous-Nellie fantasies about the nature of our present-day society.

VIII

Professor Mills espouses sociology as a part of public opinion because he is a proponent of freedom and reason—indeed, he sees himself as one of the very few such proponents. The values he proclaims are those of traditional liberalism, and the genuine tradition of the liberal distrust of authority does indeed speak in him. I sense, however, that Professor Mills is not quite so liberal as he sounds.[22] He is at heart an anarchist,

[21] I agree with Professor Mills in his aversion to a technological sociology which would be at the disposal of the powerful for the manipulation of their subjects. It is, however, an unnecessary anxiety which he feels. Sociological knowledge is nowhere near the condition in which it could be used manipulatively, as can pharmacology or neurology. It is strange that he should be concerned about this subjection of empirical research to the manipulators when he thinks that its truth value is so negligible.

[22] For example, American sociology of the period prior to abstracted empiricism and grand theory is derogated as "liberal practicality"; and, though he regards "liberal practicality" as better than the "illiberal practicality" of technocratic "abstracted empiricism," he regards it as very little better.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beneficially influenced by Max Weber, and less beneficially by Veblen, Trotsky, and Kafka; and his conception of the potentialities of power and of the relations between rulers and ruled in contemporary society appears to me to be closer to fantasy than to reality. Power, although concentrated, is not so concentrated, so powerful, or so permeative as Professor Mills seems to believe. There are, even in America today, spheres of considerable autonomy, of enough autonomy to make a difference; and there is even a considerable degree of responsiveness of the government to popular desires—sometimes too much. The autonomy of the spheres is certainly not so great as we should like it to be or as it could be if our citizenry were more sensible and our politicians were better instructed. I do not see, however, how this desirable condition will be brought about if sociology, which he wishes to become the central element of public opinion, is governed by the notion that its chief office is to serve as a harsh censor of authority, and if its critique and the image on which that critique rests are as melodramatically falsified as in the view which Professor Mills asserts. What kind of public opinion would we have if sociology were what Professor Mills would like it to be? He regards the main task of his sociology as the translation of "the personal troubles of milieu" into "the public issues of social structure." There are paranoid implications in this doctrine which, quite apart from the factual exaggeration, would free the individual of every trace of moral responsibility for his own deeds and misdeeds, and transfer the cause of his troubles into the public sphere (i.e., the centers of authority in economy and polity). There is already enough silliness in public life without the addition of Professor Mills's "improvements."

Even if our private troubles stemmed from the public sphere, this conception of the task of sociology and its public calling would constitute an entirely unjustifiable delimitation of the range of the sociological imagination. Why should only troubles and issues be investigated —assuming that Professor Mills is interested in understanding the real world and not just in agitating against it—and why should public opinion be led to think so? Are there only "troubles" and "issues" in the world? Are there no harmonies or satisfactions at all, no love or friendship or solidarity or consensus in any sphere of life at any time? If there are not, then the situation of the Hobbesian state of nature has been realized among us; and Professor Mills is whistling on very low notes, in a very dark night, when he asserts that the sociological imagination will help to instate a regime of reason and freedom. He knows, however, that we do not live in such a state of nature. Why, then, should sociology study only those elements in our society which derive

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

directly from the state of nature? The image of our own society which his program would create would be a false one, and the public opinion into which it would enter would be no less distorted than that which prevails today, so full of wrong-headed notions as it is. He would generate, by this false picture of society, an apathy greater than that which he regrets so much today, and a fanatical Prometheanism far more devastating than that to which even he aspires.

IX

In some respects, I regard Professor Mills as an ally in my own concerns—a more vigorous, more rambunctious, more strident, more audible one, whose aggressive vagaries I deplore, whose theoretical evasions and obduracies I regret, and whose literary style drives me to embarrassed distraction.

It is not my desire, in this note on his little book, to give comfort to the philistines and pharisees, of whom there are so many in sociology. Professor Mills is a man of strong temperament and an arresting rhetorical force. His passionate response to the world gives an apparent unity to his thought; but it is not the unity which it could possess if it were disciplined by a correspondingly intense and persistent rigor of analysis or by a painstaking devotion to truth.

Nonetheless, there are some important matters on which he is negative on which he is right. There are some on which he is positive and on which he is also right. He is a prophet, and prophets are not good guides for daily life. Without them, however, the quality of daily life would be worse than it is.

He has written a book which tries the patience and exasperates the intelligence by the frequent crudity of his views, his portentous manner, and his slovenly expression. But there are, here and there, in his book, very worth-while truths which should not be dismissed because of the bellowing style in which they are delivered. His refusal to accept the bureaucratization of intellectual life is admirable; his insistence on a wider context in the formulation of the problems of empirical research and his impatience with turgid obscurity are just; and his demand that sociology should qualify itself to become an effective part of the public opinion of a democratic society is certainly very much on the right track. His arguments for macro-sociology, freed of their claim to exclusiveness and his own fantasies about power, point to an important deficiency of contemporary sociology that should be remedied without delay.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is a great pity that what is sensible in his book is so entangled with what is wild and ridiculous. Sociologists should not think that, when they have pointed out the latter, they are exonerating themselves from taking the former seriously. If they do so, they and the development of their subject will be the losers; Professor Mills will continue to play his rat-catcher's pipe; and the liveliest and most indomitable of the post-graduate students and young lecturers, who hold the future of the subject in their hands, will disappear into the hillside which, to them and to him, looks like a mountain.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

By C. E. BLACK

Hugh G. J. Aitken, ed., *The State and Economic Growth*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1959, 389 pp. $3.75.
Bert F. Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1960, 250 pp. $5.00.
Norman Jacobs, *The Origin of Modern Capitalism in Eastern Asia*, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1958, 243 pp. $3.50.
Irwin T. Sanders, ed., *Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe*, Lexington, Ky., University of Kentucky Press, 1957, 214 pp. $5.00.
Nicolas Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe*, New York, Technology Press and John Wiley and Sons, 1957, 525 pp. $12.50.

I

THE relationship between economics and politics is a complex one. Economics no doubt has important areas of theory where politics does not play a significant role, yet politics enters into the picture whenever the question is raised of mobilizing human and physical resources for economic ends. What is true of economic activity in general is particularly true of economic growth, where changes in attitudes and methods of work lend great importance to organizational problems. In discussing this question much depends, of course, on what one means by "politics." The term may be used in a very narrow and partisan sense or, much more broadly, be applied to policy-making in regard to strategic choices among alternate courses of action. It is in this broader sense that politics is inherent in all economic action, and policy-making in this realm may be handled by a variety of agencies. When it comes to studying different systems of economic growth, policy decisions must be taken into consideration as much as rates and levels of achievement.

Two crucial and interrelated questions are raised by the comparative study of economic growth: (1) What does one want to learn from the comparison? (2) What are the most significant criteria for comparing different systems of economic growth? Neither of these questions has been answered very clearly as yet, and indeed the whole field of comparative economic systems is still in a state of considerable disarray.[1] The interest in making such comparisons can no doubt be traced back at least to the Utilitarians, but it has become a matter of intense and

[1] National Bureau of Economic Research, *The Comparative Study of Economic Growth and Structure: Suggestions on Research Objectives and Organization*, New York, 1959.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

practical interest only in very recent decades. It is perhaps natural that the first question to have been asked by Western economists was: How do other economic systems differ from ours? What is surprising, however, is that very often this is still the principal question. The essential breakthrough on this issue came about only in recent years when it was finally recognized that the Soviet Union had achieved a pattern of economic growth which was effective but different from that of the West. Since then the whole question of economic growth in underdeveloped societies has been subjected to intensive study, and a stage has been reached at which comparative studies have taken on a new importance. It is, therefore, appropriate to examine a representative, if somewhat arbitrary, selection of recent works in this field with a view to assessing current trends of thought.

II

The symposium on *The State and Economic Growth* is a product of the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council. It focuses on economic growth for varying periods in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in nine countries and one region, and concludes with three chapters of interpretation and summary. As a means of providing unity of treatment the authors were equipped with a scheme of analysis proposed by Bert F. Hoselitz.[2] Since so much of the argument hinges on this scheme, it seems best to present it immediately. It is set forth in terms of three dichotomies: economic systems may be *expansionist* (i.e., able to augment production by developing new land or other resources) or they may be *intrinsic* (i.e., dependent for economic growth on increasing the efficiency of existing land and resources); they may be *dominant* (i.e., free from reliance on foreign markets, raw materials, and capital) or *satellitic*; and, finally, they may be *autonomous* (in the sense that vital economic decisions are made by agencies other than those responsible for political decisions) or *induced*. The countries treated were selected in order to illustrate all possible combinations of these three categories, and can perhaps best be presented in tabular form:

United States, 1820-1890: expansionist, dominant, autonomous
Australia, 1860-1900: expansionist, satellitic, autonomous
Canada since the 18th century: expansionist, satellitic, autonomous
Russia, 1890-1939: expansionist, dominant, induced

[2] Bert F. Hoselitz, "Patterns of Economic Growth," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXI (November 1955), pp. 416-31; reprinted in his *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth*, Glencoe, Ill., 1960, pp. 85-114.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany (fragmentary treatment): intrinsic, dominant, autonomous
France (fragmentary treatment): intrinsic, dominant, autonomous
Switzerland since the 16th century: intrinsic, satellitic, autonomous
Turkey, 1933-1950: intrinsic, dominant, induced
Eastern Europe since 1860: intrinsic, satellitic, induced

The chapters on economic growth in these selected countries bring together an impressive body of material, which is concerned primarily with the role of the state at the expense of the first two categories. From this material two general conclusions emerge. One is that the role of the state has never been negligible, even in the most "autonomous" systems. In discussing the economic role of the government in the United States, for example, Henry W. Broude notes that it played a positive role in a variety of ways. Taking into consideration all levels of government—federal, state, municipal, and county—he points out that in the case of transportation and other bottlenecks to economic growth the role of governmental agencies was decisive. These agencies also had a psychological influence, in the sense that in the westward expansion and in other undertakings involving large risks a relatively small initiative by the government could evoke a very large follow-up by private entrepreneurs. Even though the formal outlay of governmental agencies was in most areas normally small by comparison with the total investment, its role in stimulating economic growth was large. Indeed, Broude goes so far as to question whether the United States can be placed in the "autonomous" category without serious qualifications.

This conclusion applies in even more striking fashion to Australia and Canada, where a relatively small population in undeveloped territories leaned heavily on government support. In Australia, according to Noel G. Butlin, the efforts of the government until the 1890's were directed toward a more or less independent effort at economic development, but thereafter were concentrated increasingly on the creation of stable conditions for the growth of private enterprise. Hugh G. J. Aitken points out that in Canada the role of the state was even more important, owing in part to the sparseness of the population and in part to the need for protection against the aggressive economy to the south. In the Old World conditions were very different from those in the New, and it is regrettable that the discussion of Germany by Norman J. G. Pounds and the comparative essay on French and German ore mining by William N. Parker are too brief to provide substantial evidence. This leaves only Switzerland among the countries where the state played a relatively small role, and it would be difficult

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to find one more atypical. Moreover Alfred Bürgin adopts a very narrow definition of the role of the state, and does not deal with the many indirect ways in which it was concerned with economic activity in Switzerland.

The second general conclusion one may draw from these essays concerns the flexibility of the state as a political instrument and the diversity of the roles which it can play in relation to economic growth. It has already been noted that in relatively "autonomous" systems the state performs an essential role. In most other societies, of course, the state has been even more active. For example, in Manchuria, as Edwin P. Reubens demonstrates in his very enlightening essay, almost the entire process from the transformation of traditional values to the provision of entrepreneurial skills, capital, and markets was the result of government action, principally Japanese. In Turkey, as described by Robert W. Kerwin, the state faced a very different situation in that it represented a newly reconstituted nucleus of a much larger empire and could rely on a well-integrated and loyal elite. There were serious problems of readjustment, but the political aspect of the process resembled the European pattern much more than did the problems faced by Japan in Manchuria. The essays on Russia by George Barr Carson, Jr., and on Eastern Europe by Nicolas Spulber embrace the periods both before and after Communist regimes came to power and provide interesting illustrations of the role of continuity and change in the relationship of state to economy.

These essays are thus rich and suggestive, and constitute a provocative series of case studies. At the same time, one cannot avoid the impression that better results would have been achieved if the authors had simply been asked to explore the role of the state in economic growth without concerning themselves so much with the extent to which the economic systems of the various countries were expansionist or intrinsic, dominant or satellitic, autonomous or induced. In his concluding summary chapter, Joseph J. Spengler reports that at the conference at which these papers were initially discussed there was some unrest in the ranks in regard to the scheme of analysis. And well there might have been. The first two criteria, certainly, provide a most unstable basis for comparing systems of economic growth. It is often not known until very late in the game whether an economy has untapped resources which it can exploit or must rely on more efficient use of resources already being exploited. A barren desert may grow a forest of oil derricks almost overnight. A country like China, long assumed to be lacking in basic natural resources, may suddenly decide to do some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prospecting and find them in abundance. The degree of self-sufficiency of an economic system is also an unreliable criterion, depending as it does, to so great an extent, on frontier changes, regional political relationships, and other factors.

The third criterion, the role of the state, no doubt provides a firmer basis for comparing systems of economic growth but it also presents serious problems. One which is very apparent in these essays is that "the state" means different things to different people. Some see it as the entire framework of law, administration, and regulation within which a national economy operates, while others interpret it only in terms of the public ownership of enterprises. A more serious difficulty, however, is the inclination of most Western economists to regard the state as an independent variable and to think primarily in terms of the dichotomy between liberal and socialist policies. This issue has a long history within the family of West European countries and their offshoots in the New World, and it is a perennial campaign issue in the United States, but is it an issue on which one can base a fundamental comparison of systems of economic growth?

Broude suggests that the existence of an expanding frontier in the American West may well have been one of the principal conditions contributing to the limited economic role of the central government in the United States. Yet Russia also had a frontier, and it did not dilute to any significant degree the "induced" character of Russian economic institutions. In certain respects life was freer in Siberia, but the character of European Russia was not particularly affected and in due course the institutions of the new territories were integrated into those of the old.[3] What this suggests is that the role of the state in economic growth is much more directly related to the traditional role of the state in the countries under consideration than to anything else. In the cases of Russia and Turkey, a long tradition of effective central government antedated rapid economic growth in the modern sense. When one compares the economic role of the state in various countries, one is to a very considerable extent comparing their traditional political institutions. If one abstracts the traditional role of the state, is there much left to compare?

This problem emerges clearly in the very interesting interpretative chapter in which Richard Hartshorne discusses in general terms the extent and nature of the governmental impact on economic growth.

[3] Donald W. Treadgold, *The Great Siberian Migration: Government and Peasant in Resettlement from Emancipation to the First World War*, Princeton, N.J., 1957, pp. 3-9, provides an interesting discussion of this comparison.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He approaches the problem in terms of eight fundamental elements of growth, of which four are material (transport facilities, capital goods, power resources, and raw materials) and four non-material (entrepreneurship, money capital, labor, and markets for finished products). Since Hartshorne is not bound by the scheme of analysis and the limited group of nine countries and one region which were selected to illustrate that scheme, he is free to examine more fundamental problems. He shows that some elements of economic growth can be more easily influenced than others by state action, and he points out that the limitations in the material realm which handicap so many nations are not likely to be overcome in the near future. The very great existing differences in per capita income and energy consumption and in the per cent of labor force in non-agricultural employment are graphically set forth in tabular form.[4] He also lays great stress on the widely varying traditional social characteristics of countries which exert so great an influence on the non-material elements. He suggests that human resources and attitudes represent the most important single factor in economic growth, and that a primary aspect of the economic role of the state is its ability to affect these characteristics. Hartshorne turns briefly at the end of his chapter to Hoselitz' scheme of analysis, and in effect demonstrates that his eight essential elements provide a more sophisticated framework than the three dichotomies for discussing the role of the state in economic growth.

There is, finally, an interpretative chapter by Bert F. Hoselitz on economic policy and economic development. Here he centers his attention on the role of the government in introducing innovations, as a particular aspect of economic growth, in terms of the Parsonian model of change according to which societies devote their efforts alternately to problems of pattern-maintenance, integration, goal-attainment, and adaptation.[5] He illustrates this interpretation with examples from West European history, and suggests that the amount and kind of resources devoted to economic growth depend on the general systemic needs of a society at a given time. He concludes that an induced pattern of economic growth is likely when problems of goal-attainment predominate, whereas autonomous economic policies are likely to flourish when problems of adaptation are the order of the day. Since societies are well integrated and attain their goals with some degree

[4] A much fuller selection of comparative tables is now available in Norton Ginsburg, ed., *Atlas of Economic Development*, Chicago, 1961.

[5] Set forth in detail in Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, *Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory*, Glencoe, Ill., 1956.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of satisfaction only at rare intervals, autonomous patterns of economic growth are correspondingly rare. This accounts for the general predominance of induced patterns of economic growth, and Hoselitz suggests only with the greatest caution that at some future time the latecomers may possibly reach a point where autonomous policies become widespread. In the collection of his essays published under the title of *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth*, in which Hoselitz discusses among other things the relationship of social structure, population pressure, entrepreneurship, and urbanization to economic growth, emphasis is again placed on universal social characteristics at the expense of diverse traditional cultures.

III

Economic growth in the Communist countries has received much attention in recent years, and a convenient introduction to this subject is provided by the chapters on Russia and Eastern Europe in *The State and Economic Growth*. Carson points out that both before and since the revolution the state has played a major role in economic growth, although of course the nature of this role has changed greatly under the Soviets, and that in both periods the state played a relatively much greater role in Russia than was the case in Europe or the New World. In Spulber's essay on Eastern Europe, the contrast with Russia in regard to historical background emerges clearly. Here the state also played an important role, but it was not nearly as great either before World War I or in the more nationalistically inclined states in the interwar years. When the totalitarian system developed by Stalin was imposed on Eastern Europe in the early postwar period, it thus found a diversity of local conditions, and the ensuing development of economic policy provides an instructive study in comparative economic growth. Spulber has brought together the essential elements of this story in his study of *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe*, in which he concentrates particularly on nationalization and the development of a system of planned growth. Spulber notes that, except in the agricultural sector and in retail trade (for most countries), full nationalization was very substantially achieved by 1949. A second general trend was the rapid growth in the proportion of national income derived from industry. Within this trend there were nevertheless wide variations due to the differing economic structures of the countries concerned—ranging from Czechoslovakia, where 70 per cent of income originated in industry in 1953, to Yugoslavia, where only 42 per cent came from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industry in that year. The variations in per capita income likewise reflect the very considerable differences among these countries in structure and stage of development. Spulber also discusses the problems faced by the Soviets in trying to integrate economic activity in this region, and cites the revolutions in Poland and Hungary as evidence of the dangers inherent in the uniform imposition of an alien pattern on a regional grouping of substantially diverse economic systems.

Spulber provides a convincing account of the extent to which a determined political authority can alter and integrate the system of economic growth in a diverse group of countries, and his statistical tables drawing on national and United Nations publications appear to present a reasonably accurate picture of the quantitative changes that have resulted from Soviet policy. Since Spulber is dealing with the general effects of Communist policy in Eastern Europe, he naturally places more emphasis on the common features than on the differences. The latter are brought out forcefully in the symposium on *Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe*, edited by Irwin T. Sanders. The sense of uniformity gained from a study of nationalization, industrialization, and many other aspects of economic growth is shattered when one turns to the realm of agriculture, which reflects much more profoundly the differences among the countries of Eastern Europe. The general introductory chapters by Enno E. Kraehe, Irwin T. Sanders, and Philip E. Mosely discuss the historical and cultural background of agriculture in this region and the character of the agrarian revolution which is the goal of Soviet policy. What is particularly stressed is the deep traditional attachment to the agricultural way of life of the bulk of the population in these countries as late as 1945 (except in Czechoslovakia, where only one-third of the population was agrarian), and the extent to which Soviet policy calls for the complete control of agricultural resources by means of nationalization, collectivization, and ultimately direct state ownership and operation. In the four chapters on individual countries—on Bulgaria by Edmund O. Stillman, on Czechoslovakia and Poland by Ernest Koenig, on Hungary and Romania by Nicolas Spulber, and on Yugoslavia by Jozo Tomasevich—the limited success of collectivization by 1954 is made clear. Only in Bulgaria had collectivization embraced as much as one-half of the arable land, and in Poland the percentage was as low as 8.5 (in Albania it may have been even lower). Since that date, however, over four-fifths of the arable land has been collectivized in all the countries of the Soviet orbit except Poland. In Yugoslavia, collectivization proceeded rapidly until 1949, but after 1951 most of the collectives were dissolved.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The central issue throughout the region was to gain control over agriculture for the purpose of increasing investments in industry. In Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, a combination of political and cultural factors has enabled the state to achieve substantial success in this direction. In the other countries, however, popular resistance to collectivization was so great that it seemed more politic to use less drastic means of harnessing the resources of agriculture. Back in the 1930's in a relatively remote Russia it was possible for Stalin to risk widespread chaos in order to enforce collectivization, but in postwar Eastern Europe this chance could not be taken. This volume offers perceptive insights into the agricultural problems of Eastern Europe in the mid-1950's, although the essays are essentially descriptive and one would like to see a more systematic comparison of all seven countries as a means of identifying with greater clarity the role of agriculture in economic growth in this region.

A very different sort of comparison is made by Norman Jacobs in *The Origin of Modern Capitalism in Eastern Asia*, which attempts to answer the question, "Why did modern industrial capitalism arise in one East Asian society (Japan), and not in another (China)?" (p. ix). He approaches this question in terms of a sociological theory which maintains that "social values are the fundamental assumptions on which institutions . . . are grounded" (p. ix), and prefaces his study with a careful summary of theoretical propositions which draw principally on Weber but also differ from him in significant respects. He then proceeds to compare Chinese and Japanese societies on the basis of what he regards as the eight key institutions: exchange and property, authority, occupation, stratification, kinship and descent, religion, and integration and stability.

The substance of Jacobs' conclusion is that the Chinese value system stressed the role of an elite which administered production and exchange and supervised a scheme of stratification in which a significant distinction was made between honorable roles, which were accorded privileges, and dishonorable ones, which were not. This system was supported by kinship traditions in which landed property was divided among all male heirs, and by a religion concerned with man's adjustment to the social order. In Japan, by contrast, the administration of production and exchange and the organization of social life were characterized by a variety of occupational groupings which derived their authority from administrative success in an environment of competition. In the Japanese system, landed property was passed on to one male heir, and the separation of status and other forms of property was also

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

possible. Several religions were in competition, and they were concerned chiefly with man's inner adjustment to eternal values. Thus in Japan radical changes could be made in the economic order along capitalist lines without upsetting social stability. In China, however, this was not possible. Jacobs suggests, finally, that what is true of Japan was also true of Western Europe, and what is true of China is true of India and other "oriental" societies as well.

Specialists on the social history of China and Japan may wish to take issue with specific aspects of Jacobs' analysis, but it has the great value for the study of economic growth of illustrating the profound effect of social institutions on the type of change that is possible. The contrast between China and Japan in this respect is probably as clear-cut as any, but when it comes to generalizing from this contrast the possibilities are limited. Jacobs' interest lies not in economic growth in general, but in an abstracted pattern of growth which Weber defined as "capitalism." Moreover, he is dealing with two countries which never came under the direct tutelage of the West, with the consequence that the trend of developments depended very greatly on the adaptability of the traditional system. To say that India belongs in the same category as China in this respect is to ignore the entire history of British India. The India which was confronted by economic growth in the modern sense was not an "oriental" society, but one in which much of the elite was trained in the British version of the Western tradition. Indeed, China is unique in the pertinacity of its value system and social structure, and the conclusions which one may draw from its experience cannot be applied elsewhere without serious qualifications.

IV

The main purpose of comparing patterns of economic growth is presumably to make generalizations on the basis of the more advanced countries which can be used with benefit by the less advanced. This involves finding out which aspects of the process are fundamental and hence must be adopted by all societies, and which are particular and can be varied from one society to another. The tendency to measure all societies by those of the West persists to a considerable degree, and even studies published as recently as those under review are not free from reliance on a rather narrowly Western approach. What would be much more useful would be to ask comparative questions stemming from the functional requirements of economic growth rather than from the institutional experience of the more advanced societies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If one were to base a comparison on policies under which countries can achieve a rate of savings and a pattern of investment adequate for economic growth, one might obtain much more useful answers than by asking about the role of the state.[6] It is much more enlightening, for example, to know that 25.2 per cent of the Soviet GNP is invested each year, as compared with 20.3 per cent of the much larger per capita GNP of the United States in 1955,[7] than to know that the Soviet government plays a greater economic role than the American. There is, moreover, no necessary correlation between the role of the government and the pattern of investment, for there are highly regulated economies (such as that of Portugal) with a low rate of investment, and relatively free economies (such as those of Japan and Western Germany) with a high proportion of investment. Indeed, governments are not necessarily more successful in mobilizing human resources than are such private organizations as trade unions, business corporations, and religious associations. The politics of economic growth must thus be considered in terms of the varied means by which different societies may be able to achieve essentially the same results in economic terms.

The question which needs to be asked is not how the institutions of the less developed societies can be altered to fit the Western pattern, but what are the fundamental requirements of economic growth. It is important to know why China did not develop along "capitalist" lines the way Japan did, but it is more important to know how economic growth can be stimulated in a country with China's institutional structure. To answer such a question, one must certainly have a thorough knowledge of the traditional values and institutions of a society, but one must not be mesmerized by them. One must also grasp the significant role of modernizing leadership in determining how these values and institutions can best be adapted to economic growth. The traditional society of India doubtless presents certain problems, but it makes a great difference whether its leaders are trained in London or in Moscow. Given the inescapable requirements of economic growth and the idiosyncrasies of traditional societies, the policy-making leadership still has a wide range of perplexing choices and decisions. The scholar will be of greatest assistance if he makes his comparisons with a full appreciation of this complex relationship.

[6] An instructive example of such a comparative study is available in Wilfred Malenbaum and Wolfgang Stolper, "Political Ideology and Economic Progress: The Basic Question," *World Politics*, XII, No. 3 (April 1960), pp. 413-21.

[7] Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, 3 vols., Washington, D.C., 1959, II, p. 380.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERMANY LOOKS IN THE MIRROR OF HISTORY

By HENRY PACHTER

Ludwig Dehio, *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1959, 137 pp. $4.00. (German edition: *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt, S. Fischer, 1961, 137 pp. DM 2.40.)

Michael Freund, *Deutsche Geschichte*, Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann, 1960, 797 pp. DM 44.—

Hans Kohn, *The Mind of Germany*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960, 370 pp. $5.95.

Golo Mann, *Deutsche Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, Frankfurt, S. Fischer, 1959, 981 pp. DM 25.—

Hans Rothfels, *Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler*, Frankfurt, S. Fischer, 1958, 214 pp. DM 2.40.*

RANKE remarks somewhere that defending its borders is not sufficient justification for a nation's policy; "the condition of its existence is that it provides a new expression of the spirit of mankind." That, he added, is "its mandate from God." In his new, monumental *Deutsche Geschichte*, Professor Michael Freund finds that German history never has been "providential" in this sense, as was Israel's, Greece's, or Rome's which, respectively, brought forth the ideas of justice, science, and law. Having surveyed "a terrifying chain of catastrophes," he concludes, half in despair, half in resignation: "Nothing remains of German history but a quiet luminescence" (p. 780). The phrase belongs to Prince Oscar von Preussen, who fell in Russia as Hitler's soldier, and whatever his merits as a coiner of phrases may be, it cannot be an accident that his words in particular were chosen to conclude a volume adorned with over a thousand other apt quota-

* Ludwig Dehio is professor of history at the University of Marburg; his book consists of essays previously published in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, Germany's foremost academic quarterly, in *Der Monat*, and in *Aussenpolitik*. Michael Freund, once a left-wing Social Democrat, now a regular contributor to the liberal *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, teaches at the University of Kiel. Hans Kohn, an *émigré* scholar and an authority on nationalism, is on the faculty of the College of the City of New York; a German translation of his book is in the process of preparation. Golo Mann, son of Thomas Mann, formerly taught in this country and has published an American history for German lay readers. Hans Rothfels also taught as a refugee in this country, but has now returned to Germany; an earlier version of the book under review appeared in English as *The German Opposition to Hitler* (Hinsdale, Ill., Henry Regnery, 1948); the present German edition, completely revised and enlarged by abundant notes, supersedes it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions. It will be seen that Freund's sense of history has a Friderician ring, and this also explains his terminal evasion into aestheticism: "form" has been a comfort of last resort precisely for those German historians who have grappled most profoundly with the problem of freedom and power.

The tradition began with no less a thinker than Schiller, who saw the theater as a "moral institution" but history as a drama of beauty. Via Jacob Burckhardt and Cassirer, it reached the last of Germany's great historians to witness Germany's collapse: Meinecke, too, pleaded this extenuating circumstance for the *hubris* in German history—that the tragic grandeur of its fall bestowed a glow of profundity on its fatal path. Meinecke himself was too subtle, too honest, and too ethical a person not to be pained by his own Machiavellism. Like Ranke, he could not conceive of a state without moral purpose and responsibility; when he found it impossible to stick by his country "right or wrong," he fled into the meta-historical pathos of Inevitability, Fate, Destiny, Tragicality.

These notions, Hans Kohn points out in *The Mind of Germany*, always have exerted a strange fascination on German historians and publicists. But they provide a poor cover for Servility, Hate, Cruelty, and Sentimentality, and patriots who repudiate such heroic self-pity are faced with two terrible alternatives, represented by the books of Kohn and Freund, respectively: either resignation or gloom, as far as the life of Germany as a nation is concerned. Kohn frankly advises the Germans to renounce the idea of the national state, to integrate with the Western community, and to seek *le petit bonheur* so deeply despised by Nietzsche, Spengler, and George; Germany's greatness has always been the period of classical literature—why not return to it?

Freund, for his part, burrows in Germany's past with a fanatical, almost savage zeal to tear up the roots of misfortune. He finds the bad seeds everywhere: the Anabaptists of Münster and the Hussites appear as "dress rehearsals" for the Nazi apocalypse; the knights' rebellion under Sickingen reminds him of the Junkers who succumbed to Hitler's drumming, and Emperor Frederick II is a forerunner of Hitler. Goering's phrase "Heads will roll" was first used by Bismarck, Germany's most measured statesman. Nor does Freund see an end to these tribulations. He does not abide by the verdict of history but rather, looking at the present state of Germany, promises more history: though "German history started out without Germans and for the time being ends without a Germany," he prophesies with an ominous scowl that "His-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tory is not what has happened but what is happening" (p. xiii). The fatal cycle of shameful despondency and terrifying dominance may repeat itself.

In his review of this painful *Geschichte*, Golo Mann has charged that Freund assumes an everlasting substratum of evil in the substance of the German nation. This is a misunderstanding. Freund describes the futility of power without principle. His ideal is the Bismarckian state of law and order; he admires the daring moderation of the Old Chancellor's policy which for the last time reconciled respectability with power. Much as Right and Left have disparaged it, most Germans still consider Bismarck's reign as the finest incarnation of their national will. By accident or design, his account of it occupies the middle of Freund's heavy volume, after which he records a rapid erosion of substance and an almost continuous degeneracy of the national will. The state built for a Bismarck fell into the hands of subalterns. The gentry who were supposed to be its pillars deserted their historic assignment: "with their backs to the state and their faces turned to the dunghill," they fell into the impotent rebellion which ended in their call for a Wagnerian doomsday. Led by a blustering young Kaiser, the nation launched into an orgy of *Weltpolitik* and, intoxicated with its own *hubris*, hurried toward the "rendezvous with death" which seems to be the perpetual goal of its history.

This apocalyptic view leaves only one half-page for the economic aspects of imperialism: they are acknowledged as another manifestation of the conquering instinct. Not the dynamic forces of industrial capitalism but the Teutonic curse disrupts the world order: Germans always push an idea to its realization and every longing to its logical conclusion; they crave "extreme situations" which can be resolved only by a total breakthrough or total defeat. They provide an Antichrist for other nations, but, as Freund says in more than one place, they never make their history meaningful for themselves.

Ludwig Dehio supports this general view in a more rational way. Instead of the volcanic eruptions of the Nibelungen, he uses the automatism of world politics to explain imperialism. When Ranke's sound conception of a "European concert of powers" lost its validity, his disciples continued to twist it into interpretations which flattered the Kaiser's megalomaniac dreams of naval power and of German hegemony. Dehio is convinced that a consistent effort at moderation could have avoided the First World War; he hurls his indictment at *Machtpolitik*—the "specifically German discrepancy between power

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and spirit . . . that absence of harmony which has characterized German history since the Hohenstaufen age" (p. 95).[1]

Neither Dehio nor Freund, however, asks himself whether Bismarck's creation may not have contained the seeds of its own destruction from the beginning. Precisely at this point Hans Kohn takes up the argument. Bismarck erected his Reich on the defeat of freedom, and the ideologies which accompanied its foundation were a mixture of power worship and romantic hallucinations. Treitschke falsely identified the nation-state of the nineteenth century with the medieval *Kaiserherrlichkeit*. The point is important for Kohn, because he denies such continuity and rather hopefully asserts that peoples can change and make new starts. He views the "moral catastrophe in modern history" as a European malady of which the Germans, to be sure, "presented the most outstanding example." He neither thinks that Nazism was the inevitable outcome of German history, nor does he attribute it to "modern mass society." As a lifetime student of nationalism, he knows that it is centuries older and has affected other minds, too, in many nations. But the German case is unique, owing to the historical condition—which Thomas Mann described movingly and perversely as early as 1917[2]—that in Germany Western civilization was superimposed like a thin veneer on a premodern foundation which was not Western. Protestantism, as Dostoevski had seen, was Germany's reaction against Roman universalism and rationalism. Romanticism, which grew in the West as a legitimate fruit in well-tended gardens, came late enough in Germany to set the values of the modern soul off sharply against the measured ideals of the Enlightenment; moreover, through an unfortunate coincidence, the romantic rebellion was called upon to wake the nationalistic forces in Germany (and Italy). Ever since, the murky ideologies of a pseudo-populist folk myth have served the cause of the German political Right.

Following Thomas Mann, Hans Kohn sees German history as "a tragic clash" between the two worlds to which it necessarily belongs: the Western Mediterranean world, which attracted the Emperors, and the Eastern, which was its home soil. The German Emperors were able to absorb Roman civilization only by conquering Rome—a strange paradox, the reflections of which still glitter in Hegel's dialectics: the power which is not of the spirit must reach for the idea which may

[1] In a similar vein, as the title indicates, is *Die Zerstörung der deutschen Politik: Dokumente, 1871-1933*, edited and annotated by Harry Pross, Frankfurt, S. Fischer, 1959.

[2] *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, withdrawn from circulation and never translated into English.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

justify it; the nation tries to slip into the ideological garment of a "providential" power. Hence the struggle between *Geist* and *Macht* which Dehio deplores.

Myth-makers like Hegel, Wagner, Treitschke, and Nietzsche in the nineteenth century, or Heidegger, George, Benn, Schmitt-Dorotic, Karl Barth, Ernst Jünger, and Spengler in the twentieth, married the idea of power to the dark forces of tribal instincts and thereby blinded themselves to the fact that the nature of power is demoniac. The task of modern German historiography, therefore, is to de-mystify the forces which have shaped German history. Each of the works under review undertakes this assignment in its own way. In boldness and radicalism, the most forceful attack is Freund's. He sees various attempts at an organized national life coming to naught, and more often he sees the demoniac forces still holding sway. But there never emerges any continuity of purpose (with the notable exception of Bismarck); there is neither a beginning nor an aim, and the author is not even sure whether he knows what the German nation is. His is a devastating, depressing account which leaves no illusions.

Golo Mann lays his stress not on debunking but on telling his story in such a way as to reveal the variety of motives, the multiplicity of causes, the dubiousness of successes, and—is he not the son of Germany's most ambiguous novelist?—the ambiguity of values. He starts out by saying that a nation is what its people have made it by living together, but he, too, ends up with little to be proud of. Dehio's approach is quite different. He studies the ideas which national policy tried to realize and shows the close fit of great historical interpretations with the contemporaneous needs of imperial propaganda. Whether the conception was the "German rebellion" against the preponderance of a continental power, or that of German leadership in a continental rebellion of the "have-nots" against the "haves," or of German "mediation" between East and West, Dehio's inexorable analysis always shows how the underlying assumption was a German hegemony. The message of his small book is noteworthy not for Germany alone: all Western nations must now renounce the illusion of an independent policy.

Hans Kohn uses the method of intellectual history, of which he is a master, to show that Germany made her greatest contribution when her thinkers cared least for her state. He then traces the drifting-away of German thought toward romanticism and nationalism, the substitution of unity for freedom in the March revolution, and the subsequent abdication of democracy in favor of nationalism. But he also notes the dissenting voices and, more importantly, the disappoint-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment of those who had followed Bismarck under erroneous assumptions —and suddenly the reader becomes aware that his research has made a U-turn. In his earlier book, Kohn mined the soil of the Enlightenment for small nuggets of nationalism; he now digs in the rubbish of chauvinism, imperialism, and fascism for some hopeful signs of a European renewal. This is not difficult either, because most of the significant minds of modern Germany—even most of the inadvertent fathers of totalitarianism—were good Europeans: George rejoiced at Germany's defeat in 1918, Thomas Mann in 1945; nearly all the original creators of the Nazi ideology (Jünger, Spengler, George, Benn, Schmitt, with the inglorious exception of Heidegger) fell out with the Nazis.

But alas! we also hear of an "unknown Rilke" who was a worshiper of Mussolini, of a pan-Austrian Hoffmannsthal, of a Machiavellian Meinecke, of a chauvinistic Max Weber, of a totally brain-washed Brecht, of Friedrich Naumann who professed himself "a Christian, a Darwinist, and an imperialist" (p. 287—Kohn caustically comments that Christ was the minor partner in this trinity). Again, one disciple of Stefan George created the myth of a "secret emperor-saviour," another carried the bomb which nearly killed Hitler on July 20, 1944. How do we get out of this circle which turns into a maze when we look abroad? Victor Hugo worshiped the first Napoleon; Maurras was a member of the Academy; Sorel preached violence of the elites; Benda found it necessary to condemn *La Trahison des Clercs*; d'Annunzio stormed Fiume; the anti-rationalism of D. H. Lawrence or Céline was comparable to German "blood and soil" literature; and then there are cases like Hamsun, Montherland. . . . With *Geistesgeschichte* methods, no one can tell how important the entire George circle might have been in German history. Kohn's book has the subtitle, *Education of a Nation*, but we do not learn why any of the above-named were considered educators. Was not Hermann Löns, the folk poet, more influential than Rilke, whose lasting work was known only to the elite? Golo Mann rightly remarks that in the history of a nation's mind the secondary writers may be more significant than the giants. For a long time Johanna Schopenhauer's sentimental novels expressed the mind of Germany more adequately than the philosophy of her justly more famous son.

But suppose we admit the history of the intellect as a substitute for the history of the mind, which excludes quantitative methods; there arises the problem of selection. If Scheler is mentioned, why not Simmel? If Lassalle, why not Bebel, who certainly formed the German

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

worker's mind? If Mommsen, why not Virchow? On the other hand, if Alfred Rosenberg occupies a place of dishonor in the history of the German mind, why not Kautsky a place of honor? As far as intellectual achievement is concerned, the latter's heroic output is justly forgotten; but the former would not even be known had not his party seized power and imposed his drivel on the historian's patience. Kautsky's philosophy has become Soviet state doctrine, but that does not make him representative of the Russian mind any more than the outbreak of Spenglerian disease signified any specific German vulnerability. Spengler's success indicated the nervous breakdown of part of the German middle classes after the defeat, the revolution, and the inflation, while another part of these middle classes took to Freud.

The point is that *Geistesgeschichte* here has to carry too heavy a load of political history. While certainly no writer should be considered a spokesman of any particular class, group, or generation, even less can any one claim to represent the German mind. Golo Mann is more fortunate from the outset, because his method forces him to stress the existence of many Germanies, and although he is as far from historical materialism as Kohn, he occasionally finds the sociological link between intellectual and political history. Kohn's method, on the other hand, forces him to register decades of German *Machtpolitik* as so many deviations from Germany's better nature. Since these aberrations are mental, moreover, the cure of the patient is seen, not in a healthier relationship of the German nation with its state, but in a return to the Epicurean idyl of the eighteenth century.

But Germany cannot go back to Goethe any more than to Bismarck. The present stability of the German government is based on the patriarchal figure of the man who rules it with a heavy hand, on protection by foreign partners, on unexpected opportunities in business and, last but not least, on political indifference. The state, however, is not securely founded on the love of the citizens for their country, or on their integration in its institutions, any more than the state of Anhalt-Koethen was in Goethe's time. Of the five authors whose works are under review, only Kohn is satisfied with the partial fatherland of Bonn and even denies that the question of unity and of the eastern frontiers is a serious concern. The truth, as Dehio brings out with as much vehemence as elegance, is that millions of Germans consider the present structure to be purely utilitarian and have no deeper loyalty to it as a historical incarnation of the national will; they accept the Bonn structure as an outpost of the Western community to which their true loyalty has turned. The theme of *Überzeugungsvaterland*—par-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tisan fatherland—and of the demise of the national state is highly topical in German political science now. It appears in Margaret Bovari's widely read book, *Treason in the Twentieth Century*, and in the new, enlarged edition of Hans Rothfels' *Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler*. Dehio alone draws the conclusion that a "complete break" with German history is needed.

It must be said that the conspiracy of July 20, 1944, was not European in this sense. German historians are justly proud that some courageous people inside the Third Reich tried to save the German name from infamy; but an honest attempt to glorify them must fail. While erecting a monument to their heroism, Rothfels cannot acquit the conspirators of their former collaboration with the Nazis or make their ideas comprehensible to the West. The legend that these were leaders of the "other" Germany will not stand scrutiny; their tradition was Potsdam, as Rothfels shows. Representatives of the true "other" Germany did not travel abroad on Hitler's behalf and had no chance to make conditional offers to Dulles. They were in concentration camps or sacrificed themselves in perilous attempts to maintain contact with old-timers, friends, and other remnants of Weimar. In German historiography and memory, the 5,000 who tragically and splendidly gave their lives on July 20 eclipse the patient martyrdom of the hundreds of thousands who went underground because they never believed in Hitler. This not only is regrettable; it is dangerous. Not one of the books under review mentions the *Reichsbanner* or the Social Democratic underground, as though Weimar had no defenders and no tradition.

It has been the unhappy fate of the ill-starred Republic that whoever looks at it does so from the point of view of its failure. Kohn starts out by calling it an illusion; Freund does not even mention the names of all the Chancellors whose portraits the publishers have supplied; the best book so far on the period, by Professor Karl Dietrich Bracher, is characteristically entitled *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik*;[3] Golo Mann thinks that "there never was a Republic . . . the Weimar state was an appendix of the Empire, no period with a stamp of its own, an interregnum which through all kinds of experiments faked a historical life" (p. 667). And this from the son and nephew of two of the most significant writers of the period: "Radical literature was not of the Republic, only of its time" (p. 708)! This is like saying that Mencken and Sinclair Lewis just happened to live in the 1920's.

[3] Schriften des Instituts für politische Wissenschaft, Stuttgart, Ring Verlag, 1955.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kohn, who writes so well about the German classics, laments that *The Magic Mountain* fails to solve any of the problems of its time: was Shakespeare any help to Queen Elizabeth?

Yet the fallacy of hindsight has worked still greater injustice. The historians overvalue the writers who announced the doom of republicanism and the coming of totalitarianism; they undervalue those who were "of the Republic." To take the thread up where we left it with Kautsky and Spengler—if Schmitt-Dorotic is worth mentioning, why not the republican philosophers of government: Oppenheimer, Redslob, Kelsen? The Republic failed, but it is wrong to conclude that its representatives were inferior or that its institutions were not worth preserving. On the contrary, it failed because of a unique constellation of hostile circumstances which is not likely to be reproduced anywhere. It is worth studying in its own right, not as a transition from the Empire to the Third Reich—that would be Hitler's greatest victory —but as a positive period with a stamp all its own. We often hear it said reassuringly that "Bonn is not Weimar." If that statement is true, it is not reassuring; unless Bonn seeks its roots in Weimar, it will again fall a prey to Potsdam. Bonn has been more fortunate than Weimar; but in many respects it is the weaker state, and those who make light of Weimar really are running away from the problems they may have to face tomorrow.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

By MORTON A. KAPLAN

Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960, 309 pp. $6.25.

THIS volume consists of a series of essays that were published in substantially the same form in various scholarly journals in 1957-1960. In them, Schelling attempts to adapt game theory to sociologically relevant aspects of the strategic process not encompassed within the formal mathematics of the theory. Thus his book represents a strikingly original contribution to the literature. In general, the essays share the theme that formal game theory is not a sufficiently good tool for sociological analysis of the bargaining process that takes place in real life. (This contention would not be denied by orthodox game theorists, since they do not regard the provision of such a tool as the purpose of game theory.) Except for this unifying thread, the various aspects of Schelling's analysis do not seem to me to evince a consistent point of view. To press this point, however, would be pedantic, for in *The Strategy of Conflict* the reader will discover a number of illuminating and penetrating sociological analyses of strategic problems.

One of the most striking contributions made by Schelling is the concept of saliency. For instance, if two parachutists drop in a town, each carrying a map, but without any instructions on where to meet, how can they, in the absence of communication, find each other? Schelling has shown by experimentation that people can and do solve problems of this kind. In the case just cited, let us suppose that the town has four churches but only one bridge; the two parachutists, each consulting his map, will probably choose the bridge as their meeting place. That is, they look for some salient feature on the map which each believes will call itself uniquely to the attention of the other, and choose independently that feature as the co-ordination point.

Again, suppose that two individuals are put in different rooms and that each will receive a prize (always of the same amount) if they choose the same strategies, but no prize if they disagree. According to formal game theory, the labeling of the strategies should be indifferent to the strategy choices, but, in the case cited, this is not so. The players will choose the strategy labeled "1" as salient, since the only relevant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

feature of the game is to choose the same strategy. Similarly, in real-life bargaining, agreements may be reached that are not abstractly just but that have some feature of saliency which the players choose for fear they may not be able to agree on anything else. Schelling feels that the distinction between the use and the non-use of atomic weapons has the same kind of saliency and that, no matter how rational other suggested distinctions concerning the possible use of atomic weapons may be, there is a rational reluctance to test these distinctions for fear that no other solution has the saliency of the distinction between use and non-use.

In particular, Schelling has done much with the investigation of first- and second-move strategies, commitments, promises, threats, and self-imposed penalties. Self-imposed penalties, for instance, are related to the old bromide about being backed into a corner. But Schelling has analyzed a number of situations where it is advantageous to be backed into a corner. At one point, he employs the charming example of the Victorian maiden who tucks some desired object in her bosom, confident that no male will be so lacking in chivalry as to attempt to retrieve it. This example is, in some ways, a poor one, for the effectiveness of the stratagem depends not so much on the willingness of the maiden to fight harder because of the severity of the shame should some male hand violate her bosom, as on whether the male has empathy (positive interdependence of utility) for her shame or fears the obloquy he might face if he violated the proprieties so grossly.

Other examples employed by Schelling fit his criteria better. The house buyer (an example that does not occur in von Neumann and Morgenstern, despite Schelling's reference) can buy the house at his price if he can convince the seller that he must pay a penalty greater than the difference between the offering and asking prices if he agrees to more than his offering price. The union negotiator may be able to gain concessions from management if he convinces management representatives that he cannot be expected to accept their terms because he will lose office if he does.

In this kind of situation, a player in effect threatens an opponent with a penalty—for instance, the continuation of a strike, action that involves a risk of nuclear war, or nuclear war itself. The effectiveness of the threat depends on the penalty resulting from not carrying it out. Thus, the union leader may find it advantageous to so commit his prestige that he will be fired if management does not give him what he asks, for management then knows that he must continue the strike even though the agreement he is offered may be economically prefer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able to the costs of a strike. That is, the farther the union leader can back himself into a corner, the greater the threat he holds over management. Analogously, if Khrushchev so commits his prestige that he will be removed and executed unless the United States makes concessions to him or unless he resorts to nuclear war, he has a bargaining advantage over American leaders. If the fate of the whole Communist regime were involved in a failure by the United States to make concessions, the bargaining position of the United States would be even worse.

In all these examples, however, Schelling deals with the single-shot case. He does have a few references to repeated-play considerations. He remarks that although it would be cheaper to settle out of court, an insurance company may prefer to bring suit in order to deter other potential nuisance suits. Clearly, the repeated-play case may involve different conclusions from the single-shot case. But this consideration is not integrated into Schelling's analysis.

Schelling also analyzes situations involving promises. The murderer who is observed has an incentive to murder the observer. Many observers would be willing to promise not to inform if their life were spared. The murderer would be quite willing to accept this promise if it could be enforced. Unfortunately, once the observer is removed from the power of the murderer, his incentive to keep his promise—the threat of death—is removed. Both the United States and the Soviet Union might prefer a world in which there were no nuclear weapons to one in which they exist. Both would then have an incentive to agree to the destruction of nuclear weapons, provided each could believe the promise of the other to destroy its stockpile of weapons. Unfortunately, neither may feel an incentive to keep the promise if it cannot be monitored. Unless each party can present to the other some "hostage to fortune," the promise cannot be believed.

One solution suggested by Schelling for a less severe version of this problem is that of "decomposition." For instance, if each of two players agrees to give a certain large amount to the Red Cross on condition that the other gives a comparable gift, and if the gifts must be made independently, each may fear that the other will fail to keep the agreement. If, however, the amounts to be given are broken down into small sums, given one at a time, the amount risked may be acceptable. After all, the second payment need not be made unless the other player has paid his first installment. Thus, no one act of implementation involves an unacceptable risk. The military analogy is clear: if disarmament were desirable, some sort of progression by stages might make the risks involved at each stage of disarmament acceptable. Of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

course, it must be noted that nothing in the thesis either makes disarmament inherently desirable or implies the availability of a scheme of decomposition involving acceptable risks at each stage.

One of the interesting ideas developed by Schelling concerns the randomization of threats. It has long been argued that nuclear deterrence is effective only if nuclear retaliation is known or at least suspected to be automatic. Otherwise, the cost of retaliation will outweigh the gain; in fact, it has often been asserted that the cost of massive retaliation is suicide and that the threat is therefore not credible.

But the risk involved in failure to credit nuclear retaliation may be sufficient to deter war. Indeed, it might be argued that even a low probability would be sufficient to deter a rational opponent under most circumstances. He does not have to believe the threat; he only has to believe that there is some probability it might be carried out. Schelling carries this argument further and explores the deliberate use of risky devices. Thus an induced crisis may create the risk, not that a country will opt for nuclear war, but that nuclear war may result from the crisis. This provides an incentive to dampen the crisis and to reach certain kinds of agreements, whereas in the absence of crisis an incentive to agreement might not be present. Limited war carries the risk of total war. Moreover, there are forms of risky behavior in limited war that may induce the enemy to compromise his demands. There are also degrees of involvement that may heighten this particular kind of risk. Thus, the Communists might not believe that we would make a deliberate decision to go to war in Southeast Asia. We may get involved, however, with troop and supply movements. And this involvement may lead to war, not in terms of a deliberate decision to make war, but as a consequence of involvement, changes in the situation, and Russian decisions. This possibility should serve to make the Russian leaders more cautious than if they merely had to fear a deliberate American decision to go to war in that particular area.

One of the most interesting of the demonstrations to which Schelling has treated us is that military "balances" may be functions of the absolute sizes of weapons systems as well as of their relative sizes. In a situation where all attacking weapons were missiles and where an attack would not be launched unless the retaliatory forces were reduced below some stated arbitrary number (i.e., the number that would cause unacceptable damage), it follows that a pre-emptive first strike may be reasonable at low levels of armament if both sides have the same number of attacking weapons. This is a quite unstable situation, for the fear of an opponent's attack may impel attack. With larger numbers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of missiles on both sides, a greater and greater advantage in numbers becomes necessary in order to make pre-emptive warfare rational—that is, in order to reduce the enemy's attacking forces below the number necessary to do unacceptable damage with some high degree of probability. Thus, leaving other factors out of account, the larger the missile forces on both sides, the greater the numerical advantage the attacker must possess, the more difficult it becomes for him to hide his acquisition of such a number (thus serving notice that an arms increase by the other player is necessary), and the more difficult it becomes economically to achieve that superiority necessary for attack. In this fashion, with increases of numbers the military situation becomes more stable. Of course, other factors complicate matters: size of warhead, accuracy, reliability, hardness of basing, secrecy, mobility, and so forth.

In a brilliant appendix calling for the abandonment of symmetry, Schelling points out that the Nash-Harsanyi games entailing symmetrical solutions are intellectually compelling only if rationality is defined in terms of symmetry. Thus, the compelling quality of the typical Nash solution, according to Schelling, is present only when the clues for the co-ordination of the strategies of the players are mathematical. For instance, if two players have to choose independently some division of $100 and have to agree on the division if either is to get anything, then a $50/$50 division will be compelling in the absence of other information delineating the choice situation. If, however, each sees and knows that the other sees a sign stating that A is to get $80 and B $20, they probably can best co-ordinate on an $80/$20 division. The problem here is not to find a symmetrical solution but a solution that both players can agree on; and any clue, whether symmetrical or not, that aids in this endeavor is helpful and will thus be utilized by rational players.

Indeed, as Schelling points out, the proper strategy for the players may lie, not in looking for symmetries, but in attempting to find asymmetries that they can exploit to their advantage. However, to adapt a rule that Luce and Raiffa developed,[1] one of the players may have an incentive to play dumb and appear to be unable to understand the asymmetry working in favor of the other player. And, indeed, one of the difficulties in attempting to exploit asymmetries in the tacit game may stem from the very fact that neither player can be sure that the other understands the asymmetry. If the players cannot co-ordinate, there will be no agreement and both players will lose.

[1] R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions*, New York, 1957, p. 101.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Amidst all the accolades that are due Schelling, it must be mentioned that to some extent he has thrown out too much of the existing literature of game theory when a modification might have been more in order. One instance of this involves threat positions in bargains of the Nash type. Luce and Raiffa, and the author of this review article, are criticized by Schelling for suggesting that threat positions in games of this kind involve interpersonal comparisons of utility. The reasoning suggested by Raiffa in a seminar, and followed in a slightly modified form by myself, runs as follows: Consider a Nash bargain in which moves are made simultaneously and in which bargaining precedes the choice of strategies. Consider two players who must agree on the division of some sum. If they must divide $100, the Nash solution of $50/$50 seems plausible. Consider the case, however, where player A gets some proportion of $100 and player B receives 1 minus that proportion times $10. The Nash solution is $50/$5. Raiffa, however, reasoned that player B may argue that player A has more to lose than player B and that their bargaining positions are not equal until each has the same amount to lose. According to this reasoning, the solution point would be $9.09/$9.09. I pointed out that player A may argue that if B insists on the $9.09/$9.09 solution, he is risking a sure $5 to gain an additional $4.09, while if player A holds out for $50/$5, he is risking only a sure $9.09 to gain an additional $40.91. Clearly neither set of reasons has the compelling quality that a Nash solution requires. We can introduce similar problems in a Nash bargain where the prizes are symmetrical if we introduce considerations of stubbornness and so forth. Luce and Raiffa conclude that one cannot predict where the bargain will be struck—or if one will be reached at all—without knowing the bargaining psychologies of the players and without making interpersonal comparisons of utility.[2]

Admittedly, the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility is a sensitive one. No one has yet demonstrated a scientifically acceptable technique for rendering such comparisons meaningful, regardless of how much some of us may feel that such comparisons are made nonetheless and enter into the determination of bargains. Schelling's objection, however, is not directed at this problem, but rather at the legitimacy of considering such comparisons even if they could be made. Schelling's position is that in a 2 x 2 matrix only one of the players may have a plausible threat. "A threat is essentially a credible declaration of a *conditional* choice for second move. It is profitable only if it

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 131. See also Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, New York, 1957, pp. 195-99.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

yields a better payoff than either first move or second move or second move alone and when one can make the other player move first either actually or by promise. . . ." Schelling points out that, in an example employed by Luce and Raiffa, the second player has no plausible threat, "not because the absolute size of his gains or losses is greater than player 1's but for the much simpler reason that player 2 has no use for a threat. He wins if he moves first; he wins if he moves second; and he wins with simultaneous moves . . ." (p. 125n). According to Schelling, he needs only to forestall the threat of the other player, and he can do this by an unconditional commitment to his preferred strategy. The matrix involved is as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} (1, 2) & (3, 1) \\ (0, -200) & (2, -300) \end{bmatrix}$$

Schelling, however, goes on to admit that player 1 can in fact enforce the (3, 1) solution in the game as described by Luce and Raiffa. He ascribes the result, however, entirely to the "peculiar legal structure of the game"—that is, to the fact that irrevocable commitments cannot be made. Schelling undoubtedly is correct in turn in holding that player 2 can win the game by making an irrevocable commitment to his preferred strategy, in the sense that player 1 must then rationally permit the (1, 2) solution. However, this result is entirely the consequence of the peculiar structure of Schelling's game, in which irrevocable commitments can *safely* be made—that is, in which the opponent can be depended upon to act rationally. For example, let us interpret the figures in the matrix as dollars. Would any reasonable player commit himself irrevocably to a strategy that could at best increase his winnings from $1 to $2, when he stands to lose $200 if player 1 carries out his threat? And, as Luce and Raiffa point out,[3] if the players play the game repeatedly, and if player 1 carries out his threat, how many times would player 2 play the game before he made a binding agreement with player 1 to accept the (3, 1) outcome? In the repeated version of the game examined above, player 1 even has a rational reason to carry out his threat and not merely to make it.

Schelling's reasoning is unconvincing to me, even within the limits examined above, and I feel there are additional reasons for doubting his conclusions. He stands on his contention that the Luce-Raiffa game has a peculiar legal structure. Indeed, it does; but one might argue that the peculiar legal structure of the Luce-Raiffa game illuminates

[3] Luce and Raiffa, *op.cit.*, p. 111.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some bargaining structures better than the structure of the Schelling game. Schelling's arguments against considering bargaining psychology and interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot be defended unless irrevocable commitments can be made, unless these commitments involve penalties greater than carrying out the threat involved in the commitment, and unless repeated-play aspects are unimportant. In addition, not only must it be possible to make an irrevocable commitment but it must also be rational to do so.

We can cast serious doubts upon all these assumptions with respect to very important bargaining situations in international politics. Consider a situation in which the Soviet Union threatens to send troops to Laos. The United States responds that if the Soviet Union sends troops, the United States will engage in limited nuclear retaliation. The Soviet Union sends troops anyway; perhaps it regards the American threat as a bluff. The United States can retract its threat or carry through. The Soviet Union can withdraw or carry on. Examination reveals that underlying a simple single-shot game there is a complicated move structure. There are first moves in the sense that other moves follow particular moves. But short of total nuclear war, there is no clear end—or beginning—to the game. When we decompose the strategies into moves, we see that most commitments will be of a quite tentative nature. We might establish a Rube Goldberg type of device, no longer responsive to our control, that would carry out our threat on sensing Russian troops in Laos. But, for obvious reasons, we are quite unlikely to do this. Nor would it be desirable to do so. Yet, short of this, most of the commitments involved are probably revocable, although there will be costs if they are revoked. There is a very real sense in which this kind of game is closer to the simultaneous-move game of Luce and Raiffa, in which there is pre-game bargaining, than to the first- and second-move game of Schelling, in which irrevocable commitments are made.

Undoubtedly, in the example we have examined, some kinds of commitments of an irrevocable nature are made during the progress of the game. Threats commit prestige irrevocably. Sending troops is a partial commitment to other moves, but it does commit prestige irrevocably. Such commitments alter the credibility of policies of nuclear reprisal and so forth, and consequently affect the bargaining situation. The penalties involved in withdrawing from the situation are, however, dwarfed by the penalties of nuclear war. There is no rational necessity to remain involved. The opponent can hope to force withdrawal even in the single-shot case. Questions involved here hinge to a considerable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

degree on how much each side wants the particular objective, how much each is willing to pay to get it, and the estimates each makes of the other's estimates. Thus, bargaining psychology becomes applicable even in the single-shot case, since the penalty which reinforces the threat is much smaller than the costs of nuclear war. How the threat stemming from the commitment works also depends on whether repeated-play considerations are involved or not.

It is not possible to undertake here an extensive analysis of how the repeated-play game affects bargaining strategy, even apart from considerations of threats and commitments. But a few remarks may be in order. We have cast doubt on the inapplicability of considerations of bargaining psychology even in the single-shot case. Our earlier discussion of the example taken from Luce and Raiffa shows that questions of bargaining psychology play an even greater role in the repeated-play case. The reasons given earlier were quite decisive. But other considerations are also involved. For instance, the outcome of one game may determine the shape of the matrix and the respective bargaining positions in the second game. Even if it were technically possible to handle this in a single super-game matrix—which is doubtful—to do so would only obscure the sociologically interesting aspects of the strategic interplay. That in international politics outcomes in one play of the game affect bargaining situations in the next play does not require argument. Nor can one escape the game. We must remain in it, willing or not, and our survival is at stake.

Another important consideration in repeated games is to establish rules of behavior, not merely particular outcomes in particular plays. Earlier we referred to Schelling's assertion that an insurance company may sue, not because it can gain more from suit than from settlement, but to serve notice on other potential claimants that they cannot exploit their nuisance value beyond certain limits. In the same way, representatives of an industry may feel that they must undergo a strike to serve notice that union representatives cannot use prior political commitments to coerce them. Examination of these repeated-play factors might put an entirely different light on promises, threats, and commitments.

In an earlier work, I developed a repeated-play or stochastic game in which each player had a threat position.[4] Use of this technique was demonstrated as a potential means of avoiding the prisoners' dilemma situation or of preventing an opponent from forcing an unfavorable

[4] Kaplan, *op.cit.*, pp. 230ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

solution on oneself. It was intended to outline a method that permitted players to co-ordinate on solutions that were reasonably favorable to both, where the shape and content of the matrix made this possible. But it seemed to me that the argument could be made to work only on the basis of "I can hurt you worse than you can hurt me" or "I want this more than you do." Either player could make this kind of threat, depending on the particular matrix.

In his own critique of Nash-Harsanyi solutions, where he deals with a very simple case, Schelling points out that if two players must agree on the division of $100 and agree on a $70/$30 division, it is difficult to criticize this as irrational unless symmetry is adopted as the definition of rationality. If one player says he expected $70 and knew the other player expected him to expect $70, and the second player says that he expected to be offered only $30 and knew that the other expected him to accept it, it might indeed have been irrational for either player to make any offer other than the $70/$30 offer. But at least one possible, and in some cases plausible, explanation of these expectations would lie in each player's knowledge of his own and the other's bargaining psychology, including expectations concerning the nature of the world. This may or may not be related to considerations of how much each would be hurt absolutely, but it is certainly related to know how much each would be hurt when expectations are taken into account. And, if this is conceded, the Luce-Raiffa explanation that Schelling rejected must also be conceded. Indeed, it is hard to observe the world around us and to deny that a process of this kind is taking place.

It seems to me that Schelling has said almost the same thing at other points in his book. For instance: "If one player badly wants a particular state, because it has especially high value for him, so that he is willing to stick around and fight it out a long time, losing several dollars to the kitty before the other gives it up, it is better for both players that they realize ahead of time that one wants it most badly" (p. 104). Similar reasoning occurs on p. 115, p. 136, and elsewhere in the book. Now wanting something badly and being prepared to give a lot up for it is strategically equivalent to "I can hurt you more than you can hurt me." It says in essence that I can afford a higher penalty than you can, that I have more to gain by holding out for it or more to lose by giving it up. In terms of ordinary controls or penalties that could be enforced, the situations of both players might look equivalent; they might have the same number of chips to throw into the game. But, for whatever reason, the fact that one player is prepared to spend more chips than the other, and that both know it, is a determining factor in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the co-ordination between the players and in the solution that will be reached.

The need for co-ordination is recognized in Luce and Raiffa. Schelling's major—and quite brilliant contribution—lies in his extensive discussion of the sociology of the move structure. However, he throws out too much of the relevant aspect of bargaining psychologies, thus depriving himself of additional sociological power (indeed, it was the necessity to go beyond the mathematics of game theory into sociological constraints that produced the Luce-Raiffa variations), and he does not develop the important repeated-play aspect of games. Although the book is not highly theoretical in a game theoretic sense, it is a most powerful work intellectually, filled with both subtle and profound reasoning. It constitutes a landmark in the literature—a "must" for all serious students of the subject.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wiley **BOOKS**

THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By Morton A. Kaplan, *and* Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, *both of the University of Chicago.*

Here is a book written by a political scientist and a lawyer who combine their skills brilliantly to demonstrate in a powerful way the extent to which international politics is constrained by legal rules, how these rules, in turn, respond to political considerations, and how much of the struggle of international politics is a struggle to determine the values governing international political behavior. Based on a systems theory of international politics, the book is written in a style that is clear to both lawyers and political scientists. It clarifies problems of interest to everyone—such as the possible development of space law, the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, the role of sovereignty in the modern world, and the growth of new supra-national organs of political power such as NATO, the Communist bloc, the European Economic Community, and the United Nations.

The development of new areas of international law as a consequence of new institutions of political organization is examined as well as the growing role of the individual and private organizations as participants in the international legal and political process. The mutual influence of law on politics, and politics on law, is clarified and the distinction between political and judicial behavior is related to international political organization. The book is of timely interest and covers the traditional topics of international law systematically enough to be useful as a text in international law and international organization. 1961. 372 pages. $6.95.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER

By Richard E. Neustadt, *Columbia University.*

"To review *Presidential Power* is to become obliged to commend, without reservations, this extremely valuable book to the political science profession as well as to all people who wish for a more sensitive appreciation of American presidential politics."—*The Journal of Politics.* 1960. 224 pages. $5.95.*

* *Textbook also available for college adoption.*

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc. **440 Park Avenue South, New York 16, N. Y.**

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Journal of the Indian School of International Studies

International Studies is published quarterly by the Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi and contains articles in the fields of modern International Politics, Economics, and Law as well as on political, economic and social developments in Asia or other areas.

3rd year Vol. III No. 1 (July 1961)

Contents

ARNOLD and VERONICA TOYNBEE, Problems of Research in International Relations
M. S. AGWANI, The Ba'th: A Study in Contemporary Arab Politics
JAHAR RAY, The European Free Trade Association and Its Impact on India's Trade
GARGI DUTT, The Rural People's Communes of China
NAGENDRA SINGH and M. K. NAWAZ, The Contemporary Practice of India in the Field of International Law (1960)
NOTES AND MEMORANDA SURVEY OF SOURCE MATERIAL

The Price of *International Studies* is Rs. 6.00 a number ($1.80) or Rs. 22.00 ($6.60) per annum. Copies may be obtained from the publishers, Asia Publishing House, Contractor Building, Nicol Road, Ballard Estate, Bombay 1, to which address all correspondence should be addressed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

CANBERRA

Research School of Pacific Studies

Applications are invited for appointment to the Chair of International Relations; salary £A4,700. Reasonable travel and removal expenses are payable. One year's study leave, with travel allowance, will be granted after each three years' service.

The Professor of International Relations, as Head of the Department, will be expected to encourage and supervise post-graduate research into the political, economic and legal relationships between nations, especially in the Asian and Pacific regions. It is not essential that an applicant's own field of research has been so directed. However, the University would be especially interested in applicants prepared to give this broad regional emphasis to their own work.

Further particulars should be obtained from the Registrar, with whom applications should be lodged by 1st August, 1961. Notwithstanding this notification the Council of the University retains the right to fill the Chair by invitation at any stage.

D. K. R. HODGKIN
Registrar,
Institute of Advanced Studies

Box 4, G.P.O.,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

A Quarterly Published by
The University of Notre Dame

The July issue will include the following articles:

Hans Kohn: The Impact of Pan-Slavism on Central Europe

Vukan Kuic: Theory and Practice of the American Presidency

Martin Kessler: The Synthetic Vision of Joseph Schumpeter

David H. Burton: Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist

C. Ernest Dawn: From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology

David Nicholls: Gladstone on Liberty and Democracy

Annual Subscription $5.00 **Single Issues $1.50**

Address: THE EDITORS, THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
P. O. Box 4, Notre Dame, Indiana

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Princeton UNIVERSITY PRESS

Political Change in Morocco

By Douglas E. Ashford

How to develop new forms of political expression and political participation on the national level is one of the major problems facing newly independent countries. In this book Mr. Ashford gives a careful description of the pattern of Moroccan national politics at the time of independence, and goes on to analyze how this pattern was changed during the first three post-independence years. He provides a general outline of the ways a widely differentiated people can participate in the national politics of a developing country.

456 pages. $8.50

The Political Kingdom in Uganda:

A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism

By David E. Apter

Political upheavals in Africa have focused world attention on anti-colonialism. Uganda, one of the continent's most puzzling countries, raises the question of what shall remain after colonialism departs. What are the problems of a *modernizing autocracy*, a political system that can absorb and traditionalize change but cannot alter its autocratic principle of authority? While Uganda grows into a modern state, its most important part, the Kingdom of Buganda, remains separatist and parochial. Examining this relationship, the author describes the history of the country—its social, religious, and economic changes of more than half a century; the nature of its government and leaders; the inhibited growth of political parties.

550 pages. $10.00

Tojo and the Coming of the War

By Robert J. C. Butow

At the time of Pearl Harbor the premier of Japan, General Hideki Tojo, became to many Americans the Asian Hitler, and was held responsible for the coming of the war between Japan and the United States. Mr. Butow reconsiders this complex of events and shows the consequences —for the man and the nation—of Japan's decision to break the peace in the Pacific. The role of the Japanese army in affairs of state is seen through the career of General Tojo. For his account of the famous trial of Tojo, the author had access to the voluminous records of the International Military Tribunal in the Far East, including a stenographic record of the trial in Japanese, a source hitherto not used. *598 pages. $10.00*

Order from your bookstore, or

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Princeton, New Jersey

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Center of International Studies

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

A THEORY OF STABLE DEMOCRACY

By HARRY ECKSTEIN

Attempting to improve upon previous theories linking governmental and social patterns, the author argues that stable government of any sort requires "congruence" among social authority patterns and that democracy can, for this reason, be stable only if it is to a high degree impure.

Research Monograph No. 10 — *$1.00*

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF INTERNAL WAR

By GEORGE MODELSKI

An analysis of the international components of the political conflicts that take place *within* states and empires.

Research Monograph No. 11 — *50 cents*

FURTHER NEW TITLES

Internal War and Pacification: The Vendée, 1789-1796, by Peter Paret (Research Monograph No. 12) *$1.00*

Command and Control, by Thornton Read (Policy Memorandum No. 24) *$1.00*

Obtainable from the Center of International Studies
Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton, N.J.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX TO VOLUME XIII

Africa, *see* Apter, Spiro
Aitken, Hugh G. J., ed., *The State and Economic Growth*. Reviewed by C. E. Black, 4:622
Ames, Edward, A View of Soviet Business —Through Window or Mirror? 3:485
Apter, David E., The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda, 1:45
arms control, *see* Brown, Hoag, Kaplan, Schelling
Arms Control: Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force, by T. C. Schelling, 1:1
Ashford, Douglas E., A Case Study in the Diplomacy of Social Revolution, 3:423

Barnett, A. Doak, *Communist China and Asia*. Reviewed by Robert C. North, 1:156
Becker, Abraham S., Comparisons of United States and USSR National Output: Some Rules of the Game, 1:99
Black, C. E., The Politics of Economic Growth, 4:622
Bolshevik Past as the First Secretary Likes It, The, by S. I. Ploss, 1:77
Brown, Seyom, Invulnerable Retaliatory Capability and Arms Control, 4:528
Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., The Organization of the Communist Camp, 2:175; *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, reviewed by Paul Kecskemeti, 2:313

Case Study in the Diplomacy of Social Revolution, A, by Douglas E. Ashford, 3:423
Challenge of Communist China, The, by Robert C. North, 1:156
China, Communist, *see* Daniels, North, Thornton
Chinese Revolution in Russian Perspective, The, by Robert Vincent Daniels, 2:210
Christiansen, Bjørn, *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality*. Reviewed by Herbert McClosky, 1:129
Cohen, Bernard C., The Present and the Press, 1:165
Comparisons of United States and USSR National Output: Some Rules of the Game, by Abraham S. Becker, 1:99
Consensus and Conflict in Indian Politics, by Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, 3:385
Critique of U.S. Commercial Policy, A, by Imanuel Wexler, 2:330
Crossing the Culture Bars: An Approach to the Training of American Technicians for Overseas Assignments, by John D. Montgomery, 4:544

Daniels, Robert Vincent, The Chinese Revolution in Russian Perspective, 2:210
de Gaulle, Charles, *The Edge of the Sword* and *War Memoirs*. Reviewed by Stanley Hoffmann, 1:140
De Gaulle's Memoirs: The Hero as History, by Stanley Hoffmann, 1:140
Dehio, Ludwig, *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*. Reviewed by Henry Pachter, 4:633
Deutsch, Karl W., and Alexander Eckstein, National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959, 2:267
Development: The Visible or the Invisible Hand? by Yusif A. Sayigh, 4:561
Diversity and Uniformity in Communist Politics, by Paul Kecskemeti, 2:313
DIVO Institut, *Untersuchung der Wählerschaft und Wahlentscheidung 1957: Arbeitsbericht über Erhebung in Wahljahr*. Reviewed by Lewis J. Edinger, 3:471

Eckstein, Alexander, and Karl W. Deutsch, National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959, 2:267
economic development, *see* Black, Deutsch and Eckstein, Sayigh, von Vorys
Economic Regionalism Reconsidered, by Lincoln Gordon, 2:231
Edinger, Lewis J., Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in Western Germany, 3:471
Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in Western Germany, by Lewis J. Edinger, 3:471

foreign policy-making process, *see* Cohen, Halperin, McClosky, Tucker
Fox, William T. R., ed., *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*, reviewed by Richard C. Snyder, 2:300; and Annette Baker Fox, The Teaching of International Relations in the United States, 3:339
France, *see* Hoffmann
Freund, Michael, *Deutsche Geschichte*. Reviewed by Henry Pachter, 4:633

Gaither Committee and the Policy Process, The, by Morton H. Halperin, 3:360

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German Democracy in the 1950's, by Otto Kirchheimer, 2:254
Germany, Western, *see* Edinger, Kirchheimer, Pachter
Germany Looks in the Mirror of History, by Henry Pachter, 4:633
Gordon, Lincoln, Economic Regionalism Reconsidered, 2:231
Granick, David, *The Red Executive: A Study of the Organization Man in Russian Industry*. Reviewed by Edward Ames, 3:485

Halperin, Morton H., The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process, 3:360
Hitch, Charles J., and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*. Reviewed by Robert E. Kuenne, 3:454
Hoag, Malcolm W., On Stability in Deterrent Races, 4:505
Hoffmann, Stanley, De Gaulle's Memoirs: The Hero as History, 1:140
Horelick, Arnold L., Outer Space and Earthbound Politics, 2:323
Hoselitz, Bert F., *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth*. Reviewed by C. E. Black, 4:622

India, *see* Rudolph, von Vorys
international relations, theory of, *see* Fox, Snyder
International Relations Theory—Continued, by Richard C. Snyder, 2:300
Invulnerable Retaliatory Capability and Arms Control, by Seyom Brown, 4:528

Jacobs, Norman, *The Origin of Modern Capitalism in Eastern Asia*. Reviewed by C. E. Black, 4:622
Jessup, Philip C., and Howard J. Taubenfeld, *Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy*. Reviewed by Arnold L. Horelick, 2:323

Kaplan, Morton A., Strategy and International Politics, 4:642
Kecskemeti, Paul, Diversity and Uniformity in Communist Politics, 2:313
Kenen, Peter B., *Giant Among Nations: Problems in United States Foreign Economic Policy*. Reviewed by Imanuel Wexler, 2:330
Kirchheimer, Otto, German Democracy in the 1950's, 2:254
Kitzinger, Uwe, *German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign*. Reviewed by Lewis J. Edinger, 3:471
Kohn, Hans, *The Mind of Germany*. Reviewed by Henry Pachter, 4:633
Kornhauser, William, *The Politics of Mass Society*. Reviewed by Talcott Parsons, 1:112
Kuenne, Robert E., Welfare Economics and the Military Decision, 3:454

Lerner, Daniel, and Richard D. Robinson, Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force, 1:19
Lipset, Seymour Martin, *Political Man*. Reviewed by Talcott Parsons, 1:112
Lubell, Harold, Security of Supply and Energy Policy in Western Europe, 3:400

Mann, Golo, *Deutsche Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*. Reviewed by Henry Pachter, 4:633
Mathisen, Trygve, *Methodology in the Study of International Relations*. Reviewed by Richard C. Snyder, 2:300
McClosky, Herbert, Perspectives on Personality and Foreign Policy, 1:129
McKean, Roland N., and Charles J. Hitch, *The Economics of Defense*. Reviewed by Robert E. Kuenne, 3:454
military history, *see* Morton
Mills, C. Wright, *The Sociological Imagination*. Reviewed by Edward Shils, 4:600
Montgomery, John D., Crossing the Culture Bars: An Approach to the Training of American Technicians for Overseas Assignments, 4:544
Morocco, *see* Ashford
Morton, Louis, Sources for the History of World War II, 3:435

National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959, by Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, 2:267
New Constitutional Forms in Africa, by Herbert J. Spiro, 1:69
North, Robert C., The Challenge of Communist China, 1:156

On Stability in Deterrent Races, by Malcolm W. Hoag, 4:505
Organization of the Communist Camp, The, by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, 2:175
Outer Space and Earthbound Politics, by Arnold L. Horelick, 2:323

Pachter, Henry, Germany Looks in the Mirror of History, 4:633
Parsons, Talcott, Social Structure and Political Orientation, 1:112

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peking, Moscow, and the Underdeveloped Areas, by Thomas Perry Thornton, 4:491
Perspectives on Personality and Foreign Policy, by Herbert McClosky, 1:129
Ploss, S. I., The Bolshevik Past as the First Secretary Likes It, 1:77
Political Realism and Foreign Policy, by Robert W. Tucker, 3:461
Politics of Economic Growth, The, by C. E. Black, 4:622
Present and the Press, The, by Bernard C. Cohen, 1:165
Professor Mills on the Calling of Sociology, by Edward Shils, 4:600

Robinson, Richard D., and Daniel Lerner, Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force, 1:19
Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda, The, by David E. Apter, 1:45
Rothfels, Hans, *Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler*. Reviewed by Henry Pachter, 4:633
Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber, Consensus and Conflict in Indian Politics, 3:385

Sanders, Irwin T., ed., *Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe*. Reviewed by C. E. Black, 4:622
Sayigh, Yusif A., Development: The Visible or the Invisible Hand? 4:561
Schelling, T. C., Arms Control: Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force, 1:1; *The Strategy of Conflict*, reviewed by Morton A. Kaplan, 4:642
Schramm, Wilbur, ed., *One Day in the World's Press: Fourteen Great Newspapers on a Day of Crisis*. Reviewed by Bernard C. Cohen, 1:165
Security of Supply and Energy Policy in Western Europe, by Harold Lubell, 3:400
Shils, Edward, Professor Mills on the Calling of Sociology, 4:600
Snyder, Richard C., International Relations Theory—Continued, 2:300
Social Structure and Political Orientation, by Talcott Parsons, 1:112
sociological problems, *see* Parsons, Shils
Some Aspects of the Economic Development of India: The Problem of Accelerated Reaction, by Karl von Vorys, 4:584
Sources for the History of World War II, by Louis Morton, 3:435
Soviet Union, *see* Ames, Becker, Brzezinski, Kecskemeti, Ploss
Spiro, Herbert J., New Constitutional Forms in Africa, 1:69
Spulber, Nicolas, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe*. Reviewed by C. E. Black, 4:622
Strategy and International Politics, by Morton A. Kaplan, 4:642
Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force, by Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, 1:19

Taubenfeld, Howard J., and Philip C. Jessup, *Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy*. Reviewed by Arnold L. Horelick, 2:323
Teaching of International Relations in the United States, The, by William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, 3:339
Thompson, Kenneth W., *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy*. Reviewed by Robert W. Tucker, 3:461
Thornton, Thomas Perry, Peking, Moscow, and the Underdeveloped Areas, 4:491
Tucker, Robert W., Political Realism and Foreign Policy, 3:461
Turkey, *see* Lerner and Robinson

U.S. economics, *see* Becker, Deutsch and Eckstein, Kuenne, Wexler
U.S. foreign policy, *see* Montgomery, Tucker

View of Soviet Business—Through Window or Mirror? A, by Edward Ames, 3:485
von Vorys, Karl, Some Aspects of the Economic Development of India: The Problem of Accelerated Reaction, 4:584

Welfare Economics and the Military Decision, by Robert E. Kuenne, 3:454
Western Europe, economics of, *see* Gordon, Lubell
Wexler, Imanuel, A Critique of U.S. Commercial Policy, 2:330

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XIII

October 1960—July 1961

Under the editorial sponsorship of
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Published by Princeton University Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS

No. 1—October 1960

Arms Control: Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force	*T. C. Schelling*	1
Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force	*Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson*	19
The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda	*David E. Apter*	45
New Constitutional Forms in Africa	*Herbert J. Spiro*	69
The Bolshevik Past as the First Secretary Likes It	*S. I. Ploss*	77
Comparisons of United States and USSR National Output: Some Rules of the Game	*Abraham S. Becker*	99

Review Articles

Social Structure and Political Orientation	*Talcott Parsons*	112
Perspectives on Personality and Foreign Policy	*Herbert McClosky*	129
De Gaulle's Memoirs: The Hero as History	*Stanley Hoffmann*	140
The Challenge of Communist China	*Robert C. North*	156
The Present and the Press	*Bernard C. Cohen*	165

No. 2—January 1961

The Organization of the Communist Camp	*Zbigniew K. Brzezinski*	175
The Chinese Revolution in Russian Perspective	*Robert Vincent Daniels*	210
Economic Regionalism Reconsidered	*Lincoln Gordon*	231
German Democracy in the 1950's	*Otto Kirchheimer*	254
National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959	*Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein*	267

Review Articles

International Relations Theory—Continued	*Richard C. Snyder*	300
Diversity and Uniformity in Communist Bloc Politics	*Paul Kecskemeti*	313
Outer Space and Earthbound Politics	*Arnold L. Horelick*	323
A Critique of U.S. Commercial Policy	*Imanuel Wexler*	330

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No. 3—April 1961

The Teaching of International Relations in the United States — *William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox* — 339

The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process — *Morton H. Halperin* — 360

Consensus and *Conflict* in Indian Politics — *Susanne Hoeber Rudolph* — 385

Security of Supply and Energy Policy in Western Europe — *Harold Lubell* — 400

A Case Study in the Diplomacy of Social Revolution — *Douglas E. Ashford* — 423

Research Note

Sources for the History of World War II — *Louis Morton* — 435

Review Articles

Welfare Economics and the Military Decision — *Robert E. Kuenne* — 454

Political Realism and Foreign Policy — *Robert W. Tucker* — 461

Electoral Politics and Voting Behavior in Western Germany — *Lewis J. Edinger* — 471

A View of Soviet Business—Through Window or Mirror? — *Edward Ames* — 485

No. 4—July 1961

Peking, Moscow, and the Underdeveloped Areas — *Thomas Perry Thornton* — 491

On Stability in Deterrent Races — *Malcolm W. Hoag* — 505

Invulnerable Retaliatory Capability and Arms Control — *Seyom Brown* — 528

Crossing the Culture Bars: An Approach to the Training of American Technicians for Overseas Assignments — *John D. Montgomery* — 544

Development: The Visible or the Invisible Hand? — *Yusif A. Sayigh* — 561

Some Aspects of the Economic Development of India: The Problem of Accelerated Reaction — *Karl von Vorys* — 584

Review Articles

Professor Mills on the Calling of Sociology — *Edward Shils* — 600

The Politics of Economic Growth — *C. E. Black* — 622

Germany Looks in the Mirror of History — *Henry Pachter* — 633

Strategy and International Politics — *Morton A. Kaplan* — 642

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Little, Brown and Company

U.S. Foreign Policy . . . Important Prospects from LITTLE, BROWN

THE EMERGING NATIONS:

Their Growth and United States Policy

Edited by Max F. Millikan, Director, **and Donald L. M. Blackmer,** Assistant Director, Center for International Studies, M.I.T. *Contributing Authors*: Everett E. Hagen, Daniel Lerner, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Lucian W. Pye, Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, Walt Whitman Rostow, Francis M. Bator, Richard S. Eckaus. A description and analysis of the economic, political and social changes now going on in the underdeveloped countries and their implications for American policy. Based on material originated for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and prepared especially for college use. In paper: Spring 1961. 5 x 8; 192 pages; $2.50

THE UNITED NATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

By Lincoln P. Bloomfield. A new and important look at the ways in which the U.N.'s international machinery and United States long-range interest mesh or conflict. The author, recently the State Department planner on United Nations problems, is now Director of the United Nations Project at M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies. "His findings may come as a shock to those who conceived of the United Nations as something that would do away with power politics."—*N.Y. Times Book Review.* In paper: 5 x 8; 276 pages; $2.50

At all bookstores

SINCE 1837

Boston Toronto

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED